



BONAPARTE.

POLITICAL AND MILITARY


MEMOIRS

OF

EUROPE,

DURING THE YEAR

1799.



BY T. E. RITCHIE.

PART I.

Non nostrum est inter vos tantas componere lites.

EDINBURGH :

PRINTED FOR AND SOLD BY

G. HOUSTON AND CO. NO. 21, PRINCE'S-STREET ;

AND BY CROSBY AND LETTERMAN, NO. 4,

STATIONERS-COURT, LONDON.

1800.

Printed by T. Maccliesh and Co.

Entered at Stationers-Hall.

P R E F A C E.

IT is not without diffidence, that the author of this work, aware of the magnitude of the task he has undertaken, ventures to usher the *first* PART into public notice. In mentioning the motive which induced him to project an historical retrospect of European affairs during the year 1799, it is far from his intention to depreciate the value of the Registers which annually appear ; their character is already established. He will, however, be pardoned for observing, that as the extensive and diversified plan of these publications necessarily obliges their authors to compress the accounts of military operations and political events, many readers may require a greater amplitude of narrative.

MORE anxious to ascertain facts than to embellish his style, he might perhaps plead that the plan of these Memoirs can only be matured by time and experience. The title adopted, and the nature of a periodical work minute in its detail, are generally understood to admit a greater latitude of execution, than regular history requires. The professional critic who is not actuated by private pique, nor influenced by the interested suggestion of his employer, will treat with leniency a production, the writer of which pretends only to the merit of being industrious. At the same time, it may be observed, that the record of sanguinary battles seldom admit

PREFACE.

of varied diction ; while the versatility of negotiators, and the disgusting narrative of civil discord, are but little susceptible of polished language.

AN unconcerned spectator of the bustle of mankind, the author thinks himself entitled to arrogate the epithet of impartial. But although his heart absolves him of intentional error, yet, amidst such a diversity of public occurrences, the accounts of which ever receive the colouring of prejudice and passion, it is possible that mistakes may have been committed. While, however, he professes his wish to correct exceptionable passages, a becoming respect for candour requires, that he should disregard the querulousness of party. The annexed State-Papers will prove of inestimable value to the future historian ; and by occasional reference to them, the reader will have it in his power to form an opinion for himself, without placing implicit confidence in the observations of the writer.

THE publication of the *second* PART will be forwarded with all possible dispatch. But it is obviously necessary to postpone it a few weeks, in order that a multiplicity of circumstances, influencing public events, may be sufficiently developed, so as to enable the author to record facts with fidelity, and warrant him in hazarding political remarks. To one who does not boast of possessing uncommon sources of information, such a delay is indispensable ; it is dictated by a sacred regard for truth, and a sense of the duty he owes to the public.

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ERRATUM.

Memoirs, P. 43. l. 4 — *Distance of* inadvertently used in
the sense of *distance between*.

THE BINDER

Will cancel the first leaf of signature A.

MAP
of the
Seat of War
In
GERMANY, FRANCE,
SWISSERLAND
& ITALY
Eng. for Ritchie's Memoirs of Europe for 1799.
J. M. Smith, London

Scale of Miles
5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80





POLITICAL AND MILITARY

MEMOIRS OF EUROPE

DURING

THE YEAR 1799.

NO period in the history of mankind, since ^{Introduc-} the destruction of the western empire, has ^{tion.} been marked by events of such magnitude as those, which distinguish the conclusion of the present century. After the Gothic and other barbarian nations had consolidated their establishments in Europe, and after Germany and France had been formed into two distinct and independent kingdoms, the political system of the western world seemed to be modelled in such a manner, as to secure it in future against innovation on a general scale. The territories of several inconsiderable princes were, in the lapse of ages, gradually incorporated with the great monarchies by the intermarriages of the sovereigns, or absorbed by the fate of war. Still, however, nations confined themselves to local disputes respecting territorial acquisition, and all quar-

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rels originated from the aggrandisement of particular families ; while the monarch and the chieftain, intrenched behind feudal institutions, set at defiance any popular effort for the amelioration of civil society. In this state of things, several centuries rolled on amidst the gloom of feudalism and the turbulence of barbarous manners ; the warlike virtues were alone the object of the ambition and the esteem of every rank.

A COMMUNITY of rational beings, particularly after the introduction of letters, have a natural tendency to progressive civilization. If a considerable portion of the human race had enjoyed a century of uninterrupted tranquillity, the intercourse of nations, and, what operates as a more powerful cause, the active mind of man, when detached from warfare, and directed towards the arts of peace, would have rapidly advanced social improvement. But the continual recurrence of war, superinduced by the selfish passions of princes and their favourites, too effectually tended to retain the people in ignorance and thralldom. The first ray of light, that illumined Europe, was the invention of printing ; and no sooner was it known, than science, hitherto confined to a few solitary individuals, became, so to say, the property of mankind. It is by the collision of sentiment that truth is elicited ; and the discussions of the learned, although ultimately fatal to the overgrown power and tyranny of the great, promoted the general welfare of nations. The Reformation and religious controver-

sies of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, by teaching men to call in question tenets sanctioned, or rather consecrated, by the credulity of their ancestors, contributed to the diffusion of knowledge, and were attended with benefits, that amply compensated for the temporary convulsions they occasioned. The Protestant princes of Germany were influenced by political as well as religious motives to support Luther, and consequently obliged to foster amongst the people a principle of opposition to the hitherto sacred decrees of councils and kings: thus mankind gained in proportion as the noble and the priest were stript of their usurped prerogatives, which violence and superstition had originally created. The history of this epoch interests the heart: the ultimate success of the Protestant league against that colossal power, which spiritual and temporal villainy conjured up against it, appears even miraculous: we deplore the differences that arose between its members, we weep at their disasters, and we exult in their triumphs. The mind is agonized on contemplating the atrocities, which (to use a forcible expression) ensanguined the sixteenth century. It was then Europe trembled at the frown of her tyrants: it was then that a Henry VIII. a Mary of England, a Philip II. a Catharine de Medecis, a Charles IX. a Henry III. and a Christian II. presided on the throne: it was then that the massacre of St. Bartholomew, and the horrid orgies of Smithfield and Madrid, disgraced the annals of the human species; and that the hallowed rulers of church and state celebrated their union by the immolation of a thousand victims.

As in the physical world a placid calm succeeds the rage of the tempest, it might have been expected, that Europe, glutted with disasters, would have sought and enjoyed a lengthened period of tranquillity; but in the rivalry of nations uncurbed by moral laws that compel obedience, emulation produces rancour, an opposition of interests engenders disputes, and disputes terminate in war and devastation. During the age of chivalry, the ambition of the monarch entailed misfortune on his subjects; during the age of religious controversy, the torch of civil discord spread every where its baleful influence; and during the age of commerce, which comprises the greater part of the present century, obtrusive avarice enkindled afresh the flames of war. We have now approached that period, which may not inaptly be styled the age of politics. At a time not very distant, monarchs, presuming to term themselves the vice-gerents of the Deity, arrogated an uncontrollable authority, which they claimed by a divine and indefeasible right; but in the progress of knowledge, the principles of civil polity have been developed, and sovereigns instructed that the only bases of their title are the consent and affections of their subjects. Yet while this salutary doctrine is acknowledged, the man of gentle and benevolent manners, accustomed to cautious investigation, and taught to believe, that change ought to be produced by the conviction of reason, and not effected by the point of the bayonet, will sincerely lament the precipitate subversion of established institutions, and the

maddening fury of sanguinary and unprincipled factions.

It is not within the sphere of the following work to trace the origin and progress of the French revolution, or the destructive war it has occasioned; neither does it permit our introducing a narrative of the multifarious operations of the preceding campaigns, or of the bloody struggles of the ephemeral factions, which have successively held the reins of government in France. But before entering on a detail of the military and political events during the year 1799, it will be necessary to recur to some anterior transactions, in order to enable the reader to form an accurate idea of the state of Europe at the period, from which we commence our narrative. In doing this, we will have occasion to remark that inflexible spirit of animosity which unhappily pervades the belligerent governments, and deeply to regret its desolating consequences. A cessation of hostilities, however grateful to humanity, is merely a breathing moment for preparation, that both parties may enter the lists with renovated fury. It is only a prelude to wider devastation :---even a solemn treaty becomes a fallacious truce, and every circumstance predicts, that the present contest can alone be terminated by the unqualified triumph of monarchy or republicanism. In vain the friend of peace sighs for its return ; in vain his eye ranges among the neutral sovereigns in search of one, whose power enables, or inclination induces him to part embattled hosts. The calm voice of reason is lost amidst the clangour of arms :

Preliminary remarks.

---impassioned nations have now appealed to the sword, and its destructive edge can alone decide the struggle. To no purpose has the experience of mankind, during two centuries spent in wars concerning abstract principles of religion, demonstrated the folly of those who attempted to stifle them. The thunder of the cannon may dictate obedience, but it cannot convince the understanding : if opinions be groundless, they will expire of themselves, and the common sense of the people will prove triumphant ; but if founded on immutable truths, no violence can eradicate them from the human mind.

1797.

AFTER the conclusion of General Buonaparte's campaign in Italy and Germany by the signing of the preliminaries of peace at Leoben in April 1797, a protracted negotiation ensued relative to the terms of a definitive treaty. It is not our intent to trace the causes, which occasioned this dilatory procedure ; but it may in general be remarked, that as the brilliant victories of the French armies had rendered a temporary suspension of arms, and the evacuation of Germany, indispensable to the preservation and safety of the Imperial house, little sincerity ought to have been expected from an act of necessity ; and accordingly we find, that the Emperor evinced a steady inclination to escape from an unhallowed agreement with heretical republicans. His exhausted state, and the unfavourable aspect of circumstances, deterred him from an immediate renewal of hostilities, while

the acquisition of the Venetian territories soothed his disappointed ambition. Future events have now removed the thin film, which veiled the duplicity of the Imperial ministers ; at the same time we will find reason to accuse the French government of assuming a dictatorial conduct barely warranted by the laws of European policy. 1797.

By the public treaty concluded at Campo-Formio, the Emperor unequivocally acknowledged the Cisalpine republic as an independant power; and as the contracting parties professed to be alike animated with the desire of removing every cause of interruption to the good understanding happily established between them, they mutually bound themselves, in the most solemn manner, to contribute to the utmost of their power to the maintenance of internal tranquillity in their respective states. His Imperial Majesty ceded the late Austrian Netherlands to the French republic, and consented to her possessing, in full sovereignty, all the islands in the Levant, and certain establishments in Albany, formerly belonging to the Venetian state; while the republic on her part consented, that the Emperor should possess Istria, Dalmatia, the Venetian islands in the Adriatic, the city of Venice, and all Terra Firma. This treaty likewise fixes the limits of the Cisalpine republic, and contains a multiplicity of subordinate conditions, which it is not necessary to enumerate. We must, however, state at considerable length the articles of an additional convention, which was signed by the

Public definitive treaty between France and Austria.

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1797. plenipotentiaries on the same day at Campo-Formio.

Secret treaty between these two powers.

HIS Imperial Majesty, by the first article of this secret treaty, consented, that the frontiers of the French republic should extend to the Rhine, and engaged to use his influence, that France, by the peace to be concluded with the empire, should retain that line as its boundary. But if, notwithstanding the mediation of the Emperor, the Germanic body should refuse to consent to the boundary line of the republic, as regulated by this convention, he formally engaged to furnish to the empire no more than his contingent, which should not be employed in any fortified place, or otherwise it should be considered as a rupture of the peace and friendship re-established between Austria and France. The second article stipulated, that the Emperor should employ his good offices, in the ensuing negotiation of peace with the empire, to obtain,---1. That the navigation of the Rhine, from Huninguen to the territory of Holland, should be free both to the French republic and the states of the empire on the right bank;---2. That the possessors of territory near the mouth of the Moselle should, at no time and on no pretence, attempt to interrupt the free navigation and passage of vessels from the Moselle into the Rhine; and, 3. That the republic should have the free navigation of the Meuse, and that the tolls and other imposts from Venloo to Holland should be abolished. His Majesty renounced the

1797.

sovereignty and possession of the country of Falkenstein and its dependencies; and it was agreed, that the countries taken possession of by Austria, in consequence of the sixth article of the public definitive treaty, should be considered as an indemnification for the territory given up by the seventh article of that treaty, and the cession of Falkenstein; but this stipulation was only to be in force, when the troops of his Imperial Majesty should have occupied the countries ceded by these articles. The French republic pledged herself to employ her influence, that the Emperor should receive the archbishopric of Saltzburg, and that part of the circle of Bavaria lying between the archbishopric, the rivers Inn and Salz, and the Tyrol, including the town of Wasserburg on the right bank of the Inn. His Majesty, by the sixth article, consented to give up to the French republic, at the conclusion of peace with the Empire, the sovereignty and possession of the Frickthal, and all the territory belonging to the house of Austria on the left bank of the Rhine, between Zurzach and Basle, provided his Majesty received a proportionate indemnification; but it was stipulated, that the French republic, in consequence of particular arrangements to be afterwards made, should unite that territory with the Helvetic republic, without farther interference on the part of his Majesty or the empire. The seventh article bore, that if the French republic should make an acquisition in Germany by the ensuing peace with the empire, his Imperial Majesty should receive an equivalent;

1797. and if his Majesty should make an acquisition, the republic should in like manner receive an equivalent. By the eighth article, the Prince of Nassau-Dietz, late Stadtholder of Holland, was to receive a territorial indemnification, but not in the vicinity of the Austrian possessions, or of the Batavian republic. France made no difficulty in restoring to the King of Prussia his possessions on the left bank of the Rhine ; it was, however, agreed that no new acquisition should be proposed for his Prussian Majesty, and this stipulation the two contracting powers mutually guaranteed ; but in case he should consent to cede to the French and Batavian republics some small part of his territory on the left bank of the Meuse, the Emperor agreed to use his influence, that such cessions should be accepted and rendered valid by the Germanic body. His Majesty, by the eleventh article, pledged himself not to object to the manner in which the Imperial fiefs had been disposed of by the French in favour of the Ligurian republic, and to use his influence in conjunction with France, that the Diet of the empire should renounce all feudal sovereignty over the countries making part of the Cisalpine and Ligurian republics, as also over the Imperial fiefs lying between Tuscany, the states of Parma, the Ligurian and Lucchese republics, and the adjacent points of the Modenese territory, which fiefs made part of the Cisalpine republic. The twelfth article bore, that the two contracting powers should in concert employ their influence in the course of the negotiation with the empire, that the Electors

of Mentz, Treves, and Cologne, the Elector-Palatine of Bavaria, the Duke of Wirtemberg and Teck, the Margrave of Baden, the Duke of Deux-Ponts, the Landgraves of Hesse-Cassel and Darmstadt, and the other princes and states of the empire, who should suffer any loss of territory or rights in consequence of the stipulations in this convention, or in consequence of the treaty to be concluded with the empire, should receive proportionable indemnifications in Germany, to be settled by mutual agreement with the republic. It was stipulated by the thirteenth article, that the Imperial troops should evacuate the towns and fortresses of Mentz, Ehrenbreistein, Philippsburg, Mannheim, Koenigstein, Ulm, Ingolstadt, and, in general, the whole territory of the empire to the boundaries of the hereditary states, within twenty days after the exchange of the ratifications. And lastly, it was agreed, that these secret articles should have the same force as if inserted in the public treaty of peace, and be ratified at the same time by the two powers, ---the ratifications to be exchanged at Rastadt.

1797.

THE contracting parties had agreed by the twentieth article of the public definitive treaty, that there should be held at Rastadt a congress solely composed of the plenipotentiaries of the German empire and the French republic, for a pacification between these two powers; and that this congress should be opened a month after the signing of the treaty, or as soon as possible. Accordingly, in the beginning of December 1797, the respective pleni-

1797. plenipotentiaries assembled at Raftadt, and continued sitting until the twenty-eighth of April 1799, when the horrid catastrophe occurred, which we will hereafter have occasion to relate.

Military
convention
at Raftadt
between
Austria and
France.

THE French legation at Raftadt was at first composed of the citizens Treilhard and Bonnier, who had acted as plenipotentiaries in the conferences with Lord Malmesbury at Lisle. We are unable to ascertain, whether General Buonaparte was nominated chief plenipotentiary, or repaired to Raftadt on a special mission from the Executive Directory. Circumstances, however, induce us to suppose the latter, and that the object of his journey was to prevent procrastination in the exchange of the ratifications of the public and secret treaties of Campo-Formio, and in concluding a military convention between the republic and the Emperor, which was agreed to on the first of December 1797, and reciprocally guaranteed by that General on the part of France, and by the Counts Cobentzel, De la Tour, and Meerfeldt, on the part of his Imperial Majesty. It was stipulated by this convention, that the troops of the Emperor, and those of the empire in his pay, should evacuate the territory of the empire by the twenty-fifth of December, and withdraw into the hereditary states of his Majesty *beyond the river Inn*; and that his contingent should retire across the Lech, and not be employed in the fortresses of the empire. The troops of the garrison of Mentz were not to amount, on the twenty-fifth of that month, to

more than 15,000 men ; and on the same day, the French army was to evacuate the Venetian territories, of which the Emperor was to take possession ; but it was agreed, that fifteen thousand French troops should remain in these territories, as well to garrison the different fortresses as to maintain order. On the twentieth of December, the Imperial troops were to evacuate Mannheim, Philipsburgh, Ehrenbreitstein, Ulm, Ingolstadt, and Wurtzburg, and restore them to the sovereigns to whom they appertained ; and at the same time the artillery, ammunition, and provisions, belonging to the Emperor in these places, were to be removed by the thirtieth of that month. By the eighth article, the French troops were to blockade Mentz on the tenth, but the communication was to remain open to the Austrians for the purpose of removing the stores. The Imperial plenipotentiaries were to declare to the Diet of the Empire before the eighth of December, that it was the intention of their sovereign to evacuate its territory and fortresses ; and they were also to procure the surrender of Mentz, on the part of the Elector and the empire, to the French troops during the negotiations, so that they might be in possession of the city on the thirtieth ; but if the Elector or Germanic body should refuse their consent, the republic was at liberty to compel them by force. The French generals in the vicinity of Ehrenbreitstein were to afford to the Austrian troops, who evacuated that place, every assistance on their march, and to furnish horses and carriages for the convey-

1797.

1797. —
 ance of artillery and stores. It was likewise stipulated, that the French and Cisalpine troops should, by the thirtieth, evacuate Palma-Nuova, Osoppo, Porto-Legnago, Verona, the two castles, the city of Venice, and the Venetian territory to the line of demarkation; and that the Imperial and French commanders-in-chief in Italy should take all the necessary measures to secure the execution of the sixth article of the treaty of Campo-Formio, and also provide for the removal of every obstruction that might impede the Austrian troops in occupying the territories and fortresses, of which possession was to be given them according to this convention and the secret treaty. And lastly, if magazines of warlike stores and provisions, belonging to the French republic, should remain in these territories and fortresses at the time they were taken possession of by the Imperial troops, all necessary protection and assistance were to be granted for their removal.

Congress at
 Rastadt.

To negotiate with the Germanic body is proverbial for lengthened discussions and vexatious delays, as the variable and jarring interests of the electors and princes render nearly chimerical all hopes of concluding a definitive arrangement. It would extend our introductory retrospect to an inconvenient length, were we to enumerate the various notes and resolutions published during the continuance of the congress; we must therefore confine ourselves to that period and those parts of the negotiations, when the parties seemed ap-

1797.

proaching to a friendly adjustment. No instance ever occurred, that evinced more cogently the futility of affecting concealment of a treaty, as the silence of the French government respecting the secret convention of Campo-Formio, and the military one concluded at Rastadt. Had these been published to the world, France would have been secured from a load of opprobrium, on account of the apparent magnitude of her claims; while the tenor of the treaties would have precluded an useless discussion of the basis of the negociation, and at once intimated the general terms of peace to the whole Germanic body, and exacted compliance. The great potentates of Europe can never be at a loss to ascertain the nature of the most secret treaty;---Jupiter in a shower of gold entered the apartment of the imprisoned Danaë, and won the heart of the fair one. The French ministers, by bringing forward a new demand after the discussion of a former, seemed to regard it merely as the simple effect of the progression of ideas, while this tardy and successive development of their plan was held up to mankind as the foundation of an ambitious project, that threatened the independence and security of Europe.

THE primary points, canvassed at Rastadt, were the cession of all the German territories on the left bank of the Rhine, and the admission of secularization as the basis of indemnity; to these the Deputation of the empire, after a protracted discussion, consented, although with an extreme and ve-

Primary
points can-
vassed at
Rastadt.

1797.

Conclusum
of the depu-
tation of
the em-
pire.

Article I.

Article II.

ry natural reluctance. As the arrangement of the boundary line, which next engrossed the attention of the congress, was less simple in its nature than the preceding, the Imperial ministers availed themselves of its complicated qualities to retard the pacification, until the secret plans, carrying on by the coalesced powers, were sufficiently matured for a successful explosion. After many tedious and lengthened debates, and after the interchange of a multiplicity of notes, the Deputation on the seventh of August formed a *conclusum*, whereby they consented to the abolition of the toll-duties on the Rhine, as the republic had agreed to the suppression of those on the left bank. At the same time, as the loss of these duties required some fixed compensation, the arrangement of which might experience much difficulty and delay, they suggested that the complete suppression ought not to take place for two years, which would give time for securing entirely the free navigation of the river, from its mouth upwards, by means of a convention with the Batavian republic. They likewise consented, that the principal navigable course of the Rhine, formerly called the *Thalweg*, as fixed by scientific men with common consent, should form the future boundary between Germany and France. With regard to the islands in that river, the proposition, that those lying on the right of the *Thalweg* should remain with the empire and those on the left should be ceded to the republic, was perfectly agreeable to the wishes of the Deputation; and they also acceded to the proposal

of the French ministers, that any future change in the channel of the river should not innovate the rights of sovereignty over the islands. The private property of the isles, and the free enjoyment of their produce, were to belong to the present and future proprietors without regard to the stipulated line of separation; and, in addition to these points, the neutrality of the navigation was to be scrupulously observed. Thus far the coincidence of the negotiating parties merits approbation; and when it is recollected, that the numberless and vexatious tolls on the Rhine had hitherto operated strongly against the improvement of the adjacent territories, and nearly amounted to an absolute prohibition of commercial relations, the proposition of the republic, as to the unqualified freedom of the navigation of the river, was founded on a solid and liberal policy, however much it might militate against the revenues of the petty princes in the vicinity, whose affectation of consequence and splendour has hitherto absorbed the industry of their subjects.

THE French plenipotentiaries had represented the existence of the fortress of Ehrenbreitstein as incompatible with the security of Coblenz, and likewise stated it to be the irrevocable demand of their government, that this fortress should be demolished: they had also demanded liberty to retain possession of Kehl and its territory, and the fort of Cassel as an appendage of Mentz. By the third article of this *conclusum*, the Deputation acceded to the "afflicting" proposition, that Ehrenbreitstein should be demo-

Article III.
The demolition of Ehrenbreitstein.

1798. lished after the conclusion of peace ; but this consent was given under the condition, *sine qua non et resolutiva*, that the French government should demolish all the fortified places on the right of the Rhine and the Thalweg, viz. Kehl, Cassel, the fort of Mars, and the isle of St. Pierre ; and that these should be given up to the Empire, and all claims to them, as well as to other places on the same side, solemnly renounced by France. The Deputation farther declared, that, in adopting the resolution to give up in future a bulwark which had hitherto been so useful, they thought themselves entitled to demand in consistency with existing conventions,* that the blockade of Ehrenbreitstein should

* IN consequence of this allusion by the Deputation to a real or pretended convention, the author thought it his duty to make the most assiduous research ; but his enquiry has been fruitless, and he is satisfied that such a convention never existed. In a *conclusum* (6th November) of the Deputation on the subject of re-victualling Ehrenbreitstein, it is mentioned in these words : “ When on the eighteenth April 1797, the suspension of arms was stipulated at Leoben for Germany, and consented to by the parties, the generals-in-chief of the two armies, Werneck and Hoche, agreed on the *eighteenth* of April 1797, “ In case hostilities should recommence, Mentz and Ehrenbreitstein shall be victualled for as many days as the *armistice* shall have lasted. The Austrian generals shall inform the French generals of such victualling, in order that it may be ascertained : it shall be done from week to week during the time the *armistice only* shall last.” Unfortunately for the authenticity of this alledged convention, General Hoche only crossed the Rhine on the *eighteenth*, and afterwards fought the battles of U-

be immediately raised, and the measures discontinued which had been taken to prevent the inhabitants of the Thal from receiving provisions. 1798.

BEFORE proceeding to enumerate the subsequent articles of the *conclusum*, we will take the liberty of hazarding a few remarks on the preceding proposition. We have already mentioned, that his Imperial Majesty, by the thirteenth article of the secret convention at Campo-Formio, agreed to evacuate, among other places, the fortrefs of Ehrenbreitstein, and withdraw his troops to the hereditary states beyond the Inn; but it can no more be virtually inferred from this, that he consented to the cession or demolition of that fortrefs, than of Philipsburg, Mannheim, Ulm, or Ingolstadt, all particularized in the same article. Supposing the par-

Remarks
thereon.

kareth, Altenkirchen, and Dierdorff: and it was not until the twenty-third that he suspended hostilities; on which day he received a dispatch from General Berthier, intimating, not the signing of the armistice with which Hoche was unacquainted, but of the preliminaries of peace. The armistice was signed on the evening of the seventh, and the preliminaries at two in the morning of the eighteenth. It is no argument to say, that so respectable a body as the Deputation would not certainly quote a non-existing convention: do we not find them alluding to the secret treaty of Campo-Formio, the terms of which they either wilfully perverted, or of which they were ignorant? The acquiescence of the Imperial commissioner is of no importance, as his sanction of the article, by which the Deputation refused to cede the Frickthal, as afterwards mentioned, evinces his duplicity.

1798. ties to have negotiated on a footing of liberal equality and material justice, while France claimed the retention of all the fortresses on the left side of the Rhine as necessary to her security, the Empire was entitled, by the same law, to demand the preservation of all those on the right bank as an indispensable barrier against future aggression. Nothing, therefore, could be more vexatious and unjust than the encroachments of the republic on the opposite side of the river, as Germany would thereby have been deprived of every effectual and immediate point of defence to resist invasion: and we cannot help condemning the tame complaisance of the Prussian monarch. The Directory appear, tho' they have not adduced it as an authority, to ground their plea on the seventh article of the secret treaty, by which it was arranged as a presupposition, that if the republic should make an acquisition in Germany by the ensuing peace with the Empire, his Imperial Majesty should receive an equivalent. The proposition of the deputies was liberal and candid, or rather they conceded too much; while the Directory, become arrogant by victory, insisted on a point involving the safety of the north of Germany, and wantonly risked the neutrality of his Prussian Majesty, whose earnest desire for the continuance of peace induced him reluctantly to comply. It must, however, be acknowledged, that there is a wide difference between the demolition and cession of a fortress; and as the arms of France had proved triumphant in the contest, she was entitled to her terms, if not impeded by treaty: at the

same time, she could plead, that a conventional arrangement with his Imperial Majesty did not preclude her obtaining from the Empire the best conditions, which circumstances might enable her to procure.

1798.

THE fourth article of the *conclusum* related to bridges established for the purposes of commerce, respecting which the Deputation persisted in their opinion, that permanent bridges on a river, which served as the boundary between two nations, could not be considered simply as relating to commerce, but also as points of contact connected with political and military operations. These motives had already prevented, in preceding treaties of peace, the erection of bridges of the like kind; and they hoped the French government would not insist farther on the establishment of them. Relative to the possessions of the nobility on the left bank of the Rhine, further discussion was requested; and as to debts attaching to territory on that side of the river, the Deputation pleaded the impracticability of transferring them to demesnes on the right bank: to this last point we will afterwards have occasion to advert. To the cession of the Frickthal, which the Deputation files a new demand, they refused to consent; and this demonstrates the propriety of our observation as to the impolicy of France remaining silent on the terms of the secret convention at Campo-Formio, whereby his Imperial Majesty, as proprietor of the Frickthal, had solemnly agreed to its cession.

The other
articles of
the con-
clusum.

1798.

Conduct of
the Imperial
Legation
and discus-
sion there-
on.

THE Imperial plenipotentiary refused to approve of this *conclusum* : not, however, to obstruct the negociation, he agreed to transmit it to the French ministers without annexing his usual sanction, but took the liberty of suppressing the third article relating to the demolition of Ehrenbreitstein. This circumstance occasioned reiterated discussions in the sittings of the Deputation, and several members warmly expressed their dissatisfaction with the proceeding, as contrary to the instructions of the Empire and its constitution. A formal interview between the Imperial and French plenipotentiaries terminated without effect ; and the deputies, feeling themselves in so unpleasant a situation, adopted a *conclusum* on the seventeenth of August, in which they premised, that, in compliance with their repeated entreaties, the Imperial commissioner had declared to the French ministers, that the Deputation had come to a formal resolution respecting Ehrenbreitstein, but that the importance of the article obliged him to wait the instructions of his court, and that he could not and would not say a word as to his acceding to it, till these instructions were received ; that on being asked whether his declaration was official, and on his answering in the negative, the French ministers replied, that they could not continue a discussion on the subject, but would expect a speedy answer from the Deputation to their last note : in consequence of this, the Deputation now publicly declared, that they had distinctly explained themselves several days ago respecting the points

in the note of the French Legation. The *con-* 1798.
clusum then narrated their resolution as already
mentioned relative to Ehrenbreitstein, and con-
cluded with observing, that as the Imperial Com-
missioner had reserved the power of giving,
in a short time, his necessary declaration on
the subject, the Deputation could only apprise
the French plenipotentiaries of the state of things,
and give them the assurance, that the deputies had
nothing nearer their hearts than to accelerate the
progress of the negociation.

AFFAIRS at this period assumed a very threatening aspect. The Austrians prepared to occupy the country of the Grisons, the majority of whom had rejected a proposed union with Switzerland; and General Shauenburg, the French commander in Helvetia, directed part of his troops to defile towards the Tyrolean and Grison frontiers. Numerous bodies of Russians, in the pay of Great Britain, were advancing through Poland towards Germany; and it is known, that, anterior to this, a triple alliance, the specific terms of which have not yet transpired, but which were avowedly hostile to France, was either concluded, or on the point of being so between Russia, England, and Austria; and to this treaty his Prussian Majesty was to be invited to accede. The diplomatic agents laboured incessantly in consolidating a new coalition, and every thing portended great events: the French government sent reinforcements to their army on the Lahn under General Joubert; but it

Military
prepara-
tions.

1798. is apparent from circumstances, that the positions taken by that general with his inconsiderable forces were intended solely to cover the blockade of Ehrenbreitstein. Although a dilatory and indecisive conduct on the part of the republic was obviously impolitic, the Directory confined themselves to ineffectual preparations, while the Imperial armies were rapidly increasing, and the Emperor of Russia was marching towards his frontier a powerful force to the assistance of his ally. The princes adjacent to France became alarmed, and implored the Deputation of the Empire to hasten the conclusion of a general peace, by making every possible concession not absolutely repugnant to their duty. Among these were the courts of Deux-Ponts, Hesse-Darmstadt, and Baden, the House of Nassau, the Counts of Westphalia and Wetteravia, and others: and they likewise intimated to the French ministers this application, as a proof of their earnest and sincere wish for peace.

Note of the
French plenipotentiaries.

AFTER the interchange of several unimportant notes, the French Legation, on the fourteenth of September, made the following propositions, under the express reserve, that the fortified island of St. Pierre should be immediately ceded to the republic, and that all clauses and conditions annexed to the demolition of Ehrenbreitstein and other demands of the Deputation should be annulled: 1. To remove any fear on seeing the fortified points in the possession of France, the republic renounced all claims to the fortifications of Kehl and Cassel,

1798.

which were to be demolished ; but she wished to retain a tract of territory in the immediate vicinity of these places for commercial purposes. 2. As to the debts, the Deputation certainly could not presume, that the French government would accede to any arrangement calculated to depreciate too sensibly the cession of the left bank, perpetuate the germ of perplexed discussions between the two states, and load a territory, now annexed to France, with the expences of a war carried on by the Empire against her: the French ministers, however, consented, that the provincial and communal debts, with the exception of those contracted on account of the war, should remain charged on the ceded countries, and the rights of third creditors be reserved. And, 3. They declared, that the laws relative to emigration were not applicable to the countries ceded and not united, such as Mentz, and other districts in a similar situation. In this note, the plenipotentiaries observed, that it was in general an error to endeavour to establish, between two contracting powers, a reciprocity of advantages rigorously exact. This balance scarcely ever existed, either in the nature of things, or in the relative state of parties ; and if it were to be admitted in the present negociation, it was manifest, that the consequence would be a real inequality on the side of the republic, as she would thereby not only lose a considerable part of the proportional satisfaction due to her, but also see the importance of the advantages, which she might have preserved, diminished by the effect

1798. of that reciprocity. Such a system, incompatible with any peace whatever, and still less suited to the splendour of the French arms, could never, they averred, be seriously supported by judicious and sincere negociators.

Their second note.

IN a second note bearing the same date, in answer to a demand of the Deputation, that the French troops should evacuate the whole German territory on the right bank of the Rhine, the French ministers stated, that as the abandoning of military positions ought only to be the consequence of a pacification completely effected, there was no urgent reason that the troops of the republic should be withdrawn to the other side of the Rhine. In repeating this observation, which, they said, was essentially just, they took the opportunity to contradict an invidious assertion, which had been assiduously circulated, that the French troops had passed the line of demarkation. This they positively denied, and called on the Deputation to be on their guard against exaggerated or false reports intended to create discord, or perhaps to divert the attention from designs really hostile. No person could be ignorant, that there were certain evils inevitable in passing from a state of war to a state of peace, and it had not been the fault of the republic, that this passage was not happy and rapid. The deputies must be conscious, that they could not labour more efficaciously for the relief and happiness of nations, than by preventing the scourge of war for the future by a speedy pacification. It

was their duty to yield to the wishes, remonstrances, and complaints, of the princes and states of Germany ; while, by so doing, every cause of discontent would cease, and the sentiment of past evils be lost in the enjoyment of a tranquil prosperity. 1798.

It might have been expected from the approximation of the sentiments now expressed by the negotiating parties, that a pacific arrangement would soon have been effected : but a secret influence operated too strongly in preventing it. Intelligence of the brilliant victory gained by the English fleet over that of France at Aboukir, and of the declaration of war by the Ottoman Porte against the republic, had reached Europe, and so intoxicated the allied courts, that they abandoned all pacific ideas, and no longer dissembled their hostile intentions against France. The *conclusa* and notes of the Deputation degenerated into voluminous discussions on the meaning of terms, or an unnecessary recurrence to points already determined. No portion of history is more uninteresting and tiresome by its prolixity, than the sophistry of a diplomatic congress : while, therefore, we omit no article of importance, we will hasten to conclude our narrative of the proceedings at Rastadt ; but before doing so, we must advert to the internal transactions of France, in so far as they tended to influence the negociation.

The probability of a continental war increases.

1798.

Prepara-
tions on the
part of
France.

Message of
the Direc-
tory to the
French Le-
gislation.

THE poignant grief of the French nation, on account of the total destruction of their fleet at Aboukir, soon gave place to sentiments of revenge, which burst forth in impotent menaces and impassioned declamation. In the end of July, General Jourdan, in name of the Military Commission, had proposed a plan for forming a national army to suit every possible emergency; and this plan had received the sanction of the Legislature. Long accustomed to the pæans of victory, but now smarting under the anguish occasioned by so disastrous a defeat, the Executive Directory, on the twenty-third of September, sent a message to the Councils, importing, that the legislative body had been requested to hasten the conclusion of their labours respecting the receipts and expenditure of the current year; but that interests more pressing now demanded measures more energetic, and the exigency of circumstances required extraordinary aids rapidly called forth into action. The object of these exertions was to hasten and secure that peace, which the innumerable victories of the republic had announced to Europe. Nations, weary of the disasters inseparable from war, had placed their hopes of peace on the issue of a congress which had continued for so many months; and every thing seemed to promise, that the sufferings of the continent were about to terminate, and that its governments, armed against France, were on the point of yielding to the voice of humanity and the dictates of reason. In this prospect, which appeared so certain, the Executive Directory negotiated with good faith, and thought

1798.

only of leading the victorious legions of the republic against a perfidious power, hostile to the repose of the world. But that power, foreseeing the tempest, by which she was to be punished, fermenting, and on the point of bursting on her in every direction, had exerted all her efforts to turn it aside. With gold, the fruit of her rapine, she had succeeded in sowing corruption and discord in several courts, reanimating the thirst of vengeance, inflaming certain princes deceived by new illusions, and exciting in those states, which stood most in need of peace, an imprudent desire of rekindling the war. The Directory said, that they could not publish all they had conceived to be their duty to attempt, in order to remove the veil from the eyes of those deluded powers, and prove their own sincerity in the offers of peace; --- the world, however, would one day learn with astonishment, how far the republic, induced by pacific views, had carried her condescension even to governments, which only existed because France forbore to sweep them from the face of the earth. But this moderation of the republic was turned against herself, and the more concessions she made, the greater obstacles were raised to the object in view, while every day premeditated delays were opposed to the conclusion of a general peace. The French nation was tired of such artifices: these were not the days of the monarchy, when its weakness aided the eternal procrastination of a temporising congress; ---and if diplomacy be the art of subterfuge, such art was not suited to republicans. France had proposed peace, but she

1798. wished that the powers concerned would distinctly declare, whether this peace be accepted; and since they hesitated, it became the republic to assume an attitude calculated to put an end to their indecision, and to obtain by force what persuasion had in vain attempted.

SUCH, continued the Directory, was the object proposed, and they would now suggest the means of attaining it in a sure and speedy manner. The wants of the armies were considerable, but the national resources were immense; and it was proper to point them out to those, who might dream of new coalitions, and who were not yet undeceived by the issue of the last: Europe ought to know, that the French republic was still able to sustain an extraordinary crisis without creating the necessity of additional imposts. With regard to the land forces, their quotas were incomplete, and the deficiency required a levy of 200,000 men; while, in the imperious necessity of the moment, the effect of this measure depended on its celerity. "Speak the word, citizens," said they, "and let these two hundred thousand warriors start from the ground at your command." The naval force ought also to correspond with the efforts by land, and the fleets of the republic shew themselves more terrible after the moment of disaster. There was no occasion to examine the history of ancient republics in order to prove the nascent elasticity, which every check communicated to the energy of free

nations. In 1794 the army of the north retreated 1798.
under the walls of Valenciennes, only to recover
the impulse which carried it to the Texel;—
and that of the Sambre and Meuse availed itself
of a similar impetus to bound over the Rhine.
No doubt could be entertained of the zeal and
ardour, by which the seamen would be ani-
mated; but zeal could effect nothing without
immense preparation, and on this object vast funds
and productive payments must be bestowed.

AFTER giving some financial statements, the Di-
rectory proceeded to observe, that the same resour-
ces, which had effected the revolution, must com-
plete the work; and that the national domains
still presented means superior to those, which the
pressure of circumstances required. They called
on the councils to decide the success of the nego-
ciation by immediately completing the army with
the two hundred thousand soldiers required, and by
giving to the fleets the means necessary to enable
them to multiply their attacks against the cabinet
of London, on the seas which it controuls, in the
Indies which it oppresses, and even in the heart of
its own island. “Teach our enemies,” concluded
they, “that the French people, indignant at the
delays and refusals opposed to their views of conci-
liation, are prepared to terminate the war of liber-
ty. Let us finish it, if necessary, by the utter de-
struction of those who resist our power: in fine,
hold forth the republic presenting in one hand the

1798. olive of peace, and in the other suspending the
 ——— thunder of war."

Measures
 adopted in
 conse-
 quence of
 this mes-
 sage

THIS infuriate message, calculated to intimidate the enemies of the republic, was referred to a military committee, who, as urgency had been declared, made an immediate report, which was approved by the councils. By this plan, two hundred thousand men entered in the military register, who had attained their twentieth year, and composed the first class of the military conscription, were called into active service in the army; and if those registered in the first class should not amount to the number wanted, the Directory were authorised to complete the levy by calling on the youngest registered in the second class. To stimulate the people, the legislative body published an address to the French nation, reminding them of the laurels they had earned in the field: it is replete with invectives against thrones and kings, and, as might be expected, particularly clamorous against England.---Had these energetic measures been carried into effect with proper activity, the French armies would not have experienced the calamitous reverses they met with in the beginning of the present campaign.

Transac-
 tions at
 Rastadt.

WHILST Europe resounded with military preparations, the re-victualling of Ehrenbreitstein engrossed the attention of the negociators at Rastadt; and as the French troops were intitled by the treaty of Campo-Formio to occupy the surrounding coun-

1798.

try, they did not think it prudent, in the present equivocal state of affairs, to permit the introduction of the necessary supplies. Every other point became an article of inferior consideration; both parties charged each other with delays, and boasted of their concessions. The Prussian Legation were alarmed, and presented a memorial to the French plenipotentiaries respecting that important fortress; but no representation could influence the resolution of the Directory. In vain note followed on note, and memorial on memorial; the approach of winter, and, still more, the absence of his Russian auxiliaries, seem to have prevented the Emperor from resolving on an immediate rupture; while a speedy conclusion of every difference appears to have been regarded by his Prussian Majesty, and the majority of the Germanic body, as the only mode of saving the Empire from the calamities of war. The Deputation, therefore, acceded to every proposition in the late French notes, and on the eleventh of December the Imperial commission, to prevent a direct breach, communicated the *conclusum* accepting the *ultimatum* of the plenipotentiaries of the republic. This acceptance, however, was mere finesse on the part of Austria; for as the allies were now in a powerful state of preparation, and war was inevitable, the acquiescence of the Imperial commissioner in the French *ultimatum* was only a subterfuge to obtain the re-victualling of Ehrenbreitstein. Had the Directory complied with this measure, that fortress, on the commencement of hostilities, would have occupied a considerable

1798. army for a twelvemonth, as it can only be taken by blockade. --- We must here leave this chaos of discordant interests, and, after giving a concise view of the relative state of the different powers, direct our attention to Italy, where a premature disclosure of their hostile designs, and imprudent accession to the new combination against France, in a few days precipitated from their thrones two of the minor potentates of Europe.

England.

WHILE the insular situation of England secures her from the invasive attempts of an enemy, it also points out the impolicy of engaging in a continental war. Her pecuniary resources transcend calculation, and the victories of her fleets guarantee her safety amidst the convulsions that agitate Europe; but a population, which may be termed scanty when compared with the multitudinous nations of the continent, disables her from singly undertaking military expeditions against them with any prospect of ultimate success. In distant regions, the operations against an enemy's colonial settlements participate of a maritime nature; and in these her plans are generally crowned with a fortunate issue.

HOWEVER deeply we may lament the inconsiderate rashness of the British cabinet in precipitating this country into the present war, and however much we may condemn the sophistry employed to vindicate that step, the only question now is, in what manner Britain can recede with honour and

safety. When in 1797 Lord Malmesbury proved 1798.
unsuccessful in his endeavours to negotiate at Lisle,
the minister had the momentary candour to declare,
that his government had committed a mistake in calculating
the resistance of France. Yet, as if destitute of any fixed
resolution or specific object, and guided solely by chance
and temporary expedient, he grasps at some ephemeral
success, not for the wise purpose of pacification, but to
further some crude undigested project of restoring
monarchy in France. It requires, however, but little
penetration to discover, that from such versatile
policy, incorrigible by reason or experience, no real
benefit can possibly ensue. Had the court of London
uniformly declared, that the resources of the country
would not be dissipated in attempts against the
constitution and independance of France, and that every
effort would be confined to measures of defence, and
curbing the inordinate ambition of the republic, an
avowal so explicit and generous would have received the
united approbation of the people ;...for assuredly there
exists not, within the circuit of our sea-girt isle,
a being so unprincipled as to meditate the degradation
of his country.

As our military operations in Europe seem to have
been injudiciously planned, or tardily executed,
permanent success was not to be expected : yet the
acquisitions of Britain in other quarters have been
respectably extensive, and her naval glory has soared
beyond the ken of history. If the

1798. French republic was inflexibly retentive of her own territorial aggrandisement, England was certainly entitled to claim an equivalent ; for, however unfortunate the Imperial arms had been, this country had sustained no loss that could intitle the enemy to assume an imperious tone. France indeed had been grossly injured ; assailed by a formidable combination, she had victoriously compelled all her continental foes to solicit peace ; and now, liberated from hostilities on her frontiers, and indignant at the conduct of Britain that had conjured up so many storms against her nascent liberties, she resolved on revenge. It appears, however, from the papers published relative to the Irish rebellion, that the Directory had determined to conclude a peace with Britain, if terms worthy of their acceptance could have been obtained : . . . and this ought to deter the disaffected from rising in arms against the established government, in hopes of aid from France, which employs them only in furthering her own purposes, and deceitfully sacrifices them as the price of her own aggrandisement.

France.

Russia.

Thus baffled in their efforts, whether sincere or insincere, the British ministry had now no other alternative than to persevere in the contest. The years 1797 and 1798 were spun out in a kind of armed neutrality, signalised by no operation of consequence, with the exception of two or three naval victories rather brilliant than useful. The cautious policy of Russia had been hitherto confined to menacing declamation ; but scarcely was

its Amazonian sovereign deposited in the tomb, 1798.
when her successor formed the heroic design of saving Europe by overturning the republican constitution of France. Yet however arduous might have been the execution of this task, it is perhaps no less difficult to assign a justifiable reason for attempting it.

THE British minister had bent all his soul to organise a new confederacy against France : mutual necessity, therefore, and a congeniality of political views, soon matured a connection between the courts of London and St. Petersburg. Our history records, that, during the American war, the Indian with his scalping knife was in the pay of Britain ; and the reader will recollect the memorable burst of eloquence, which a defence of that measure by a minion of the day drew from the venerable Chatham. Posterity will read, perhaps not with a sentiment of approbation, that, in the present war, the Pactolean stream of the British treasury swept the Tartar and the beastly Siberian from their deserts, and impelled them to the plains of Lombardy, and the banks of the Rhine. The finances of Russia, altho' they exceed the ordinary expenditure, do not admit of distant and tedious warfare, plunder being the chief support of the soldier during hostilities. Accordingly, in his bargain or treaty with Britain, the Russian minister arranged, with the minute exactness of a pawnbroker, every item of expence, all of which was to be borne by the former.

1798.

 IN consequence of the stipulations of that treaty, his Imperial majesty directed the greater part of his troops, even from his most distant Asiatic possessions, towards the German frontier, the inhabitants of which recognised with fear and astonishment the ferocious bands of this modern Attila. They dreaded, and with justice, that a soldiery, who regarded even train oil and black bread as delicious viands, would not be over-scrupulous as to the social distinctions of *meum* and *tuum*.

Prussia.

EARLY in 1798, a new coalition, as we have already mentioned, had been projected between Russia, England, and Austria; and every effort unsuccessfully made to induce Prussia to join it. These courts had congratulated themselves on the death of the late Prussian monarch, and fondly expected that his youthful successor would yield to a very natural hatred of republicanism, and unite in their hostile projects against France. But these hopes were completely disappointed; for no sooner had the new sovereign ascended the throne, than he remarked the impolicy of dissipating the resources of his dominions, interrupting their tranquillity, and perhaps endangering the existence of his sceptre, by operations that behoved inevitably to debilitate himself in proportion as they tended, in case of success, to aggrandise his rival, Austria. The cabinet of Berlin, ever since the conclusion of peace with the republic, had been in a manner besieged by the ministers and envoys of the allied

courts, while entreaties, promises, and threats, were alternately employed. Its neutrality, however, was perhaps less the effect of inclination than of political prudence : but while the coalition resounded every where the clamour of a social and religious war, the friendly connection between Prussia and France demonstrated to mankind, that the latter power was as fully competent, as any of the old monarchies of Europe, to maintain the accustomed relations of amity and peace. 1798.

THE Austrian states were no sooner liberated from the French armies, than the cabinet of Vienna forgetting the dangers it had lately experienced, and as if indignant at its humiliation, betrayed a decided inclination to avail itself of the first favourable incident in the chapter of accidents again to measure swords with the republic. Altho' his Imperial Majesty had acknowledged the Cisalpine republic by the treaties of Campo-Formio, yet he inflexibly refused to receive its ambassador, and by this conduct unequivocally indicated a determined spirit of hostility, which was fostered by his growing intimacy with Russia, and the prospect of extensive assistance from that powerful state. Two years of peace had, in a considerable degree, remedied former disasters, and enabled him to form a gallant and numerous army ; but the auspicious moment of action was not yet arrived, as the Russian auxiliaries were at too great a distance from the French and Italian frontiers to afford certain and immediate aid, in case of a very probable success in the field. Austria.

1798.

Spain.

ALTHOUGH Spain, by her connection with the French republic, had involved herself in a war with Britain, the feeble efforts she made testified her internal debility, and perhaps may be partly ascribed to a disinclination to the new system of politics she had embraced. In the close of the year 1798, the island of Minorca was taken by the English, the acquisition of which was of great importance, as it facilitated the operations of the British fleet in the Mediterranean, and increased the means of annoying the enemy's coasts. Holland, with a disabled marine, a contracted territory, a ruined commerce, and the loss of all her colonial establishments, was in the lowest stage of depression. Denmark and Sweden, at a distance from the theatre of war, wisely cultivated the arts of peace, and reaped the benefits of an increasing commerce and improved manufactures, uninterrupted by the ebullitions of that political frenzy, which devastated the fairest portion of Europe.

Holland.

Denmark
and Swe-
den.

Sardinia.

Tuscany

THE English and Russian cabinets had laboured so successfully in forming a new combination against France, by inciting the hopes of some and the fears of others, and by liberal promises of aid to all, that leagues offensive and defensive had been concluded between these two powers, Austria, Naples, and the Ottoman Porte. The King of Sardinia and the Duke of Tuscany, naturally alarmed at the formation of the new republics surrounding their dominions, appear to have inconsiderately entered into connections inimical to

France. His Sicilian Majesty's hostile disposition betrayed itself in the reception he gave to the English fleet before and after the battle of Aboukir, and in admitting them into his ports beyond the number prescribed by the treaty of seventeen hundred and ninety-six. Not satisfied with this imprudence, he sought every opportunity to lavish his contempt on the accredited agents of the republic, while his open and extensive preparations for war left no doubt respecting the nature of his intentions. *

1798

Naples.

IN the month of August, the glorious epoch of Lord Nelson's victory, the King of Naples issued a proclamation, declaring every male, from seventeen to forty-five years of age, liable to be called into active service; and it is not unworthy of being remarked, that the chief pretence, advanced for this measure, was the danger arising from the Barbary states since the reduction of Malta by the French. The rigorous enforcement of this and some subsequent edicts created much popular discontent; and another cause of chagrin arose from the despotic conduct of the Neapolitan government towards the persons imprisoned on account of their political sentiments. Altho' opinions, to become amenable to the laws of society, must assume the appearance of overt acts, yet the court party, refining on this general principle, asserted, that whoever entertained sentiments, different

Internal
policy of
Naples.

* THE French government published several intercepted letters, indicating the views of the Neapolitan and Sardinian cabinets: some of these may be seen in Appendix, No. I.

1798. from the established creed of the state, was inimical to it, and consequently merited punishment. Accordingly, several persons, and among others the sons of some of the first noble families in the kingdom, who had been liberated on their trials, were again thrown into prison. But the majority of the judges, unbiassed by court influence, persisted in their decrees of acquittal on revising their sentences by a special order of the monarch.

Treaty between
Great Britain and
Naples.

A CONVENTION, entered into by Great Britain and Naples on the eleventh of June 1798, was afterwards modelled into a regular treaty of alliance, which was concluded on the first of December following. His Britannic Majesty engaged, during the continuance of the war against France, to maintain a fleet superior to that of the enemy in the Mediterranean; while the King of Naples was, on his part, to furnish a certain number of ships of war to co-operate with the English, and also three thousand seamen to serve on board their fleet while acting in that sea. It was further stipulated, that all the harbours of the Two Sicilies, without exception, should be open to the English, with liberty to procure the necessary stores; but that these harbours should be shut against French ships of war and merchant vessels, and all trade and intercourse of his Majesty's subjects with France prohibited. The contracting parties likewise agreed, that the ships of other nations should not be suffered to convey provisions, or naval and military stores, from the ports of Naples to those of France.

THE treaty of alliance between Russia and Naples was signed at St. Petersburg on the twenty-eighth of the same month of December, the distance of the two courts having retarded its completion till that period. Their Majesties guaranteed to each other, not only their present states and possessions, but what they might acquire by future treaties. This clause seems to corroborate the opinion we have hazarded, that his Sicilian Majesty intended to annex the whole or part of the Roman state to his own dominions. It was agreed, that as the destructive views of the present government of France threatened the security of every well-organised state, the contracting parties would not only ward off every danger from themselves and their allies, but also endeavour to restore the governments which had been overthrown by the French, and to reinstate the lawful owners in their possessions. His Imperial Majesty promised, besides the co-operation of his fleet with that of the Porte in the Mediterranean, to assist the King of Naples with a stipulated number of troops, which were to march to Zara in Dalmatia, and be conveyed from thence in Neapolitan vessels. But the Emperor, with that worldly wisdom characterising his interposition in the deliverance of Europe from French thralldom, particularly stipulated, that his Sicilian Majesty should pay the sum of 180,000 roubles, as a *douceur*, besides the expence of maintaining the Russian troops in provisions, forage, pay, &c. during their co-operation with the Neapolitan forces. The subordinate stipula-

1798.

Treaty between Russia and Naples.

1798. — tions of this treaty, and of that between Naples and Great Britain, it is unnecessary to detail. We are unable to narrate the terms of the convention between his Sicilian Majesty and the Emperor and King, as it has not hitherto been communicated to the public; and conjecture, when founded only on vague and fugitive information, is unwarrantable in a work, where it is wished not to introduce any thing, to which authenticity is not generally attached.

Want of
concert in
the plans of
the allies.

As a last effort to seduce the King of Prussia from his neutrality, and in order to quicken the operations of his Imperial Majesty by a liberal grant of pecuniary aid, Mr Thomas Grenville was dispatched from England on the fifteenth of December. He was however prevented from landing, by the inclemency of the weather, until the first of February, when he reached the mouth of the Elbe, where the Proserpine frigate that conveyed him was wrecked; but the crew and passengers were saved. His mission to Berlin, altho' seconded by the Russian and Austrian ministers, proved ineffectual. The Kings of Naples and Sardinia, abandoned to their fate, were stript of their continental dominions, and the Emperor's indecision lost him the fair opportunity of re-conquering Italy, at a time when he would have had little opposition to encounter,---while the inhabitants of the new governments were dissatisfied with the suppression of the monasteries and convents, and the fermentations in the Cisalpine republic,

on account of the forced innovations in its constitution, were still unappeased. This want of coincidence in the views of the allies, and of concert in their plans, predicted the fatal issue of their measures. An immediate declaration of war by the Emperor, however much the severity of the winter season might have retarded active operations, would have retained the French troops in the north of Italy, and thereby secured to his Sicilian Majesty an easy conquest of the Roman republic. The superior number of the Austrian forces rendered it unnecessary to postpone that measure until the arrival of the Russians; for it will hereafter appear, that the reverses, experienced by the French armies, had begun, and were confirmed, before these auxiliaries reached the scene of action in Italy.

1798.

WITH a view to prevent further procrastination on the part of Austria, or induced by the precipitate councils of his minister Acton and the English party, the King of Naples left his capital in the month of November, and in person took the command of his troops encamped at San-Germano. As a prelude to this step, he addressed to his subjects a letter or proclamation, which was the only manifesto he published, and contained a singular effusion of royal condescension and piety. The revolutionary principles, which have incited so terrible a combustion in Europe, have been productive of one good effect;---by divesting sovereigns of the fancied divinity that formerly encircled a

Commence-
ment of
hostilities
by Naples
against
France.

1798. throne, they have taught them the necessity of courting the affections of their subjects, as the only genuine basis of their authority.

The King's
pious letter
to his sub-
jects.

IN this letter after premising that he had exerted every effort, for almost forty years, to render his faithful people happy, and succour them in the calamities it had pleased God to send, the King informed them, that he was now to leave his beloved country for the sole purpose of defending their holy religion nearly overthrown, to re-animate divine worship, and to secure to his people, and to their children, the enjoyment of the blessings which the Lord had given. "Had I been certain," continued his Majesty, "of attaining that object by any other sacrifice, believe me, I would not have hesitated a moment to prefer that alternative. But what hopes of success could be entertained after the many fatal examples, with which you are acquainted! I set out, therefore, at the head of the brave defenders of their country, full of confidence in the Lord of Hosts, who will guide our steps, and shield our operations. I go to brave all danger with the greatest cheerfulness, because I do it for my fellow-citizens, for my brothers, for my children; . . . such I have ever considered you. Be always faithful to God and to her whom I leave in my stead to conduct the government of these states,---to my dear and well-beloved consort. To you then I recommend your tender mother; to you I recommend my children, who are not more mine than they are yours. At all e-

vents, remember that you are Neapolitans, that those are brave who are willing to exert their courage, and that it is better to die gloriously for God and our country, than to live shamefully oppressed. Meanwhile, may God bestow upon you all the blessings and the happiness, which is the wish of him, who is, and while he lives shall be, your most affectionate father and sovereign." 1798.

THE Neapolitan army began its march into the Roman territory on the twenty-third of November, and commenced hostilities by attacking the French troops in every direction. As this operation, however, had not been preceded by any declaration of war, General Championnet, the commander-in-chief of the French troops stationed in the Roman republic, thought it incumbent on him, before adopting any hostile measure, to demand an eclaircissement from General Mack, who had been invited from the service of Austria, and appointed Captain-General of the Neapolitan forces. With this view he sent a letter to that officer, in which he reminded him, that peace still existed between Naples and France; that the ambassadors of the two governments, and all their diplomatic agents, still resided at Paris and Naples, and finally, that nothing had dissolved the amicable ties established by the last treaty between the republic and his Majesty. Invested by his government with the command of the army destined to protect the independence of the Roman republic, he was responsible to it for every breach of that indepen-

Military operations.

Nov.

Championnet's letter to General Mack.

1798. dence. In these circumstances, to summon the French troops to evacuate their posts and the Roman territory, the defence of which was intrusted to them, was to violate the rights of nations, which did not warrant the solemn aggression of one government against another, until after a public declaration of war. He, therefore, requested an explanation of the conduct of the Neapolitan commander, in summoning the advanced corps of the French army to abandon their posts, and menacing them in case of refusal.

General
Mack's answer.

GENERAL Mack, in his answer, declared, that the army of his Sicilian Majesty, which he had the honour to command under the King in person, had crossed the frontier in order *to take possession of the Roman state*, which had been revolutionized and usurped since the peace of Campo-Formio, and had never been recognised or acknowledged by his Majesty, or his august ally the Emperor and King. He demanded, that General Championnet should instantly order the French troops, stationed in the Roman state, to evacuate the fortresses they occupied, and retire into the Cisalpine republic. The Generals, commanding the different columns of the Neapolitan forces, had received the most positive directions not to commence hostilities, if the French troops should withdraw, in consequence of the notice he had given; but they were also ordered to have recourse to force in case of opposition. He farther intimated, that he would consider it as an act of hostility, should the French

troops enter the territory of the Grand Duke of Tuscany: and he demanded a reply from the French general within four hours at farthest after receipt of his letter, adding, that the answer must be positive and categorical, both with respect to the demand of evacuating the Roman state, and of not entering the Tuscan dominions; that a negative one would be considered as a declaration of war; and that the King would thereupon carry his just claims into immediate effect.---It will not escape the reader's attention, that neither his Majesty, nor General Mack, ever charged the French republic with having committed or threatened any direct aggression against Naples.

1798.

WHEN intelligence of these transactions arrived at Paris, war was immediately declared against the Kings of Naples and Sardinia, and a manifesto, announcing the causes of that proceeding, published by the government. It began with observing, that Europe had long resounded with details of the perfidy of Naples, and must have remarked with astonishment the magnanimous moderation of France, which had manifested the sincerest wish to cultivate peace with his Sicilian Majesty. Superior to the just indignation provoked by that court in so many ways, the Executive Directory received, with the purest sincerity, the first proposition of re-establishing a good understanding between the two states, and made no other use of the power which victory gave them than for the purpose of pacification; in fine, all the advan-

Manifesto
of the
French re-
public.

1798. tages of the treaty were reciprocal, as if the successes of the war had been equal. This generosity, observed the Directory, should have for ever stifled the malevolent disposition of the Neapolitan cabinet; but instead of feeling a sense of gratitude for its preservation, it embraced without reserve all the hopes to which the idea of the destruction of the republic gave rise, and took advantage of peace for the sole purpose of secretly concerting hostilities.

THE message then enumerated various instances of the infraction of the treaty, and presented convincing proofs of the hostile conduct of his Majesty, all which were indeed too notorious to be denied; for the Neapolitan cabinet, blinded by its resentment, courted publicity in these points. As the manifesto is too long for insertion here, and insusceptible of abridgement, we must content ourselves with referring the reader to the appendix, where that interesting state paper is given at length.* The charges, brought against the King of Sardinia, were not merely confined to violations of his treaty with France; but were of a description, which, it is hoped, has been surcharged by the angry passions of the Directory. We can believe in the nomination of French emigrants to places of trust and high military command, in the encouragement openly given to the refractory priests, in the hostile movements of the Piedmontese troops, and in the intrigues and inimical disposition

* See Appendix, No. II.

of the cabinet: we can even give credit to the numberless assassinations of the French, in which, perhaps, some persons in authority may have been implicated by connivance or otherwise. But to believe, that so vast and atrocious a system of murder was deliberately planned by the Sardinian court, presupposes such a disregard of every law human and divine, that stronger evidence than the assertion of an enemy is necessary to establish it. 1798.

HOWEVER great might be the valour of the republican armies, and however consummate the military skill of their generals, the tardy conduct of the French government, and its state of im preparation against this attack of the King of Naples, were pusillanimous and impolitic in the extreme. The paucity of regular troops in the Roman state, and the feeble resources of an infant republic, whose narrow tract of territory stretched along the Neapolitan frontier, promised an easy conquest to an army formidable by its numbers, and headed by the sovereign in person. General Championnet felt the necessity of withdrawing his scattered advanced-posts, and concentrating his few Polish and French troops, who, although reinforced by some Roman levies, by no means authorized him to hazard the issue of an engagement. It was further necessary to wait for instructions from the Directory, or from General Joubert the commander-in-chief of the army of Italy, and at the same time make such arrangements in Rome, as might secure the tranquillity of the city.

The French
evacuate
Rome.

1798.

INFORMATION having been received that a Neapolitan column was penetrating in the direction of Tivoli, the French, in order to retard the progress of the enemy, broke down the bridge across the Teverone at that place. As Rome however is not tenable against a superior force, and as the republican troops were unable to make head in the numerous points in which the enemy approached, prudence dictated the necessity of evacuating the capital, and retiring to a position, which might secure a retreat, and facilitate supplies. Accordingly on the twenty-sixth, the French army, after leaving a garrison in the Castle of St. Angelo, fell back to Civita-Castellana, and was followed by the French commissioners, the Roman consuls, the senate, the tribunes, the constituted authorities, and part of the national guard. All this was effected without the smallest disturbance in the city; altho' some Frenchmen, who did not accompany the army, but withdrew towards the Tuscan frontier, were very ill treated at Viterbo and Aqua-Pendente, by the inhabitants incited by the priests, whose sinister practices the ill-timed leniency of the French generals had overlooked.

Brilliant
entry of
the King
of Naples
into Rome.

THE arrival of the Neapolitan troops at Rome was marked by some ridiculous, and, what is more to be lamented, sanguinary acts. His Majesty entered it on the twenty-ninth, and all the streets through which he passed in his way to the Farnesian palace were spread with carpets, and strewed with flowers. A numerous body of cardinals and

1798.

clergy followed in the train of the royal army ; and on reaching the city, this multitude, decorated with crosses, ribbons, and other gilded trappings of catholicism, paraded the streets in honour of the blessed virgin and all the saints, while the churches resounded with *Te deum* and hymns of victory. But this effusion of piety was tarnished by furious zeal, and unbridled licentiousness : great numbers of those who had chimed in with the republican government after its establishment, and among others the sons of several noble families, were put to death ; while the Jews, who had made the acquisition of civil liberty by the late revolution, and were therefore strongly attached to it, were abandoned to indiscriminate oppressions.

WE have now to record a summons which General Mack sent to the garrison of the castle of St. Angelo ; and as it, among other articles, was made a charge against that commander, when he afterwards surrendered to the French, we think proper to introduce it at greater length than is usual in historic detail. --- The Neapolitan general, Bouchard, was directed to inform the governor, that the commander-in-chief of the royal army learned with the most lively indignation that the garrison dared to fire on his troops ; the more so, as General Championnet had notified, that he would evacuate Rome without making the smallest exception. " He desires me," said General Bouchard, " to declare to you, that all the French sick in the hospitals at Rome, as well as the guards

Summons
of General
Mack to
the garri-
son of St.
Angelo.

28th.

1798. left there by your General, and now detained as prisoners, will be considered as hostages; and that every shot, which you may fire upon the Neapolitan forces, shall be followed by the death of a French soldier, who will be given up to the just indignation of the inhabitants." Mack himself transmitted a copy of this letter to Championnet, who did not deign to make any reply. *

* THE following answer, however, was sent to General Mack by General Macdonald.

"HEAD-QUARTERS at Monterosi, 29th November 1798.—The Commander-in-chief, Sir, has sufficient confidence in me to recognise as his own this reply to your letter of twenty-eighth November. I well know, that he has not given any answer to your letters respecting the evacuation of the forts and other places of strength, and we consider the Castle of St. Angelo as one of these. The silence of contempt was certainly what was due to your insolent menaces on that subject; and it was the only answer that could be expected, consistently with the dignity of the French name. You speak of a regard for justice! and yet you invade the territory of a republic in alliance with France, without provocation, and without its having given you the least reason for such conduct. You have attacked the French troops, who trusted in the most sacred defence,—the law of nations, and the security of a treaty. You have fired at our flags of truce in their way from Tivoli to Vicavero, and you have made the French garrison at Rieti prisoners of war. You have attacked our troops on the heights of Terni, and yet you do not call that a declaration of war!

"FORCE alone, Sir, constrained us to evacuate Rome: but believe me, (and you, Sir, know better than any one what I assert,)

IN the invasion of the Roman territory the Neapolitan army advanced in two grand divisions; the one, headed by the monarch, in the direction of the capital, and the other along the shore of the Adriatic towards Ancona, while an intermediary corps, proceeding by Narni and Otricoli, traversed the banks of the Nera to its confluence with the Tiber. A French detachment under General Rusca marched to Porto-Fermo on the Adriatic, and, altho' labouring under every privation, attacked the Neapolitan division at that place, who were seconded by a formidable train of artillery, and a considerable body of cavalry. After an engagement of two hours, the Neapolitans retreated with precipitation, abandoning all their tents and baggage, forty covered waggons, thirty pieces of cannon, and six hundred prisoners.

1798.

Engage-
ment at
Porto-Fer-
mo.

assert,) that the conquerors of Europe will avenge such proceedings. At present, I confine myself merely to stating our injuries;—the French army will do the rest. I declare to you, Sir, that I place our sick, the commissary of war, Valville, and the other Frenchmen who remain at Rome for the purpose of taking care of the sick, under the safeguard of all the soldiers you command. If one hair of their heads be injured, it shall be the signal for the death of all the Neapolitan army. The French republicans are not assassins; but the Neapolitan generals, officers, and soldiers, who were taken prisoners of war, on the day before yesterday, on the heights of Terni, shall answer with their heads for the safety of the former. Your summons to the commander of the fort of St. Angelo is of such a nature, that I have made it public, in order to add to the indignation and horror inspired by your threats, which we despise as impotent."

1798.

The Neapolitans occupy Leghorn.

DURING this operation on one side of the peninsula, a naval expedition was projected and executed on the other. A squadron of English and Portuguese men of war, having on board a corps of seven or eight thousand Neapolitans, appeared off Leghorn, when the commander of the troops requested permission of the governor to land them, at the same time menacing in case of refusal to effect his purpose by force. The general-commandant of the city, the civil authorities, and a deputation of the merchants, assembled to deliberate on this summons, and immediately resolved, in consideration of the impossibility of defence, to comply under the express, although frivolous and impracticable condition, that the neutrality of the place should be respected. Much obloquy was thrown on General Buonaparte for occupying Leghorn during his Italian expedition; but similar acts of disregard for the law of nations must convince the world, that the allied powers feel no repugnance to imitate occasionally the conduct of the French. This expedition to the Tuscan territory would induce us to suppose, that it was projected to inclose the French troops in the Roman republic, by forming a junction between the division at Leghorn and that approaching Ancona by Porto-Fermo. If such was General Mack's intention, it was certainly imprudent to press too strongly on Championnet's army occupying the right of the Tiber from Nepi to Civita-Castellana, instead of amusing him by feigned attacks. He ought not, by a rash confidence in his numbers, to have debilita-

ed his effective strength in the field, or wasted his time in taking possession of Rome with a large proportion of his forces. But perhaps the supposition, that so bold and masterly a plan existed, does too much honour to the shallow capacity of the Neapolitan government. At all events, it was rendered nugatory by the battle of Porto-Fermo, the subsequent rout of the Neapolitan troops, and the premature eagerness of his Sicilian Majesty to occupy the throne and capital of the Cæsars. 1798.

It has been insinuated, that the Grand-Duke might have prevented this aggression, if he had not secretly approved it ; a suggestion which is corroborated by the threat of General Mack in his letter to Championnet, that he would consider it as an act of hostility, if the French should enter the Tuscan state. Yet this implied acquiescence does not accord with the pacific disposition of his Royal Highness, who, during the whole course of the war, had earnestly sought to maintain neutrality, while the physical situation of his territories between the contending parties exposed him to their alternate violences. Hitherto the wise policy of his minister Manfredini had extricated him from danger, and it seems to have succeeded on this occasion : at the same time it ought to be remarked, that the weakness of the French troops in Italy, and the risk of embroiling themselves with the Emperor, might contribute to the safety of his Royal Highness. The Executive Directory, in their manifesto against his Imperial Majesty, to be

Conduct of
the Grand-
Duke of
Tuscany.

1798. hereafter noticed, assert, that they were at this period in the knowledge of hostile plans formed by Tuscany and Austria against the existence of the Cisalpine and Roman republics, and that the Gradd Duke was accelerating his preparations for war, and adopting measures that denoted a secret participation in military enterprises.

Engage-
ment at Ci-
vita-Castel-
lana.
December.

ON the fifth of December a strong body of Neapolitans, in five columns, attacked General Macdonald's camp at Civita-Castellana, in the direction of Bacano. The first column, advancing from Monterosi, assailed with great impetuosity the French advanced-guard under General Kellerman in front of Nepi, but were completely defeated, and nearly destroyed. A small body of republican light troops prevented the second column from penetrating by Rignano, and the third was driven back while attempting to advance by Fabrica. Night put an end to the contest; and the result of the action, as stated by Championnet in his dispatches, was the capture of twenty-three pieces of cannon, forty-five ammunition waggons, and two thousand prisoners.

Battle of
Calvi.

A NEAPOLITAN column, that had been defeated at Otricoli on the sixth, retired to the heights of Calvi, where they strengthened their position by intrenchments; while General Mack, in order to reinforce them and cut off the French communications, crossed the Tiber in person at the head of eight or ten thousand men. Championnet, howe-

ver, anticipated his plan, and directed General Macdonald to proceed with two brigades towards Calvi on the night of the eighth. This officer, notwithstanding the inclemency of the weather, reached the place of his destination by day-break, and having attacked the enemy on the heights, drove them after a warm engagement into the city, where the whole column immediately surrendered at discretion. In this action, five thousand prisoners, twenty superior officers, and eight pieces of cannon, fell into the hands of the victors. During these transactions, the left wing under Rusca took possession of the fort of Civitella in Abruzzo Ulterior with all its artillery.

1798.

SUCCESSES so decisive not only checked the career of this formidable Neapolitan host, amounting to about sixty thousand men, but obliged them, after a few desultory engagements, to evacuate the Roman territory; and within seventeen days after the French army had abandoned Rome, the republican brigades re-entered it in triumph. So precipitate was the flight of his Sicilian Majesty and General Mack, that they neglected to issue orders for the retreat of several corps of their army, considerable bodies of which surrendered to the French; but the greater part, after losing an immense quantity of baggage and artillery, retired into the Neapolitan dominions in irretrievable disorder. The day of retaliation had now arrived; and the French troops having succeeded in clearing the Roman republic of the enemy, cross-

Total rout
of the Nea-
politans, &
flight of the
King.

1798. fed the frontier in two divisions, that on the left by the provinces of Abruzzo, and that on the right pushing forward to Naples in the direction of Capua.

The King's
address to
his sub-
jects.

IN the moment of peril, the monarch and his cabinet felt no resources in their own courage and talents; and their arrogance during a temporary success was equalled by their pusillanimity under the pressure of danger. On his return to the capital, the King published an address to his subjects, expressive of his paternal affection towards them, and calculated to re-animate their languid valour. He reminded them, that he no sooner remarked the enemy directing their force to attack his states, than he came into the midst of his faithful and beloved people, in order to provide energetically for their defence, and to employ the most efficacious means to preserve to them religion, honour, prosperity, and life. To ward off injury long ago concerted by the enemies of religion and of thrones, he had marched in person to brave danger in the field. "The common safety," continued his Majesty, "now depends on you, my dearest subjects: the enemy are few in number;---if you wish it, you may be saved. Let all those who have courage, and who love God, our sacred religion, and their own property, take up arms to defend them. Recollect that the provincial militia, not numerous but brave, levied in haste, and taken from the plough, maintained upon the head of my august father the crown of these kingdoms, of which a

1798.

skilful and experienced enemy attempted to bereave him. The Neapolitan never was a coward; and now that it is the cause of God, your king, and yourselves, will you tamely submit to be conquered? No, my dearest friends and brethren, do not be deceived; if you do not hasten to defend yourselves, you will lose every thing,---religion, life, and property; and you will see your wives, your daughters, and your sisters dishonoured. Rise then, my faithful subjects, arm and defend yourselves; march courageously against the enemy, and prevent them from entering the kingdom,---or make them find in it only their graves. March! *call to your aid our great protector St. Januarius*: have confidence in God, who always protects his cause, for which each of you ought to fight, unless he mean to deny his faith."

ON the seventeenth, General Lemoine with his division approached Aquila, the capital of Abruzzo Ulterior, driving before him the requisitionary volunteers of the provinces who had risen in a mass. The fugitives entered the town in terror and confusion; upon which Lemoine, having summoned the governor to surrender, but receiving no answer, burst open the gates with cannon, and entered at the point of the bayonet: the different posts were immediately occupied without any resistance, and the fort surrendered at discretion. Nothing so strongly evinces the military incapacity of the Neapolitan generals, as their neglecting to occupy in force the high mountains and narrow defiles

Aquila
stormed.

1798. that cover Abruzzo, and serve as a natural barrier to the country. They had contented themselves with posting on these the undisciplined volunteers, whose irregular operations, altho' embarrassing to the French army on its march, partook more of sanguinary fury, than of the cool and skilful valour of the soldier.

Spirited defence of the inhabitants of Viterbo.

GENERAL Kellerman was detached by the commander-in-chief against Viterbo, to punish the inhabitants for some disgraceful cruelties committed on the French sick residing in that town. The Neapolitan General, Count de Rozen de Damas, formerly a colonel in the French service, had rallied a considerable body of fugitives, and was deliberately and in good order retreating in the direction of Viterbo towards Tuscany. Kellerman, in his way, overtook him at Montalto, when an obstinate engagement ensued, in which Damas, after an honourable defence, was completely routed with the loss of his artillery and a great number of prisoners. The wreck of his corps was driven in disorder to Orbitello, and afterwards finally taken or dispersed. General Kellerman then marched to Viterbo, where he found the walls covered with the armed inhabitants, and bristling with cannon. The first summons had no effect; and the second, conceived by Championnet in these intimidating terms, *Viterbo shall open its gates, or Viterbo shall only be a heap of ashes*, was equally disregarded. Fortunately the townsmen had detained as hostages, among several others, the two French

envoys to Naples and Malta; and this circumstance 1798.
procured them better terms on surrendering, than
their imprudence had entitled them to expect.

THE parade and vaunting, which had accom-
panied the successful progress of the Neapolitan
arms, now yielded to cowardly terror. His Sicilian
Majesty's alarm was so extreme, that altho' his ar-
my under General Mack at Capua far outnumbered
the enemy, and the loyalty of his subjects, and par-
ticularly of the Lazzaroni, promised a fortunate re-
sistance, he thought proper to embark precipitately,
with all his court, on board an English man of
war, in order to retire to Sicily. At the moment
of his embarkation, a serious ferment ensued. To
abandon his people and his throne, was regarded
by the confederate part of the inhabitants as an act
dissolving every tie of allegiance; and even the rag-
ged populace of the capital expressed their indig-
nation at the pusillanimous conduct of their sove-
reign. But no remonstrances or entreaties could
alter his determination, and no proffers of service
inspire him with confidence. Having put on
board the regalia, and an immense quantity of
gold and silver in specie and bullion, he set sail in
the Vanguard man of war crowded with noblemen
and ladies. The vessel landed at Palermo after en-
countering a terrible tempest, during which the
passengers, overwhelmed with terror and sea-sick-
ness, and unconfiding in the superiority of Eng-
lish seamanship, had recourse to all the faints in
the calendar. One of the King's sons died dur-

The King's
flight to Si-
cily.

1798. ing the voyage; and in this forlorn and hapless state, the father disembarked to throw himself on the loyal hospitality of his Sicilian subjects.

Passage of
the Carig-
liano.

THE inclemency of the weather, and inundations of the rivers, greatly impeded the progress of the republican army, which was at the same time harassed by insurrections of the peasants, who broke down the bridges, and intercepted the communications. General Macdonald's division passed the Carigliano at Ceprano and Isola, notwithstanding the formidable aspect of the enemy's works on the opposite bank, which the latter abandoned with eighty pieces of cannon. During this, General Rey was detached towards Terracina, with orders to carry the batteries erected at Itri in the defiles of Fondi, and after taking possession of Gaeta and crossing the Carigliano, to advance to Capua. Kellerman's division having taken Viterbo, marched directly to reinforce the main army, his cavalry joining the first division at Ceprano, and the rest General Rey's corps at Fondi. On Macdonald's reaching Capua, he summoned General Mack, who commanded there in person, to surrender; but on receiving an answer in the negative, he attacked, and carried some redoubts in front. Mack certainly committed a mistake in not vigorously defending his position on the Carigliano; but perhaps he retired his army to the intrenched camp at Caserta as a more eligible position, both for the purpose of being supported by a fortified

place with a strong garrison, and of facilitating the reinforcements he expected from the capital, and the insurrectional levies in the provinces. 1799.

To gain time the Neapolitan commander sent a letter to Championnet, informing him that he had received an order from the government to propose an armistice, with a view to afford some repose to both armies in that inclement season,—a repose rendered necessary by the fatigue they had undergone in frequent marches during continual rains. He added, that if the proposition proved agreeable, the bearer, Adjutant-General Pignatelli, was authorised to treat with the persons whom the French General might be pleased to nominate for that purpose, and to conclude a limited or unlimited armistice, on the basis of the line of the out-posts of the two armies. Championnet, aware of his intention, returned an immediate answer: “Humanity,” said he, “is the burden of your letter; bad roads, rain, and snow are your motives. But the French army, with its wonted patience, has surmounted every obstacle, and nothing more remains to it but the capture of Naples. I march to accomplish its wishes, and to execute the orders of my government, which, in consequence of your declaration of war at the mouth of the cannon, has charged me with punishing the insult.” General Mack’s situation now became daily more difficult; his troops deserted in crowds; his officers were disheartened; jealousies, suspicion, and alarm increased; and his last resource was in the resistance or

General Mack proposes an armistice, which is refused.

J A N.

1799. or rather desperate fury of the turbulent and ungovernable Lazzaroni of the capital.

Gaeta taken.

MEANWHILE General Rey, being reinforced by the troops under the command of Kellerman, presented himself before Gaeta, which was defended by a garrison of four thousand men, seventy pieces of cannon, and twenty-two brass mortars, with provisions and ammunition for a year. Seven armed feluccas, several transports, and a great many vessels laden with corn, lay in the harbour. He pointed a howitzer against the town, and threw some shells into it; upon which the garrison testifying symptoms of disorder, the governor offered to capitulate, and the troops surrendered prisoners of war. Among other stores captured in this place, were twenty thousand muskets, and one hundred thousand pounds of powder; and it is said, that there were also found thirty thousand silver medals, which his Majesty intended to distribute among the heroes, who were to immortalize their names by feats of valour. After leaving a garrison in Gaeta, General Rey threw a bridge over the Carigliano, and joined the first division before Capua.

The two
Abruzzos
completely
conquered.

THE left wing commanded by General Duhem, after some very difficult marches, arrived before Pescara, of which fortress General Mounier took possession, its garrison of 3000 men marching out with the honours of war, and laying down their arms on the glacis. Vast magazines of every kind were taken in the fort and harbour, besides forty-four pieces

of cannon and a number of mortars. In the mean time, General Lemoine, having taken Aquila, as we have already mentioned, received orders to advance to Sulmona, the central point of all the roads traversing the two provinces of Abruzzo. In his march, he was flanked by a column, advancing in the route of Tivoli and Vicovaro, which at the same time covered the left flank of the first division. This movement was decisive, and greatly facilitated the operations of Duhem.

1799

DURING these occurrences in the south of Italy, a French column under Serrurier was destined to observe Tuscany, and act as emergency might require. But the Neapolitan division at Leghorn thought proper to re-embark with precipitation, on the first intelligence of the reverses of their grand army. Serrurier, therefore, received counter-orders, and, agreeably to his new instructions, defiled towards the territory of the republic of Lucca, not wishing to infringe the professed neutrality of Tuscany.

A VEIL of uncertainty here envelops the operations in Naples. After the flight of the monarch, distrust became universal, and increased the discordant and agitated state of the public mind. Prince Pignatelli, who had been appointed viceroy in the absence of the sovereign, succeeded in concluding with the republican General an armistice, which was afterwards disclaimed by his Majesty, and the terms of which seem to have given equal dissatisfaction to the French government. It was signed

Convention
between
Champion-
net and
Prince Pig-
natelli.

1799. on the tenth, at the camp before Capua, by Championnet on the part of France, and by the Prince de Miliano, and the Duke of Gesso, plenipotentiaries of the viceroy, on the part of Naples. By the first article, it was stipulated that Capua, with all its magazines and the artillery carried from it to the intrenched camp, should be given up to the French; and the two subsequent articles arrange the line of demarkation. The ports of the Two Sicilies were to be declared neutral; those of the kingdom of Naples immediately after signing the armistice, and those of Sicily, as soon as his Majesty should have sent an ambassador from Palermo to Paris to treat for peace. No Neapolitan ship of war was to sail from any port of the two kingdoms: vessels, belonging to the powers at war with the republic, were not to be admitted into his Majesty's harbours, and those presently in port were to be sent away. During the continuance of the armistice, no change was to be made in the administrative authorities of the countries occupied by the French, and no individual questioned on account of his political principles. It was agreed, that the King of the Two Sicilies should pay to the republic ten millions of livres Tournois; that the usual commercial relations, between Naples and the territory occupied by the French army, should continue as formerly; and that the troops should be regularly supplied with provisions, and exempted from all imposts in their purchases. This treaty of armistice was, by the last article, to be submitted to the approbation of the respective governments; and if either re-

refused to ratify it, the generals were to give notice 1799.
three days before the re-commencement of hosti-
lities.

GENERAL Mack does not appear to have had any immediate concern in this transaction. He had exerted all his efforts, in conjunction with the Neapolitan government, to incite an insurrection of the peasantry against the French, while he indirectly laboured to procrastinate the convention in hopes of the co-operation of the Lazzaroni of the capital. In these measures, however, he was disappointed: for having incurred the suspicion of a capricious populace, he was obliged to solicit the protection of Championnet, which was readily granted. A spirit of disaffection had spread among his troops, who obeyed with reluctance the command of a foreigner, and by whose turbulence and insubordination his life was in continual danger. He repaired to Caserta, the head-quarters of the French army, where he received a passport allowing him to depart in quality of a Lieutenant-General in the Austrian service. It is probable, that the conduct of Championnet towards Mack gave offence to the commissioner Faypoult and the French government, and, combined with other circumstances, occasioned the harsh treatment afterwards experienced by the republican commander. General Mack and his German Staff, being charged with the commission of some cruelties on the French sick, were arrested by orders of the Directory, and sent prisoners to Milan. Yet, notwithstanding the o-

Conduct of
General
Mack.

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dium this officer has incurred by yielding to the counsels of the Neapolitan cabinet, his military skill is undeniable; and the estimation, which he enjoyed in the Imperial army, will shelter him from the sneer of those, who calculate talents only by a continuity of success, and are ever ready to declaim against the unfortunate.*

* GENERAL Mack was afterwards sent to Dijon in France, where he still remains in close confinement. He published, in the Journal of that city (second June), a vindication of his conduct during his command in Naples, and endeavoured to refute the accusations brought against him. "I am charged," says he, "with having suffered the French sick to be put to the sword. I know only of the transaction at Otricoli, *where the sick Frenchmen were slaughtered by the Neapolitan soldiers*: and I can neither contradict, nor justify, that atrocious act. It is notorious, and well known to the French generals who were with the army of Rome, that while the Neapolitan General Mersch attacked Otricoli, where this crime was committed, I was with the main body of the army, between Rome and Civita-Castellana, five miriametres from so horrible a scene. I was intirely ignorant of it, until I learned it by a letter from General Championnet.

"2. It is said, I was on the point of being the victim of that insurrection I had myself organised. The arming of the peasantry was ordered by the government a few days after the opening of the campaign, when the right column, which should have extended to the Adriatic, was defeated at Fermo. I was then at Rome, and ignorant of
what

1799.

It is not without surprise we learn, that a convention, which afforded the hope of restoring a kingdom to his Sicilian Majesty, should meet with his disapprobation. When Pignatelli intimated

what measures were carrying on, in the interior of the country, for organising a levy *en masse*. But this had nothing to do with the arming of the Lazzaroni and peasants in the vicinity of Naples, who, misled by traitors, and organised by their chiefs, equally made war on the French and their own troops. They particularly wished to wreck their fury on me as a foreigner, who had been pointed out to them, by these traitors, as having sold Capua and the whole kingdom of Naples to the French.

“ 3. It is further said, that I delivered myself up to the French. The expression *delivered myself up* implies, that I went to the French head-quarters without any previous communication, and that I surrendered at discretion: but such an assertion is absolutely false, as is clearly proved by the following facts. Immediately after the conclusion of the armistice on the twelfth of January, I sent my resignation, by an official letter, to the Vicar-General Pignatelli, who governed the kingdom in the absence of his Majesty. In the night of the sixteenth the insurrection at Naples had arrived at its height; and I received authentic information, that the fury of the Lazzaroni and armed peasants was particularly directed against me and my German *Etat-Major*, and that we were to be surrounded. I sent instantly, from my head-quarters at Caivano, Adjutant-General Pifficelli to the General-in-chief Championnet, to inform him of what I have related, and also that I had entrusted the command of the army to the Duke of Salandra, as eldest Neapolitan General. I was, therefore, no more than

1799.

The King's
letter to
Pignatelli.

the occurrence, he received an answer from the monarch, expressive of his indignation on receiving intelligence of the conclusion of a treaty, at a time when from the urgency of circumstances, and the good dispositions manifested by his people, he expected a general rising in defence of the capital.

a Lieutenant-General in the service of the Emperor ; and in this quality I entreated him to grant me a passage through his head-quarters, and passports to rejoin the army to which I belonged, with the German officers who were with me, and who also retained their ranks in the Austrian service. My Adjutant-General, having returned, assured me, that General Championnet had acquiesced in my request, without the least objection, and in the most cordial manner ; and that he had not only acquiesced, but advised me not to alter my intention, as he was informed, that every precaution had been taken to prevent my embarking at Salerno or Barletta. Penetrated with gratitude by this confidence and positive promise of the French General, I repaired to his head-quarters at Caserta, where he received me, not only with every attention, but with all that solicitude which soldiers owe to each other, when the misfortune of the one puts an end to those circumstances that separated them. I remained there four days, and on the eve of my departure received the necessary passport ; a proceeding never observed towards prisoners of war, and evidently proving that General Championnet kept the promise he had given me. This is the more apparent, as these passports purported to have been delivered to Lieutenant-General Mack in the service of Austria, a power which was not only at that time at peace with the French republic, but remained so for several decades thereafter."

1799.

But by this disgraceful armistice, concluded in consequence of the most absurd instructions to persons directed to negotiate with the enemy, he beheld the greatest part of his realm, though unconquered, given up with a view of sparing the capital; when it was obvious, that these concessions would lead to the irretrievable loss of the whole kingdom. What the more excited his astonishment at such unwarrantable conduct was, that the prince had no powers to negotiate in that manner, the instructions left by his Majesty being of a very different tendency. In concluding, therefore, such a treaty, the prince must either have forgot he had a master, or remembered it only for the purpose of imposing the most degrading terms on him. "You may suppose," added the King, "how much I am incensed at finding the trust I reposed in you betrayed in such a manner, and how indignant I feel against your unworthy advisers." His Majesty likewise issued, from his asylum at Palermo, a proclamation to the inhabitants of the Neapolitan provinces, declaring the armistice null and void, branding the French with the opprobrious epithets of traitors and seducers, and invoking the people to defend their religion and property; while, from the neighbouring kingdom, he would support their exertions with all the vigour wherewith he was inspired.

and procla-
mation to
his subjects.

MEANWHILE the insurgents in the environs of Fondi, who had occasioned a temporary interruption of the army's communications with Rome,

1799. and broke down the bridges on the Carigliano, were subdued, and their villages burned. But the republican army, harassed by incessant fatigue and sanguinary encounters, thinned by assassinations, and having no other supplies than what their valour acquired from the enemy, had still a more desperate struggle to encounter.

Account of
the Lazzaroni of Naples.

IN all catholic countries where the religion is founded on the ignorance and misery of the people, there exists a multitude of vagabonds, known in Italy by the apposite term of Lazzaroni, whose penury is increased by their laziness, and among whom the clergy, while affecting an ostentatious charity, are obliged by prescriptive usage to distribute a portion of their ill-gotten wealth. The city of Naples is particularly eminent in that respect; and the formidable numbers of this mendicant race, modelled since the days of Massaniello into a kind of regular community with captains or ostensible leaders, (for even among beggars there is ambition,) enabled them at pleasure to dictate law to the court. Thus the Neapolitan government, while its genius was inimical to the diffusion of knowledge, was severely punished by the insecurity, or open commotions, perpetually resulting from the superstition and beggary which it fostered. His Sicilian Majesty was beloved by the Lazzaroni, whose number is variously estimated from thirty to sixty thousand in the capital alone. Constantly obliged to open his treasury in order to satisfy their rapacity, the monarch, even in the last moments of his

reign, still influenced them by his gold. But their audacity had become so presumptuous, that their leader, one Sabatiello, on demanding an audience, was immediately admitted into the presence of the sovereign.

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Excesses
committed
by them.

WHEN the royal family abandoned Naples, terror filled the breasts of the citizens, while the fermentation among the Lazzaroni threatened every moment a desolating explosion. Disregarding the total rout of the Neapolitan army, these warriors conceived the bold and heroic design of preventing the French from entering the capital, to which they were advancing: and immediately an insurrection was proclaimed. The two first days were spent in bravadoes, menaces, and preparations for attack and defence. Pignatelli and the other ministers, perceiving the storm on the point of disruption, sought safety in concealment; and Prince Moliterni, who had gained the confidence of the Lazzaroni by his vigorous defence at Capua, was proclaimed Captain-General. His first efforts were unsuccessfully directed to restrain their licentious fury. They declared those, who had signed the armistice, or advised its being carried into effect, enemies of the King, and began their operations by throwing open the doors of the prisons, and taking possession of the castles. Having erected *fourteen gibbets*, they traversed the city in search of all the partisans of the French, or those who had the misfortune to be reckoned such by the arbitrary and capricious opinions of the popu-

1799. — lace ; and several noblemen and other inhabitants, after their houses had been plundered, were burned alive. A body of patriots and citizens, abandoning their property to pillage, and anxious only for their personal safety, assembled in the convent of the Celestines, which they converted into a kind of fortress by intrenching themselves with cannon. This place the Lazzaroni attacked with undaunted prowess ; and notwithstanding the loss of a great many of their number by several discharges of the artillery, they forced the convent, and put all within it indiscriminately to the sword.

IN this deplorable scene of horrors, Prince Moli-
terni, as the only means of preserving Naples from
general massacre and conflagration, privately with-
drew to Caserta, and implored General Champio-
net to hasten his march to the capital. It was con-
certed, that the French army should approach on
the side of Poggio and Capo-di-Chino, as the Laz-
zaroni had declared their intention of marching by
the little mole, and the quarter of St Lucia, to at-
tack the French at Capua. Thus it was probable,
that the republican troops would arrive in the city
before the return of the banditti, and thereby ex-
clude them from re-entering it. When the Prince
returned, he occupied Fort St Elmo with a small
body of soldiers, and fired a few cannon-shots into
the town with an intent to tranquillize it ; but the
Lazzaroni set out *en masse* for Capua, and having
advanced to the very walls of the fortress, attempt-
ed to carry it by assault, regardless of the ter-

rible havoc made among them by the artillery of the place. 1799.

Defeat of
the Lazzar-
oni, and
capture of
Naples.

Two days were spent in these fruitless and bloody efforts with unparalleled steadiness; but learning on the third that a French column, consisting of eight thousand men, had marched towards Naples, and was already at its gates, the Lazzaroni returned in great haste to the aid of their comrades, who had remained behind, and obstinately maintained the avenues leading to the city. They emptied the houses of their furniture in order to blockade the streets, and then, dividing themselves into parties, endeavoured to drive back the troops. These partial but sanguinary conflicts continued during the whole of the twenty-second and twenty-third; but at last French discipline triumphed, and the moment the soldiers obtained possession of the streets, the castles and forts surrendered, and hoisted the tri-coloured flag. The citadel of the Carmelites, which was occupied by a detachment of Lazzaroni, required a siege of three hours. Numerous bodies of them, and of the armed peasants, disputed with inflexible resolution every inch of every street, until they were driven to the outer gate, where they rallied for the last time, and after a severe engagement were either hewn in pieces or dispersed. Thus terminated a struggle, in which the republican army required all their firmness, valour, and talents, to conquer. The small number of the French no doubt excited the boldness of their opponents; yet we cannot forbear an expres-

1799.

fion of admiration at the desperate courage of the latter,—a courage which, under the guidance of an able and heroic sovereign, might have triumphed; —a courage which for three days disputed victory with French soldiers, in the streets of an open town, and in the midst of ruins, of mangled carcases, and of flames.

Pious policy of the Archbishop.

THE successful entry of the French into Naples was hailed by the citizens as a fortunate event, which could alone save the capital from being finally sacked and burned. To sooth the superstitious the Archbishop, who for his conduct on this occasion was afterwards punished with exile by the monarch, published an address, inviting all the faithful inhabitants to be present that day (twenty-fifth,) at the celebration of *Te Deum*. This service he in person, accompanied by the chapter, the clergy, the General-in-chief, and his Staff, would chant in the cathedral church to thank the Most High for the glorious entry of the French into the city, who, under the special protection of providence, had regenerated the people, and were come to establish and consolidate their happiness. “Saint Januarius, our protector,” added the Archbishop, “rejoices in their arrival, and his blood miraculously liquified on the very evening of the entrance of the republican troops.” Mount Vesuvius also, personified by the religious credulity of the Neapolitans, declared her approbation by some fiery and thundering eruptions, which unbelievers, with their accustomed scepticism, may probably betray

an inclination to interpret as an expression of dislike.

1799.

WHILE this pious fraud was employed in the service of humanity, the city became tranquil, and the new provisional government was organised. On entering the capital, General Championnet addressed a proclamation to the inhabitants with a view to remove their alarms, and restore confidence and order ;* and as a necessary measure of precaution, he likewise directed, that all without distinction should give up their arms. Meanwhile Cardinal Ruffo was dispatched by his Majesty into Calabria with the title of Vicar-General, and empowered to adopt such measures as might retard the progress of the French, disquiet the provisional government they had established, and, in fine, avail himself of any fortunate incident that might occur. Prince Pignatelli, the late viceroy, on his arrival at Palermo, was treated with great severity for hav-

* IN this proclamation to the Neapolitans, he declared that their liberty was the only reward France desired to obtain, and the only clause of the treaty of peace, which the army of the republic came to ratify by a solemn oath, in conjunction with the people, within the walls of their capital, and on the subverted throne of their last monarch. But the man who should refuse to sign that honourable compact, in which the fruits of victory were bestowed on the vanquished, and which only left to the conqueror the glory of having consolidated the happiness of Naples, would be treated as a public enemy, against whom the

1799.

ing negotiated the armistice ; but as several noble families were implicated in that transaction, this conduct of the monarch did not tend to conciliate the affections of his subjects.

Differences between
Championnet and
Faypoult.

A DISAGREEMENT having arisen between Championnet and the French commissioner Faypoult, the causes of which have not been communicated to the public, the Directory deprived that General of his command, and ordered him to be arrested, and brought before a council of war on a charge of improper conduct, in consequence of a deposition

French soldier would remain in arms. Then alluding, in glowing language, to the conduct of his Majesty, he felicitated the republican party on their emancipation. — “ Let your king” said he, “ be punished, with the loss of a crown he has dishonoured, and by the chagrin of having been the principal instrument of your freedom. But let no apprehensions of the future embitter the sentiment of your present happiness : the army I command remains in the midst of you ; it will lose its last man, and shed its last drop of blood, ere it allow your tyrant to entertain the hope of renewing the proscriptions of your families, and re-opening the dungeons in which they were immured.” He cautioned them against the insidious calumnies of the enemies of France, and declared, that if the French army now assumed the title of the army of Naples, it was in consequence of the solemn engagement, into which it had entered,—to perish for the cause of the people, and to make no other use of its arms than in maintaining their independence and rights, which it had so successfully asserted. As to the fatal mischiefs produced by the organi-

preferred against him to that effect. As Championnet, however, was not brought to trial, but, after the forced demission of part of the Directory, and the ephemeral authority of their successors, set at liberty, and appointed to the command of the Italian army, little has transpired to elucidate this accusation. It would, therefore, be premature to form any decisive opinion; but we think it our duty to communicate every fact of public notoriety, likely to throw light on the transaction.

1799.

THE civil and military commissaries whom the Executive Directory sent into the countries occupied by the French troops, not content with affecting a pro-consular authority, oppressed the inhabitants by requisitionary exactions, which were imposed and levied under pretence of the necessities of the army, but which these harpies frequently appropriated to themselves. In Italy, the ecclesiastical property which comprised the greater

Conduct
of the
French
commissa-
ries in the
occupied
countries.

zation of plunder and assassination, which the agents of the late monarch had employed as the means of defence, the republican authorities about to be established would restore order and tranquillity on the basis of a paternal administration. They would dissipate the idle alarms of ignorance; and appease the fury of fanaticism, with a zeal equal to that employed to increase them; and soon would the severity of discipline restrain disorders produced by rancour,—disorders which at present had been with difficulty repressed.

1799.

proportion of the wealth of the country, and the property of those princes and nobles who abandoned their homes to follow the fortunes of their sovereigns, formed an inexhaustible mine of wealth to inordinate avarice. Violence and the abuse of power ever accompany a state of warfare; and no doubt a German army, and German commissaries, would have displayed a similar rapacity. This charge of peculation, however, is confined to the commissaries and Staff, although, on account of it, the troops too often became the victims of popular indignation. At the same time it ought to be observed in extenuation of their conduct, that the French government were criminally negligent in supporting their armies, a circumstance which frequently obliged the commanders to have recourse to means injurious to the republican cause. General Hoche, on assuming the command of the army of the Rhine, dismissed upwards of a hundred commissaries for their malversations during Jourdan's expedition into Germany; and Buonaparte, who is a rigid disciplinarian, kept a watchful eye over these agents in his Italian campaign, and shot without mercy all marauders.

Decrees of
the Direc-
tory against
extortion.

7th Sept.
1798.

REPRESENTATIONS were made to the Executive Directory, that several adventurers, under pretence of being on mission from the government, had been guilty of irregularities and extortion. The French commissioners at Rome, and the General-in-chief, were therefore strictly enjoined to take the most rigorous care, that every Frenchman, who

1799

4th Dec.

had gone into Italy without a mission from the government since the entrance of the troops into that country, should leave it without delay. This arrêté however did not produce the desired effect; and the Directory were constrained to issue a second decree, importing; 1. That every Frenchman not usefully attached to the army of Italy or that of Rome, and every one employed by a commission posterior to the seventh September last, or even anterior to that date, in case his presence in Italy might be injurious to the interests of the republic, whether from his correspondence or connections, or from the vexations, impositions, and extortions, in which he might have taken part, should be expelled from the territories occupied by the troops of the republic. 2. Every Frenchman, who remained in Italy in contravention of the arrêté of the seventh September last, every one who remained in contravention of the preceding article, and, in fine, all those who, on having been expelled from the states occupied by the army of Italy, had retired into countries occupied by the army of Rome, or reciprocally, should be apprehended and conducted as spies before the council of war.

EITHER no measures were adopted in consequence of these decrees, or those employed proved insufficient; for complaints still continued against this evil, which seemed incapable of being eradicated. The Directory wrote letters to Generals Joubert and Championnet mentioning the intelli-

Their injunctions to Generals Joubert and Championnet.

Jan 3. 1799

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gence they had received, that Italy, notwithstanding their former decrees, continued to be tormented by a coalition of extortioners, who under every sort of denomination, profession, and mask, devoured the substance of the French armies, and imposed arbitrary exactions on the occupied countries. It was, therefore, necessary to call the attention of the commanders to the most strict and rigorous execution of those arrêtés, and to publish them in the general orders. "Reflect," continued they, "that when the government has expressed its will in the most unequivocal manner, and issued positive orders, the chiefs, who command the armies, will be alone responsible in the eyes of posterity for the continuance of these disgraceful dilapidations." The Directory accordingly reiterated their commands to the Generals to expel without mercy, from the districts under their respective authority, the horde of pillagers who infested them, and among whom several emigrants had been pointed out, and to make at the same time a terrible example of their leaders; for too long had these public robbers usurped the title of republicans, and disgraced the French name.

General orders of
Championnet.

IN obedience to this mandate, Championnet issued a strict prohibition against peculation and exactions, and also directed, that every individual presuming to make any impositions, or carry off any public or private treasures, or the pledges deposited in the *Monts de piete*, should instantly be shot. The same punishment was to be inflicted on

all persons not belonging to the army, who should enter the conquered places, and impose requisitions, or exercise any other acts of authority. It would seem that these energetic measures, and the dismissal of several agents, embroiled him with the Commissioner Faypoult, whose superior influence prevailed over the merits of an unbending foldier. Championnet was accordingly deprived of his command, and Macdonald substituted in his place, who, altho' a General of an equally decisive character, thought proper to recal the commissaries his predecessor had expelled. 1799.

WHILST these operations were carrying on in the south of Italy, the French arms were equally successful, but with less opposition, in the north. His Sardinian Majesty, implicated in the combination which Russia and England had succeeded in forming against France, rashly exposed himself to the vengeance of the latter; and as he retained his sceptre solely by the condescension of the republic, while his continental dominions were isolated by the newly formed governments, his indiscretion becomes still more manifest. Altho' priestcraft and ignorance predominate in Montserrat and Piedmont, republican principles had made no inconsiderable progress in these countries, the government of which was purely military. Popular commotions were frequent, and the political agitation of the present times added fuel to this civil combustion. Territorial disputes, and other differences, had arisen between his Majesty and

Transac-
tions in
Piedmont.

1799. the new Ligurian republic. But the French government, foreseeing only an useless effusion of human blood in the rancorous warfare of these pigmy states, insisted on both parties laying down their arms, and settling the contested points by an amicable reference.

Differences
between
his Sardinian
Majesty
and the
French.

THE cessation of hostilities exposed the disaffected, or patriots as they were styled, to the resentment of the government. But unfortunately the Piedmontese troops, in punishing their rebellious countrymen, suffered the ebullition of their rage to hurry them into the commission of acts of violence on the French, who charged them with cutting in pieces several small detachments, and firing upon parties of cavalry on their march. Mutual recriminations ensued, and General Brune, the commander-in-chief of the army in Italy, by way of punishment, and as a measure of precaution, demanded and obtained possession of the citadel of Turin. Soon after this he farther insisted, that liberty should be granted to the imprisoned insurgents; that the citadel of Turin should be supplied with provisions for two months, and the stores and other necessaries, which had been carried off when the French troops entered the fortress, re-established, as the want of them endangered the safety of that depot; that the militia and other forces, exceeding the peace-establishment, should be disbanded: and that the Count De Sala, Sardinian commandant at Alessandria, should be recalled. He at the same time issued an arrêté, purpor-

ting that to avoid all disputes between his Majesty and the Ligurian republic relative to the principle of restitution, the places taken on both sides should be put into the hands of the French republic, and kept as a deposit, until a definitive treaty should be concluded between these two powers.

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A FEW days after this, the governor of the city and province of Turin published a proclamation, the language of which exhibits a specimen of political caution : for altho' it corroborates the complaints of the French, it throws no satisfactory light on the conduct of the Sardinian cabinet, and could not exact general observance, as the public were well acquainted with the hostile disposition of the court. It began with stating that, after the beneficent and reiterated orders for the preservation of the tranquillity of the realm, his Majesty hoped to have seen it perfectly restored among his subjects. But he learned with the greatest astonishment and most lively regret, that this state of peace was in danger of being again interrupted by ill-designed persons lately returned into his territories. These laboured to seduce the people, and prevail on them to favour their dark and insidious plans by predicting still greater misfortunes, by artful exaggeration of popular complaints, or, in fine, by openly and unreservedly exciting all descriptions and classes of the inhabitants against individuals of the French nation. From the atrocious malice of these wicked men, consequences must result baneful to the public and private tranquillity of his Majesty's

Proclamation of the Governor of Turin,

1799.

subjects. In Piedmont, the French lived under the protection of public treaties of peace and alliance. All hostile plans, executed against them; would, therefore, be contrary to the engagements of the King and the principles of honour which distinguished his people, and would be the source of the most heavy misfortunes to the state and to individuals. He was anxious to prevent disorder, by making known the danger into which the enemies of the public peace endeavoured to precipitate his faithful subjects, and by putting the latter on their guard against the dark machinations with which they were surrounded. Equally desirous to stop the progress of such perfidious manœuvres, his Majesty notified to his subjects, that they should abstain from all discourse tending to agitate the minds of the people, and irritate them against the French; that, in case of provocation or insult, complaint should be made to their superiors; and that all persons disobeying these orders, would be punished as disturbers of the public tranquillity.

Animosities
increase.

IN this degraded situation it was impossible that his Sardinian Majesty should not feel indignant, and eagerly embrace any feasible mode of relief. His connection with the hostile courts grew daily more intimate, and of consequence the jealousy between him and the republic increased. While Naples and Austria were busily occupied in military preparations, the cabinet of Turin became more adventurous by the indulgence of hope. In this

state of suspicion and animosity time glided on, until the French government, weary of these secret manœuvres, ordered General Joubert to take possession of all the Piedmontese fortresses. Before commencing active operations, this officer, on the fifth December, published a kind of manifesto, in which he charged the Sardinian cabinet with requiring delays to furnish its contingent as stipulated by treaties, and in the mean time directing its force against Loano and Oneilla there to welcome the enemies of its ally the French nation. That court, continued the general, had appointed to the chief military employments such persons as were most inimical to France, and made open preparations to take part in the coalition. Its agents no longer affected concealment, but openly presumed to violate the territory of the Cisalpine republic; and the blood of French and Piedmontese republicans had been shed in consequence of its orders. He then stated what few will receive with implicit belief, that the French government, delighting in peace, were in hopes of being able to bring back the Sardinian cabinet to pacific measures, and were desirous of healing the wounds inflicted by a long war, restoring tranquillity to Piedmont, and every day more closely cementing the alliance between the two nations. But these hopes had proved fallacious; and the Directory, no longer paying credit to a court faithless in its treaties, had ordered him to avenge the honour of the great nation, and secure peace and happiness to Piedmont. Such, said he, were the motives which led the army of the repub-

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Joubert's
manifesto.

1799. lic to enter that country. The property, personal safety, and religious worship of the inhabitants would be respected ; and he farther declared, that the Piedmontese troops should form part of the French army in Italy, and that promotion would in future be given only to patriotism and talents. A message from the Directory to the legislative body, as we have already mentioned in detailing the declaration of war against Naples, expressed similar reasons for adopting hostile measures against his Sardinian Majesty.

All Piedmont occupied by the French.

THE King was in no condition to resist the enemy, and in a few days his territories were conquered without much opposition. By the definitive treaty concluded in April 1794, the French were put in possession of the fortresses of Coni, Ceva, Tortona, Exiles, L'Affietta, Suza, La Brunetta, Alessandria, and Chateau Dauphiné, until the conclusion of a continental peace ; and since that period the citadel of Turin had been occupied. They had therefore only a few places of inconsiderable strength to secure, in which, however, they found vast quantities of military stores. The occupation of these places was effected by a general military movement, and without any bloodshed: the Piedmontese and Swiss troops joined the army of Italy, a provisional government was installed at Turin on the eleventh December, and municipalities were established in all the principal towns.

On the ninth, his Sardinian Majesty signed an

act of renunciation at Turin, to which capital he was now to bid an eternal adieu. By this act, the King, after declaring that he renounced the exercise of all power, ordered his subjects to pay obedience to the provisional government about to be established by the French general, and also enjoined the Piedmontese army to consider itself as an integral part of the French army in Italy, and to obey the French commander-in-chief as its own. He disavowed the publishing of an offensive proclamation circulated by his ministers, and directed the Chevalier *Danican* to surrender the citadel of Turin*, as a pledge that no resistance whatever would be attempted against the present act, *which had emanated purely from his own free will*. The governor of the city was likewise enjoined to receive, and execute implicitly, all orders which the French General, commanding the citadel, should think proper to issue for the maintenance of public tranquillity. By the fifth article it was stipulated, (if the expression be allowable in speaking of a compulsory convention,) that no change should be made which might affect the catholic religion, the personal safety, or property of individuals; that such Piedmontese as wished to expatriate, should have liberty to carry away or dispose of their effects, and that those who were absent should be allowed to return, without any enquiry being made, as to their conduct or writings prior to this act. The King was at liberty to repair to Sardinia: and in the

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Act of renunciation
signed by
his Majesty.

It would seem from this expression, that the French were not yet in full possession of the citadel.

1799. mean time no arrangement was to be made, that might affect the security of his person. Until the moment of his departure, his palaces and country houses were not to be taken possession of by the French troops, nor any property carried off; and his guard was to be composed of those hitherto employed in that service. The passports and necessary orders were to be given, that the King and his family might arrive in safety at the place of their retreat, accompanied by an equal force of French and Piedmontese. But in case the Prince of Carignan should remain in Piedmont, he was, like other subjects, to enjoy his property there, and be at liberty to leave the country at pleasure. And it was lastly stipulated, that ships belonging to the powers at war with the republic, should not be received in the ports of the island of Sardinia.

His Majesty
retires to
Sardinia.

AFTER signing this act, his Majesty set out at midnight from the palace of his ancestors with all his family, a few friends, and a part of his retinue. The procession had the melancholy appearance of a funeral cavalcade, consisting of thirty carriages, with servants carrying flambeaus. It was escorted by a numerous guard of dragoons, whose profound silence, added to the obscurity of the night and inclemency of the weather, made a lasting and sad impression on the mind of the spectator. The King passed through Parma, on the nineteenth December, and in his route through Tuscany had an affecting interview with another expatriated sovereign, the imprudent and unfortunate Pius VI.

Thus ingloriously terminated the reign of the House of Savoy on the Italian continent ;---a house whose race of princes have attained celebrity in the military annals of Europe, and whose deceased monarch flattered himself, at the commencement of the present war, with annexing Provence, Dauphiny, and the Lyonnese to his hereditary dominions. 1799.

HAVING arrived at Cagliari on the twenty-third of March, his Majesty published a memorial, in which he declared, that the honour of his person, the interest of his family and his successors, and his connections with friendly powers, imposed it on him as a duty to protest loudly, and in the face of Europe, against the proceedings by which he had been compelled to quit his territories on the continent, and to abandon for a time the exercise of his power. He declared upon the faith and word of a king, that he never infringed in the slightest degree the treaties concluded with the French republic ; but on the contrary, that he had observed them with such a scrupulous exactness, and such demonstrations of amity and condescension, as far exceeded his obligations contracted with the republic. It was notorious, that all the care and solicitude of his Majesty were continually directed to secure respect to every French citizen, and particularly to the troops stationed in his territories or passing through them ; to repress and punish those who insulted them ; and to obviate even the well-founded resentment of others, who, having ex-

He protests
against his
expulsion.

1799. perience^d outrages from military licentiousness, might have been led to the commission of violence. He likewise protested, upon the faith and word of a king, against any writing whatever, published, and insinuating that he had carried on a secret intelligence with the powers hostile to France. To corroborate his declaration on this point, he referred not only to the accounts transmitted to the French government, and to what had been advanced by its generals, but to the impartial evidence, which the ministers and public agents at Turin had given to their respective courts. It was obvious from facts known to the public, that the adherence of his Majesty to whatever was imposed on him by the superior forces of the French republic was only temporary, and could have no object but to save his subjects in Piedmont from the evils, which a just resistance would have occasioned. He had been surprised by an unexpected attack, which he could never have surmised from a power his ally, and at a moment when, in consequence of the application of the agents of the republic, his forces were put upon the footing of the most profound peace. Impelled by all these motives, his Majesty resolved, whenever it was in his power, to make known to all the states of Europe the injustice of the proceedings of the French generals and agents, and the nullity of the reasons urged in their manifestoes; and at the same time to reclaim his reinstatement in the dominions of his ancestors.--We will not interrupt our narrative by discussing the doubts entertained respecting the

authenticity of this protest. It is conceived in temperate and persuasive language; and although ushered into the world in a silent and suspicious manner, it was prudently suppressed, until the rout of the French army in Italy revived the languid hopes of the exiled monarch. 1799.

A TREATY of alliance, offensive and defensive, had been concluded between Russia and the Porte on the twenty-third of December 1798, in consequence of which, an auxiliary Russian squadron passed the Dardanelles, and was afterwards joined by some Turkish ships. A body of troops on board of this combined fleet effected a landing on the island of Corfu, which, after some military operations and a short blockade, was surrendered by the French garrison on condition of being conveyed to Toulon in vessels furnished at the expence of the besiegers. It was also stipulated, that the soldiers, sailors, and prisoners who were to be liberated, should not serve against Russia, the Porte, or their allies, during the space of eighteen months. The acquisition of this island, and the undisputed superiority of the English fleet in the Mediterranean, facilitated the introduction of supplies and partial assistance to the insurgents in Calabria, and kept the whole coast of Italy in perpetual alarm.

Corfu taken
by the com-
bined Rus-
sian and
Turkish
squadron.

NOTWITHSTANDING the decisive successes of the French in Naples, and the co-operation of the patriots, they encountered great difficulties in the suppression of numberless insurrections of the pea-

Insurrec-
tions in
the Neapo-
litan terri-
tories.

1799. santry and villagers. The scattered remains of the Neapolitan corps in Apulia and the two Abruzzos, reinforced by the populace of San Severo and its environs, and together forming a body of ten thousand men, had occupied a height covered with trees. They had also planted artillery in such a manner as to command the principal opening of an extensive plain, which was overlooked by their elevated encampment, and scoured by their cavalry. In this position, the selection of which evinced no inconsiderable skill in military tactics, they courageously ventured to give battle to General Duhem's division. But popular fury could not oppose an effectual barrier against the steady valour of regular troops. In a few moments, the whole assemblage was dispersed with the loss of three thousand men; and it was only on the earnest intercession of the repentant inhabitants, that all Apulia, which, with the exception of Foggia, had been in a state of insurrection, was not given up to the sword. Some standards of the Neapolitan cavalry were taken in this action; but those of the infantry were only church table-cloths.

THIS event, which happened on the nineteenth of March, did not intimidate the peasantry and populace from similar attempts. The town of Andria rose in insurrection: it was attacked, and its gates forced on the twenty-third by General Brouffier, whose troops, after experiencing an obstinate resistance, penetrated into the streets in the

midst of ruins, and killed all who opposed their progress. In this disastrous affair, more than six thousand of the infatuated multitude were put to the sword. A body of insurgents had collected between Terracina and Capua; but a French corps under General Watrin, having attacked Tracetta, one of their principal posts, burned the place, and razed its bastions. After this, Watrin turned to Castleforte, the ordinary asylum of all the banditti of the mountains, and levelled it with the ground.

1799.

THESE calamitous occurrences were the effects of that system of insurrection, or levy *en masse*, modelled by the Neapolitan cabinet at the period of commencing hostilities against France. The wisest and most respectable part of the community had beheld its progress with horror; and after the flight of the sovereign, and capture of Naples, great numbers of the nobility and clergy united in supporting the new provisional government, as the only means of securing their personal safety, and their property from general plunder. Deploable must have been, and still is, the state of that country, where the restraint of regular government is unfelt, and where a great proportion of the population is composed of Lazzaroni and banditti by profession; for, even in the days of peace, the traveller in the Neapolitan states was obliged to purchase the uncertain protection of the village and mountain plunderers themselves. It is painful to peruse the narrative of bloody atrocities, which oc-

1799. curred in that unhappy land. Some ruffians belonging to the Franco-Neapolitan army had committed depredations on the peasants; and these, stimulated by the combined influence of fanaticism and revenge, exercised the most horrid cruelties on their victims, some of whom are said to have been roasted and devoured, while others were fastened alive to trees, and torn in pieces by famished dogs. It is to be hoped, for the honour of human nature, that the accounts of these barbarous reprisals have been greatly exaggerated. Were we to search for an apt and impressive similitude, we would compare this devoted country to Mount Vesuvius during the torrentuous eruption that overwhelmed Herculaneum, and when disgorging the blazing masses that inhumed Pompeia and its inhabitants.

Note of the French ministers relative to the Russians.

IN narrating the diplomatic transactions at Rastadt, we ascribed to the winter season, to the absence of the Russians, and to the hope of re-victualling Ehrenbrietsstein, the consent of the Imperial ministers to the French *ultimatum*. The same causes may be assigned for the Emperor's inactivity, during the hostile operations of the republic against Sardinia and Naples. But as the Russians had now made considerable progress, the French Legation, on the second of January, formally declared to the Deputation, that if the Diet at Ratibon consented to the entry of these troops into the empire, or did not oppose it in the most effectual manner, their march would be considered as a vio-

January.

1799.

lation of the neutrality on the part of the Germanic body. They added, that the negotiations would be broken off, and the republic and the empire return to the footing, on which they stood previous to the signing of the preliminaries at Leoben, and conclusion of the armistice. But notwithstanding this protestation, dictated by the pressure of circumstances, the French ministers expressed the earnest wish of their government for the felicity of the empire. They trusted, that an occurrence, so unforeseen as that which formed the subject of their note, and which might be attended with such fatal consequences to the tranquillity of Germany, should not destroy the hopes, now on the point of being realized, of a perfect reconciliation and perpetual peace between the two nations. No person, they said, could mistake the views and motives of the cabinet of Petersburg. The Deputation were too well acquainted with the affairs of Europe not to perceive, that Russia, after being at war for six years without participating in its active operations, would not now so openly place herself in a state of aggression against France, unless with a view to prevent the pacification of the continent, and with the no less evident design of veiling the extensive plan of usurpation she had projected. The plenipotentiaries, therefore, entertained no doubt, but the deputies would consider the present step of the French government as a new proof of its pacific sentiments, and an opportunity to the empire, by avoiding the dangers that threatened it, to acquire new claims to the friendship of the

1799. republic. In order to secure the presenting of this note to the Deputation, the French ministers took the precaution of giving it without the interposition of the Imperial commissioner, to whom they also transmitted a copy, accompanied with another note to Count Lehrbach, envoy of the King of Hungary and Bohemia.

Evasive answer of the Deputation.

THIS note, although it was to have been expected, created a general consternation. The deputies would not enter on the discussion of it, but contented themselves with decreeing, that it should be transmitted to the Emperor and the Diet at Ratisbon. On the twenty-sixth the Deputation agreed, with the consent of the Imperial commissioner, that an answer should be sent to the French ministers, importing that the Austrian plenipotentiary had received the resolution taken by his Majesty, as to the eventual march of the Russians in the territory of the empire. In this *rescript* the Emperor declared, that the Deputation were not competent to take cognisance of the French note, and that the prerogative of doing so belonged to the empire assembled under the authority of its chief, from whom they must wait for ulterior resolutions. The deputies likewise stated, that the Diet had demanded further instructions from their constituents, and made known to the Deputation, that they had not yet received either official advice, or requestorial letters, respecting the march of a Russian army.

ON this evasive answer, the French legation in-

timated, that they had orders not to receive or transmit any note, until a categorical and satisfactory reply should be given. At the same time they sent a note to the Imperial envoy, in which they expressed their astonishment at his silence as to the march of the Russians, a circumstance decidedly hostile to France. The Executive Directory, they observed, could no longer permit an uncertainty, which compromised the dignity and interests of the republic. Its ministers were, therefore, directed to demand from the Emperor a positive assurance, that these troops were evacuating his territory, and direct orders issued to that effect. They likewise desired, that this assurance should be given within the space of fifteen days from the date of their note, and declared, that the further progress of the Russians would be considered by the French government as aggressive. Moreover, the republic would regard silence, or the want of the assurance demanded, as an act of hostility, and a manifest proof that the Emperor had acceded to the enterprises of Russia.

1799.

Second
note of the
French mi-
nisters.

THE envoys, not daring to come to a definitive resolution on the subject, resolved to refer the intimation of the French plenipotentiaries to the Diet. An event had occurred on the twenty-sixth January which contributed to increase their alarm. We allude to the surrender of Ehrenbreitstein,

Surrender
of Ehren-
breitstein.

1799. — visions. On taking possession of this fortress, the French commandant immediately put it in the best possible state of defence, and revictualled it by enormous requisitions chiefly imposed on the territory of Nassau. Matters now approached to a crisis, which was retarded only by the inclemency of the weather; the deputies in the Austrian interest successively abandoned Rastadt, the armies were in motion, and the din of war resounded in every quarter.

Unprepared
state of
France.

IN reviewing the state of the belligerent powers on the commencement of hostilities, the first circumstance attracting our observation is the criminal improvidence of the Directory. Instead of rendering success certain by increasing their armies to a number of troops equal to that of the enemy, they seem to have reposed on the character of invincibility, which they proudly attached to the republican legions. The rebellious commotions in the Netherlands, increased by the enforcement of the laws of military conscription, were not yet completely allayed, and required a considerable body of forces. These disturbances, happening so opportunely, might lead us to surmise, that they were in combination with the secret plans of Austria, which wisely availed itself of every circumstance, calculated to insure future success by obliging the enemy to withdraw a large proportion of their troops from the frontiers.

THE expedition to Egypt, and the vast extent of

1799.

territory occupied in Europe by the French, necessarily weakened the effective force requisite to oppose the Imperial armies. Continually agitated by some political effervescence, the republic was obliged to retain a vast body of troops in the interior, while she had to cover a frontier extending from the German Ocean to the Gulf of Venice. At the same time the coast of Italy on both sides of the peninsula, and the whole extent of the French coast, were to be protected from the adventurous attempts of the enemy's fleets. General Jourdan had only about 50,000 men on the Rhine; and that number, in case of offensive operations, behoved to suffer a continual diminution, as it was necessary to occupy several places in his progress, in order to secure his rear, and maintain a communication with France. General Massena's strength in Switzerland was equally defective, altho' that commander had to contend not only with a powerful enemy along a widely extended line, but with the suspected loyalty, or rather open disaffection, of a considerable part of the inhabitants. The army of General Scherer, who had been minister of war, but was now appointed commander-in-chief in Italy, did not, with the frontier garrisons, exceed 60,000 men including French, Cisalpines, Piedmontese, Poles, and Helvetians. But what shews the insensate precipitation and negligence of the Directory is, that none of the fortresses in that country had nearly the proper complement of a garrison, and all were destitute of the necessary provisions and magazines. This want of preparation

1799. may, perhaps, bear testimony to the pacific disposition of the French government; but it disgraces their policy, and evinces a culpable apathy as to the safety of the republic, and the fate of their unfortunate and too confiding allies.

Wise policy of Austria.

AUSTRIA, on the contrary, had made immense exertions. Her alliance with Russia and the Porte assured the security of her frontier line toward these countries; and by her internal tranquillity she was enabled to direct all her military force against France. The Emperor had assembled, if we may give credit to a circulated statement, an army of about 100,000 infantry and twenty-three regiments of cavalry under the Archduke on the Lech and in Bavaria. General Kray commanded another on the Adige, consisting of one 100,000 infantry and fourteen regiments of cavalry, while strong intermediary corps occupied the Tyrol and the country of the Grisons. This contrast is honourable to the prudence and sagacity of the cabinet of Vienna. For it was certainly a wiser policy to secure victory by a superiority of numbers, than madly hazard it by sending into the field an inferior force, and, with the most presumptuous pride, risking the extinction of that blaze of military glory, which irradiated the annals of the republic.

General Jourdan crosses the Rhine.

ON the first of March, at four in the morning, the French army under the command of General Jourdan passed the Rhine at Kehl, and extended

its right wing by Offenburg to the Brisgaw. At the same time he addressed to the people of Germany a proclamation, bearing the sanction of the Directory, and declarative of the causes and object of hostilities.*

1799.

March.

* IN a similar address to his army, the General premised, that the Austrian troops, in contempt of a solemn convention, had passed the stipulated line of demarcation; and that the Emperor, deceiving the pacific dispositions of the French government, had called into the heart of Germany armed strangers, less known by their military success than their desolating ravages. While, said he, the French army, as scrupulous observers of the faith of treaties, remained behind their lines in a firm but peaceable attitude, his Imperial Majesty *dared* to concert hostile movements with his new allies, and under favour of a perfidious silence availed himself of the advantages, which the insuspicion and security of France gave him. This manifest infraction of public faith, respected by all civilized nations, had at length compelled the Executive Directory to make reprisals: France had made every effort to obtain peace; but if war were wished for,—she would make it. If, in assuming the military position, towards which the army advanced, opposition should be given, or if the Emperor did not promptly and strictly fulfil the existing convention, the republican troops were prepared for the contest. But faithful to the principles of moderation hitherto characterising the French nation, they would retire into their former lines, as soon as the republic should receive the satisfaction she had a right to expect. He called on his soldiers to recollect in resuming their arms, that the scourge of war ought only to fall on the enemies of France. “Your glory,” continued the General, “will

1799.

His proclamation.

In this proclamation the General stated, that the Imperial troops, notwithstanding the military convention at Rastadt, had passed the Inn, and advanced beyond the boundaries of the hereditary countries. This movement, he said, was combined with the march of the Russians in the

be effaced, your laurels withered, and the wishes of your enemies fulfilled, if you should be guilty of excesses. Your foes have employed all their arts to arm the nations of Europe against the French people; let your conduct, therefore, give the lie to all their insidious accusations. Bear constantly in your remembrance, that the army must respect general and individual property, and that every disorder will be restrained by force, and punished with severity." He farther intimated to the superior officers, that he held them personally responsible for the strict execution of these orders, and the maintenance of the most exact discipline. The Directory had ordered him to declare, that it was their firm intention to reimburse the people and governments, friendly to the republic, for whatever might be furnished to supply the unforeseen necessities of the army. It was therefore requisite, that there should be delivered, with the most scrupulous punctuality, certificates of what articles should be required or furnished for the troops; and to prevent impositions, the General detailed the mode of doing so, adding, that every infraction would be punished with the utmost severity. At the same time he expressed his hopes, that the inhabitants of Germany, in consequence of these regulations, would disregard reports propagated by malevolence, and remain calm in the midst of the storm, convinced that the best means of preserving their property would be to remain peaceably in their habitations.

1799.

Austrian states, who openly declared they came to attack the republic. The French government, ever faithful to the obligations it had imposed on itself, animated with the desire of maintaining a state of peace, and disposed to ascribe similar sentiments to the Emperor, had demanded a satisfactory declaration relative to the march of the Russian troops, and the passage which had been granted them. His Imperial Majesty, however, was silent. The Directory, therefore, felt themselves compelled by the necessity of self-defence, and the obligation which every state is under to provide for its security, to order the French armies to take such positions as circumstances might require. But at the same time they declared, that their desire of peace was unchanged; and the moment the Emperor should make known, that the Russians had evacuated his states, and his troops resumed the positions fixed by the convention at Rastadt, the French armies would return to the lines they had hitherto occupied.

THE French Legation, on the day the army crossed the Rhine, transmitted to the Deputation of the empire copies of Jourdan's proclamation and address to his troops. In their note accompanying these, the ministers declared, that the march of the French army was only to be considered as a measure of precaution imposed by circumstances, that the desire of peace was still ardent and sincere on the part of the French government, and that they would proceed to conclude it

1799. with the empire, on condition the Germanic body would declare against the march of the Russians. A note of a similar tenor was transmitted to the Imperial commissioner; and the plenipotentiaries, in like manner, communicated a proclamation by General Massena to the Grisons, which we will hereafter have occasion to mention.

Manifesto
of France.

Thirteenth.

NOT to interrupt the subsequent narrative of military operations, we will anticipate a message of the Executive Directory to the two councils, which may be regarded as the manifesto of the republic. In this message they enumerated their complaints against Austria, and accused that power of insincerity and a determined spirit of hostility towards France. It was not forgotten they said, that the republic, after five years of triumphs, and at the moment when the French armies were only thirty leagues from Vienna, had consented to suspend the progress of her victories, and preferred the immediate establishment of peace to the success of a few more efforts. And it would be recollected, that when the treaty was published, the moderation of the conqueror appeared so great that it seemed to stand in need of an apology. Little, therefore, was it to have been expected, that a peace, in which power had displayed such indulgence, and the liberal terms of which ought to have stifled every sentiment of regret, far from attaining the stability to which it seemed destined, should be, from the first, only the deceitful pledge of an ephemeral reconciliation. Equally impro-

1799.

bable was it that the infractions, which this peace was so soon to experience, should proceed from a state, that had acquired such ample compensations by it. The Directory averred, that the republic had been constantly careful to fulfil every stipulation of a treaty, which accorded neither with her success, nor with the legitimate vengeance she might have taken for the plans of destruction formed against her. But Austria, instead of shewing herself satisfied with an adjustment that relieved her from the greatest of dangers, appeared only studious to fritter away, or entirely annul, a compact to which she owed her salvation.

THE message then retraced various circumstances, which marked the hostile conduct of the Imperial cabinet. It stated, that the execution of the treaties of Campo-Formio and the military convention of Rastadt, respecting the evacuation of Suabia and other parts of the Empire by both armies, was prompt and complete on the side of the republic; but, on the part of Austria, it had been deferred and eluded, and was not yet carried into effect. In Philipsburg, the Emperor still preserved a garrison and magazines, altho' pretexts were employed to cover them; and he continued to maintain troops in Ulm and Ingolstadt. All the fortresses of Bavaria were at his disposal, while the dutchy was occupied by an army of 100,000 Austrians, who, by these treaties and convention, ought to have retired beyond the Inn into the hereditary states. The Directory next charged the

1799 Imperial cabinet with refusing to re-establish the intercourse between the two governments, by sending a minister to Paris; and thereafter adverted to the mission of the ambassador Bernadotte to Vienna. They mentioned the cold reception he met with, the flagrant violation of the law of nations in his person, and the neglect of the Imperial court to investigate and punish that outrage. On this point, they referred to the versatility of Count Cobentzel in the conferences at Seltz, and his refusal to give any satisfaction to the envoy-extraordinary of the republic, who was instructed, as to reparation for that insult, to be satisfied with a simple disavowal of it, and a declaration that endeavours would be made to secure the guilty.

AFTER noticing the encouragement given by Austria to Naples and Piedmont, the Directory alluded to the endeavours of the Imperial court to detach the cabinet of Berlin from its neutrality, their sinister views in occupying the Grison territory, the mission of the Tuscan minister Manfredini to Vienna, the Grand-Duke's preparations for war, and his connections with Naples. They called the attention of the councils to the march of the Russians into Germany, and the reception given them by his Imperial Majesty, who went in person to meet them, accepted their congratulations, and thus associated himself to the hostile designs they avowed. Struck with the scandal of such a conduct, and certain that the Russians were to pass from the Austrian territory into that of the Em-

pire, the Directory, still repressing the first impulse of the national pride, contented themselves with demanding explanations from his Majesty and the Germanic body. The Emperor was silent, and his plenipotentiary even affected to deny, that he had received the note of the French ministers; while the Deputation referred the matter to the Diet and the Diet to the Empire. Meantime the Russians continued their march, and after traversing Moravia and Austria, approached Bavaria. In this foreign invasion, the amicable representations of the French republic were as little regarded, as the interest of Germany. But the moment was now arrived in which the French government could no longer temporise, and hold a language, which might compromise the national dignity and the safety of the state. Thus forced to regard the silence of the Emperor as a hostile measure, they were likewise instructed, that the Austrian troops had already made aggressive movements in Bavaria towards Suabia. The Directory, therefore, renouncing with regret the hope of maintaining peace in Germany, but still disposed to listen to suitable propositions for a new and complete reconciliation, informed the legislative body, that such measures had been already taken, as were deemed necessary for the defence of the republic. After some passionate expressions against the conduct of Russia and England, they concluded with proposing to declare war against his Imperial Majesty and the Grand-Duke of Tus-

1799.

1799. cany ; a measure in which the Councils acquiesced without hesitation.*

Move-
ments of
the Arch-
Duke's
army.

His address
to the Ge-
nerals.

ON the morning of the third, dispatches from Rastadt reached the Archduke Charles who had fixed his head-quarters at Friedberg behind the Lech, informing him of the passage of the Rhine by the French. In consequence of this intelligence he directed his van-guard, that occupied cantonments between Ulm and Augsburg, to advance to the former city by forced marches. At the same time he published an address to the generals of the Austrian armies and armies of the empire, and, on the following day, a manifesto by his Imperial Majesty. Prince Charles began his address with mentioning, that the movement made by the French army, on the first of the month, to advance from the positions it had till then occupied, induced him to offer a short review of the political events, which had occurred during the preceding year. Scarcely, said he, were the most solemn treaties concluded between the Emperor and the empire on the one part, and France on the other, when the French government began to evince an intention to take advantage, with the most manifest injustice, of the retreat of the armies into the military positions, which the Imperial troops, relying on the security of public faith, had assumed. The peaceable inhabitants of Switzerland were subjugated, and the most

* See Appendix, No. III.

1799.

violent means adopted by France to change that country into a slavish ally, and to establish herself on the flank of Germany. In opposition to the most precise agreements, they refused to permit a supply of provisions to enter Ehrenbreitstein. They blockaded that fortress, and without any respect for the rights of nations and the indignation of Europe, devoted the brave garrison, and the quiet and inoffensive people of the Thal, to the miseries of famine; and what remained of the garrison, thus starved into a surrender, were compelled to evacuate the place. At the moment they were committing such acts of atrocity, unheard of in the history of the world; at the moment they continued to levy contributions, and impose requisitions on the right bank of the Rhine; and at the moment when the tone of the French plenipotentiaries at Rastadt became every day more imperious, and these ministers accumulated new pretensions in a manner injurious to the German nation, they did not hesitate to demand, if his Imperial Majesty was disposed to prepare any resistance to future acts of a similar nature? When it was answered, "If hostilities were put an end to by the French,---if Ehrenbreitstein were evacuated,---if the French army retreated from the right bank,---if the French troops in Switzerland, who threatened Germany, were withdrawn,---and if a reasonable peace, founded on the rights and not on the slavery of the empire, were concluded at Rastadt," no other reply was made on the part of France, than that it was hoped the Diet would agree

1799. to such a resolution as she might desire. This conduct implied in other terms, that the French should be suffered to continue at their pleasure acts of hostility, which the Germans, and all other nations, were to consider as amicable and pacific. To that diplomatic reply had now been superadded the declaration of the General of the French army, stating, that it was thought proper they should prepare themselves by taking advantageous military positions: *probably* to enable them, when sufficiently prepared, to fall with their combined force on Germany, to extend in the first instance the Helvetic republic as far as the Danube, to make that river and the Lech its limits, and even to penetrate still more forward. It was, therefore, necessary to adopt such prudential measures of defence, as a regard for the security and tranquillity of Germany rendered indispensable.

The
Emperor's
manifesto.

THE manifesto or proclamation of his Imperial Majesty was of a similar tenor with the preceding address. It complained of encroachments of the French troops on the right bank of the Rhine and other boundaries of the Austrian states, and also of the compulsory surrender of Ehrenbreitstein by blockade during a cessation of hostilities, and notwithstanding a military convention. These hostile acts, combined with the conscription of two hundred thousand men in France and the powerful levies made in Switzerland, afforded sufficient reason to be apprehensive of their views, and rendered it necessary for his Imperial Majesty to adopt measures of security. Ever accustomed scru-

1799.

pulously to fulfil his engagements, he had been desirous of maintaining peace with a moderation, under all circumstances, so strikingly reasonable and manifest, that it was impossible the French government could have the smallest ground for supposing a contrary disposition. But the restless and increasing attempts of the republic had rendered it every day more necessary to consult measures calculated to ensure tranquillity. His Majesty therefore was unavoidably placed in a situation, which obliged him to extend his preparations for general safety in proportion to the efforts of France, and also to order his troops to advance beyond those places, where they had hitherto remained in a peaceable state. To the adoption of these steps of precaution he had been led, not less by a consideration of the danger which threatened the greatest part of the empire, than by a regard to the security of his own hereditary dominions. He could, therefore, entertain no doubt, but prompt measures would be taken by all the well-disposed co-estates of the empire, and such as wished to promote its welfare, for the general safety and defence of the frontiers ; and that they would sanction with their approbation the means he employed for the protection, not only of his hereditary states, but of the whole empire.

WHILE the belligerent powers thus mutually charged each other with the renewal of hostilities, Jourdan continued his march by Offenburg and Villingen, the left wing under General St Cyr advan-

Progress of
the hostile
armies.

1799. cing by Stutgard, and the centre and right stretching towards Switzerland. A corps of observation under General Bernadotte passed the Rhine near Mannheim, and after taking possession of that place, blockaded Philippsburg. Jourdan's intention was to advance rapidly into Suabia, so that, while his left gained Ulm, the centre and right, by inclining to the lake of Constance, might cover the left flank of the army of Helvetia, and thus form a solid cordon extending to the frontiers of the Grisons. Meantime the Archduke, having crossed the Leck on the fourth and fifth, hastened forward by forced marches, his right in the direction of Ulm, the centre by Memmingen, and the left by Kempten. This wing preserved his communication with the corps of General Hotze, whose head-quarters were established at Feldkirch, and who again maintained an intercourse with General Auffenberg occupying the country of the Grisons.

Engage-
ment at
Ostrach.

ON the tenth, Jourdan took possession of the lines of Uberlingen extending to Moeskirch, Sigmaringen, and as far as Veringen; while Prince Charles occupied the opposite line of Lindau, Ravensburg, Biberach, and Ulm. The two armies now cautiously approaching each other, the French general, after driving in the Imperial advanced posts, and some warm skirmishes, took a position on the heights of Ostrach and Mengen. At the same time, the right wing under Ferino penetrated by the lake of Constance, and obliged Major-General

Piazcheck to fall back to Ravensburg. In proportion as the enemy advanced, the Archduke's main army accelerated its progress, and on the twentieth reached the heights near Saulgau and Altshausen, where it encamped at the distance of one day's march from the French. On the same day a republican corps defeated the Austrian vanguard; but the latter, having received reinforcements, obliged the French to retire who had advanced as far as Holtzkirchen. 1799.

PRINCE Charles, well acquainted with the usual impetuosity of his opponent, resolved to anticipate him by an immediate attack. Accordingly on the twenty-first, having ranged the column on the right, under the Prince of Furstenberg, along the Danube in the line of Mengen, and in the rear of the advanced-guard commanded by General Nauendorff, he directed the left column of his right wing under General Wallis to march from Altshausen towards Ostrach, whilst he himself with the centre proceeded to that place from Saulgau. Having fortunately succeeded in concentrating his main force at one point he attacked with fury the French centre, which was driven from its position after an obstinate resistance. Jourdan retreated to Pfullendorff, where he occupied an advantageous station, but during the night fell back beyond Stockach, and encamped on the heights of Aach. The loss of the Imperialists must have been considerable, as the attack on the strong position of Ostrach was extremely difficult

1799. from the nature of the ground, being either elevations or marshy. In the French official details this important action is superficially noticed ; but the Vienna gazette calculates the enemy's loss at five thousand men, and that of the Austrians at two thousand one hundred and sixty killed and wounded. The primary cause of the insuccess of Jourdan's centre has been ascribed to a deserter's having communicated the watch-word to the enemy, who, profiting of this circumstance and a heavy fog, surprised in great force the French advanced-guard. Such an incident is certainly not uncommon in warfare ; but the paucity of their numbers left the French army no hopes of ultimate success, and the masterly skill of Prince Charles, in bringing his forces to bear on one point, rendered victory certain.

MEANWHILE General Ferino on the right attacked and defeated the Austrian left near Uberlingen, and, advancing with his division and that of General Souham, pushed forward his light troops in the direction of Bregentz. This progress obliged General Hotze to hasten to that place with a detachment of twelve thousand men. But the Archduke's success at Ostrach, rendering his assistance unnecessary, he returned to Feldkirch, where General Jellachich who commanded in his absence, had succeeded, with the aid of the Tyrolese levy of peasants, in repulsing an attack of the enemy. The retrogression of the centre obliging both wings to fall back, the left under St. Cyr took a position between Sig-

maringen and Tutlingen; and this General on the twenty-third drove back with his cavalry a strong Austrian corps, that had advanced too precipitately as far as Hohen-Thengen. 1799.

JOURDAN now concentrated his main body near Engen, while the left under St. Cyr occupied Liptingen, and Ferino's division was posted at Singen. He resolved to attack the Imperialists on the twenty-fifth, and with this view dispatched two divisions from Engen to Liptingen to second General St. Cyr, who was to bear down on the Austrian right, and, if possible, gain their rear so as to cut off their communication with Pfullendorff: this was intended to be the chief point of attack. To conceal his motions, and draw the attention of the Archduke to the French right, Jourdan directed Ferino's division and the brigade of Ruby to attack Prince Schwartzemberg at Shillingen, and five or six battalions to assault the village of Aach, and endeavour to gain the defile at that place. The French left drove from their ground the Austrian right under the Count de Meerfeldt and General Wallis, pursued them into a wood between Liptingen and Stockach, and still following with rapidity impelled them in a few hours beyond its extremity, although it extends three miles in length. At the same time the Imperial van under General Nauendorff was compelled to retire to the heights of Nullenberg, and Prince Schwartzemberg to fall back on the left wing. In this dilem-

Battle of
Stockach.

1799. ma Prince Charles repaired to the left; and having given the command of it to Lieutenant-General Staeder, hastened in person to repair the disasters of the right. Staeder instantly detached a corps to assist General Nauendorff in defending the heights as the centre of the Archduke's position, or, if it became necessary to reinforce the right wing, to preserve the communications, and approach it in that direction.

GENERAL Wallis on the right ordered General Petrasch to post two battalions of infantry on the heights of Zizenhangen in order to cover his right flank, and make head against the French troops, who, after clearing the wood in front, were rapidly advancing. But this operation was particularly unfortunate; the Princes of Furstenberg and Anhalt-Bernberg were killed, and several other generals and officers of rank dangerously wounded. The assailants were the choicest troops of the French army, and bore down all before them with irresistible impetuosity. Night now approached, and Jourdan's numbers did not authorise him to prosecute his advantage. The French left, therefore, gradually retired to their former position at Liptingen, towards which the division of General Vandamme defiled, who had advanced in the direction of Moeskirch as if with an intent to turn the Austrian right. On the left wing, General Staeder's situation was extremely critical. His light infantry were compelled to abandon the village of Leuzingen; and notwithstanding the advantage of posi-

tion, no resistance could have prevented the enemy from obtaining possession of the heights of Nellenberg, now become isolated, if the darkness had not interrupted all further attempts. 1799.

Thus terminated this memorable battle; and when it is considered, that the Austrian army mustered about sixty thousand strong, while General Jourdan's force amounted only to forty or forty-five thousand men, prejudice must acknowledge the resolute spirit of the commander, and the distinguished valour of his troops. But although he slept on the field of battle, the inferiority of his numbers, and the loss he had sustained, left no other alternative than retreat. With that intent, and to check the pursuit of the enemy, he directed some partial attacks to be made on the Austrian left, after which he retired by Neustadt, Hornberg, and Freudenstadt, without experiencing any serious interruption. The Archduke calculates the French loss at five thousand men, of whom two thousand were prisoners; and his own at three thousand killed, wounded, and missing. This number, on making allowance for a pardonable inclination to diminish his own loss, and exaggerate that of the enemy, evinces, when combined with the language of his dispatches, the disastrous issue of the battle. General Jourdan states the loss of the Imperialists at four thousand prisoners, but does not mention his own. Prince Maurice of Lichtenstein was killed, and General Meerfeldt wounded.

1799.

Remarks
on the operations of
the armies.

ALTHO' aware that it is easier to discover faults after commission, than to prevent their occurrence by a provident foresight, we trust it will not be deemed presumptuous or obtrusive to hazard a few remarks on the preceding military operations in Germany. The Executive Directory, by ordering the army of the Danube to advance from Kehl thro' Suabia, appear to have committed an important error. Long ago satisfied of the impossibility of avoiding hostilities, they had it in their power to have collected the mass of their forces in the north-eastern point of Switzerland; by which means the troops would have escaped a difficult march over rugged mountains, and thro' dangerous defiles and woods almost impervious. Twenty days elapsed after commencing operations, before the hostile armies encountered at Ostrach. But, by approaching from Schaffhausen and Constance, Jourdan might, in a few days, have advanced to the Iller without interruption, as there was no Austrian corps in his rear, and the Archduke required seventeen days to reach Saulgau. While the French left occupied Ulm at the confluence of that river with the Danube, and the centre stretched along its banks to Kempten, the right would have been in a situation to have operated with decisive effect against General Hotze's post at Feldkirch, and opened a communication with Massena's left. At the same time, Jourdan, by anticipating his opponent, would have had a large river in his front, and thereby compensated for the inferiority of his numbers. The felicity of this po-

fition would, at least, have enabled him to oppose a more formidable resistance to the operations of the Imperialists.

1799.

THE French army, by debouching between the Danube and the northern extremity of the Lake of Constance, had to extend, and consequently weaken, their line in proportion to their progress. The right had not only to contend with the Austrian left, but at the same time to watch the motions of Hotze, who advanced with a strong detachment, and threatened their flank and rear. The French general could, therefore, bring his centre and left only to act against the main army of Prince Charles, who readily foresaw, that a fortunate effort by his collected forces against the French centre was, in a manner, penetrating to the vitals of the enemy. The plan of his Royal Highness was formed with judgment, and crowned with success. Jourdan had, in fact, reached the farthest possible point of his progress: for, supposing that he had anticipated the Archduke, and by concentrating his two divisions made a successful attack on the centre of the Imperialists, he would necessarily have left their wings in his rear. In this situation, retreat must have been barely practicable, considering his inferior numbers: and thus, in every point of view, his final defeat was unavoidable.

PRINCE Charles had it now in his choice either to advance in pursuit of Jourdan towards Strasburg, or, by turning to Switzerland, cross the Rhine, and fall on the left wing of General Maffe-

1799. na. To provide against either of these operations, Jourdan had directed his right under Ferino to pass the river at Schaffhausen, break down the bridges, and occupy the left bank. By this manœuvre Ferino was able to harass his Royal Highness in flank and rear in case he should imprudently advance to the Brisgaw, or to cover Massena and retard the progress of the Imperialists, until new measures of defence should be adopted.

Operations
in the Gri-
son Country.

THE proclamation, which General Massena addressed to the Grisons on the sixth, was similar to that issued by Jourdan on entering Germany, with such modifications as local circumstances produced. On the same day, he attacked, in several points, the Austrian troops posted in that country; and after an obstinate action, his main body got possession of Luciensteig. This fort, situated at the extremity of a pass formed out of a rock along the channel of the Rhine, is the only communication through the Rætian Alps between the Voralberg and the Grisons. Massena, following up his success with rapidity, entirely routed the Imperialists, took their commander-in-chief General Auffenberg and upwards of three thousand of his men prisoners, and entered Coire. On the right of the centre, General Demont made himself master of Reichenau, and the bridges over the Rhine; while General Audinot on the left defeated the enemy, and captured several pieces of cannon and fifteen hundred prisoners. During these operations, a French corps amused General Hotze in the Voralberg with a feigned attack, which how-

1799.

ever was so vigorous, that Hotze was able to preserve his main position at Feldkirch only in consequence of a powerful reinforcement from the Archduke. The Imperialists complained of the ineffectual aid they received from the Grisons; and we are informed by the Vienna Gazette, that altho' the tocsin had sounded for several hours, only sixty men of the levy of peasants appeared in arms; but it does not mention, whether this backwardness proceeded from cowardice or disaffection.

THE French now entered the valley of Engadin, where three thousand six hundred Austrians were taken prisoners, and General Laudohn their commander escaped only by flight. Thus in a few days the Grison country was cleared of the Imperialists, who, in a series of unfortunate engagements, had lost upwards of ten thousand men in killed and prisoners, besides thirty-six pieces of cannon and all their magazines. The difficulties of the country happily presented innumerable points of defence, and Laudohn, although defeated, was still able to occupy the defiles leading into the Tyrol. General Lecourbe's division penetrated as far as St. Martinsbruck and Finstermuntz in the Lower Engadin, after leaving a small corps at Zernetz to communicate with a French detachment from the Valteline, who were expected at St. Marie.

ON the fifteenth General Laudohn made a spirited attack, in three points, at Zernetz, Schultz,

1799. — and Martinsbruck. In that at Schultz, he surprised and captured the French General Mainoni and his detachment; but in the other two attacks he did not experience the same success. This good fortune seems to have rendered the Imperialists inconsiderately daring; for in a subsequent engagement, they were completely routed with great loss. General Lecourbe prosecuted his advantage by attacking St. Martinsbruck and Finstermuntz, while a division of the army of Italy under General Desolles advanced against Glurentz. Both operations succeeded, and the Austrians, on the twenty-fifth, sustained another defeat, with the loss of twenty-seven pieces of cannon, eleven hundred men killed and wounded, and about seven thousand taken prisoners, if we may confide in General Massena's dispatches.

THESE victories spread consternation in the Tyrol, and proclamations were issued by the governor at Inspruck, and other agents of government, calling on the people to rise immediately *en masse*, as it required the most prompt and energetic measures to oppose the further progress of the enemy. Marshal Bellegarde, the Commander-in-chief, assembled all his forces, and on the thirty-first attacked with great intrepidity the intrenchments of General Desolles, when a most desperate engagement ensued, in which several Austrian officers of merit were killed. The French, however, were finally obliged to fall back to Zernetz, after making a stand at Tauffers and Munster; but the Austrians having

ventured to attack Zernitz were repulsed in their turn.

1799.

By the insuccess of Jourdan, General Massena's situation became extremely critical. He was in momentary danger of an attempt by the Archduke on one side, while the Austrian corps under General Hotze at Feldkirch, being strongly reinforced from the main army, was in a condition to act with effect. Popular commotions began to break out in different parts of Switzerland, particularly in the small cantons of Uri and Glarus. The measures adopted by the Helvetic Directory to recruit their army, tended to increase these disturbances, while the friends of Austria in that country acquired additional boldness on every advantage obtained by the Imperialists. Massena was, therefore, constrained to retire his troops from the Tyrolean frontier, and, by concentrating his forces, make the best defence circumstances would admit.

BEFORE entering Switzerland, the Archduke issued a proclamation to the inhabitants. It was, he said, in consequence of the two victories obtained over the French army, that the troops under his command had entered the Helvetic territory not to wage war against the well-affected natives, but to pursue the common enemy, against whom the Swiss themselves had so bravely fought for liberty and independence. Superior force alone had reduced the inhabitants to the wretched situation, in which they were now placed, and with which

Archduke's
proclama-
tion to the
Swiss.

30th.

1799.

they had already so openly avowed their discontent. Among other pretences employed to reconcile them to their present state of dependence and subjection, it had been represented as the object of the Imperial court to make their territories the subject of partition. Efforts had been made to alarm them with the apprehension, that the Austrian army threatened them with subjugation and plunder. For these reasons he felt himself called on solemnly to make known to the whole nation, that it was the purpose of his Imperial Majesty to regulate himself by the assurances of constant friendship and neighbourly regard, which their High Mightinesses of the Swiss confederacy had experienced on every occasion; and to preserve with them the amicable relations, which had hitherto subsisted. The Emperor had no other object in view than to enter upon negotiations, by which the Swiss might be secured in their national independence, freedom, privileges, and possessions. His Royal Highness therefore expected, that the troops under his command, who had entered the Helvetic territories from the purest motives, would, on this arduous and pressing occasion, be supported by all those who had a regard for the interest of their country. He farther hoped, that the people of Switzerland would abstain from every measure, by which the evils of war might be increased. Among the various advantages such a conduct would confer, it would not be the least considerable, that the regulations, imposed with hostile views and by violent interference, would be abolished, and

the former relations, with regard to commercial intercourse between Germany and Switzerland, re-established.

1799.

AN Austrian corps under General Stzarry, destined to watch the operations of Bernadotte in the Neckerau, had slowly approached in the direction of Heilbron. They now ventured to push forward their advanced posts in order to create an alarm on the flank of General St. Cyr, who was retiring by Dornstedt, and followed by a detachment from the Archduke's main army. But neither party had sufficient strength in this quarter to undertake any consequential operation; and it is unnecessary to enumerate a variety of movements and unimportant skirmishes, which are ever attended with alternate success, and productive only of bloodshed.

Operations
in Suabia.

It is difficult to assign a reason for the subsequent inactivity of Prince Charles. But from whatever cause it may have originated, his neglect to prosecute the success which he had obtained, enabled General Massena to dissipate the alarm occasioned by the rout of the French army, and to concert measures of defence. This commander, after arranging his positions along the line to the south of the lake of Constance, hastened to the Rhine. Having been invested by the French government with the additional command of the army of the Danube, he directed a considerable reinforcement to advance by Basle, in order to strengthen his left wing now converted into a front. His

Inactivity
of the
Archduke.

1799

affiduity and perseverance were incessant and effectual, and form a striking contrast with the tardy movements of his opponent. It is futile to ascribe the Archduke's procrastination to a temporary indisposition. Such an assertion could tend only to insinuate incapacity on the part of the superior officers of his army, whose reputation in arms repels the imputation. A few days were sufficient to concert future operations with the commanders of the Imperial cordon; and the only rational causes that can be assigned for delay, were the shock his army had sustained in the battle of Stockach, and the physical inability of Austria alone to contend with France. It was not until the twenty-second of May, two months after the battle, that he attempted to cross the Rhine into Switzerland. The temporary and hard-earned success he obtained there, so far from promising a fortunate issue, demonstrated the internal debility of his army, and may be regarded as the prelude of subsequent disasters. We will avail ourselves of this pause in hostilities on the Rhine, in order to relate the military occurrences in Italy.

Tuscany occupied by
the French:

THE Grand-Duke of Tuscany resigned his sceptre without attempting an useless opposition. Since the sixteenth of March, French troops had been constantly marching to Lucca; and his Royal Highness received positive information from his minister at Milan, that France had finally determined on the conquest of Tuscany, and that ten thousand men were assembled under General

1799.

Vignole at Bologna to carry that measure into effect. This intelligence, confirmed by other unquestionable authorities, threw the court into the greatest consternation; and several persons of distinction fled in various directions with their most valuable effects. The Marquis of Manfredini, the Grand-Duke's minister, repaired to General Scherer's headquarters with an intent to open a negotiation, but his mission was fruitless. On the twenty-fifth a French detachment of three thousand men arrived at Florence, and occupied the principal posts, the Tuscan troops who guarded them laying down their arms. After this, the commanding officer intimated to his Royal Highness to leave the city with his family in the ensuing night, and at the same time gave notice, that in case of refusal force would be employed. The Grand-Duke accordingly set out for Venice, and next day a municipality was nominated, of which Professor Fontana was chosen president.

ALL these innovations were effected without any resistance on the part of the inhabitants. * His Royal Highness had issued a proclamation on the mor-

* THE French commissioner Rheinhard, a man of conciliating and humane manners, and since (we believe) minister for foreign affairs in France, directed, that all persons, attached to the personal service of the Duke and his family, should receive, exclusive of the arrears due to them, an additional month's salary, and that those who were infirm should be intitled to pensions.

1799.

ning of the twenty-fifth, declaring that he would regard it as a proof of the fidelity, attachment, and affection of his subjects, if, at the time the French troops entered Florence, the people respected them and every individual of that nation. He besought them to abstain from all acts that might give occasion to any kind of complaint; and added, that this prudent conduct would secure to them new claims to his esteem. Such was the parental care, with which this amiable sovereign employed his influence for the prevention of tumults and a resistance, that behoved to prove injurious only to the Tuscans.

ON the twenty-fourth of the same month, a corps of French troops under General Miollis took possession of Leghorn, after disarming the Tuscan soldiers. The General ordered all the French emigrants to depart, within a specified time, under the penalty of incurring the punishment, to which they were liable by the laws of the republic. Most of the English had withdrawn with their property: but the British merchandise that remained was confiscated, and all contracts of sale, made in the course of the preceding fifteen days, were annulled.

Operations
of the Im-
perial and
French ar-
mies in Ita-
ly.

March.

Two causes contributed to retard the commencement of hostilities between the French and Austrians in the north of Italy. The republican army was comparatively feeble; and the Emperor wished that the Russians, destined to reinforce his troops under General Kray, in Italy, should have reached,

1799.

as nearly as possible, the scene of action, so as to retrieve a disaster, or decisively confirm success. The Imperial army stretched along the left bank of the Adige, and occupied in force the tract of country between that river and the Lake of Garda. As the movements of the enemy intimated an approaching attack, General Kray strengthened the post of Legnago from his camp at Bevilacqua. General Kaim, who commanded the right wing, was strongly reinforced, intelligence having been received that the French were concentrating their troops near Villa-Franca and Castell-Nuovo. Similar precautions were adopted at Verona; and where the ground admitted, particularly on the right, the position was farther strengthened by intrenchments. In order to facilitate the retreat of the right, and also to preserve a communication with the left bank of the Adige, two bridges of boats were thrown over that river, each having a double *tete de pont* defended by artillery.

At day-break on the twenty-sixth, General Scherer, in three divisions, attacked the Imperialists posted between the Lake of Garda and the Adige, while two other divisions advanced against Verona, and a sixth attracted the attention of the Austrian troops posted at Legnago. The two divisions under Generals Victor and Grenier, destined to act against Verona, attacked with impetuosity the posts of St. Lucia and St. Massimo, the central points of this part of the Austrian position. About four o'clock, General Liptay, who commanded at

Battle of
Verona &
Legnago.

1799.

St. Lucia was wounded, as was also soon afterwards the General next in command, and the post carried. The republican troops made seven successive attacks on the post of St. Massimo, carried it seven times, and were latterly obliged to abandon it on the approach of night. The divisions on the left carried the Austrian redoubts in front, while General Serrurier's detachment, seconded by the flotilla on the lake, cleared the adjacent heights. At Legnago, both sides fought with fury; and it required every exertion of General Kray in person to arrest the progress of the enemy. The country, being intersected by canals, was happily favourable for defensive operations. After a sanguinary contest during eighteen hours, night terminated the struggle, and the hostile armies resumed their former positions. Scherer states the loss of the Imperialists at three thousand killed, and four thousand taken prisoners. The Vienna Gazette asserts in general terms, that the loss of the enemy could not be estimated at less than from eight to ten thousand men. General Kaim, the French General Delmas, and several superior officers on both sides, were wounded.

Engage-
ment at
Verona

Not intimidated by his unsuccessful attack on the twenty-sixth, General Scherer made another attempt on the thirtieth. He directed the division of Serrurier, and part of that of Victor, to endeavour to gain possession of the heights behind Verona; and after passing the Adige at Ronco, and turn-

ing the enemy's right wing, oblige them to retreat by Vicenza, and entirely separate them from Verona and Legnago. This detachment succeeded in driving in all the Austrian advanced-posts; but the farther they proceeded, the greater opposition they had to encounter. Sensible of the impracticability of effecting his object with so small a force, the French general prepared to retire. The Imperialists, however, having collected all their troops, intercepted, by a successful manœuvre, the retreat of part of the French detachment, and took about one thousand prisoners. General Scherer made no effort to second this operation of Serrurier by a powerful diversion, or to succour his troops when in danger; but, with the most criminal indifference, sacrificed the lives of men, whose bravery sunk under the incumbent weight of numbers.

1799.

AFTER this check the French descended the Adige, and took a position between that river and the Tartaro, as if with an intent to cross the former. On the second of April, General Kray passed with his main army, and occupied a camp in front of Verona, his left being supported by the post of Tomba, and his right by that of St Lucia. To create a diversion, and distract the attention of the French, General Klenau made some movements on the Lower Po as far as Ostiglia, where he encountered little opposition from the scattered parties of the enemy. General Kray on the fifth marched with his army in three columns, supported by a fourth, against the French camp at Magnan, opposite to that occupi^d

Battle of
Magnan.

April.

1799

by his main body under Vercana; and as his antagonist had determined to make a further attack on the Imperialists, both sides were prepared for action.

Scherer, to make a third attempt to pass the Adige, Scherer had concentrated his forces between that river and the Tormen. He had evacuated the whole country near the Lake of Garda, so that the communication with the Tyrol by the valley of the Adige was open to the Austrians, who had pushed their parties as far as Pustiana, and even thrown several boats into the place. Instead of advancing to the Upper Adige where the passage was easy, driving General Kray to the left side of the river, and re-opening communication with the army of Helvetia, Scherer fell into a trap, interdicted, and consequently rendered difficult, by numberless canals and streams. Every step must have entangled his troops, while the Imperial General, who had crossed the Adige in great force, was in condition to act against the flank and rear of the French, and thereby perhaps annihilate their army by a single blow.

Thus ensnared by his imprudence, Scherer had no alternative but to endeavour to oppose Kray's progress, on the right bank of the Adige, by hazarding a battle. He accordingly directed Generals Victor and Grenier to proceed along the banks of the river below Vercana, and take possession of the village of St. James, while Delmas with the advanced guard covered their attack. General Mo-

reau, with the divisions of Hatry and Montrichard, 1799.
was charged with engaging every hostile corps he might find between Villa-Franca and Verona; and Serrurier, who was intrusted with the attack on the former of these places, was to carry it, and follow the Imperialists to the Adige. Serrurier, although at first repulsed, succeeded in a second attempt; and General Moreau, having forced the enemy in the plain to fall back, advanced towards Verona. But Victor and Grenier, notwithstanding some advantages gained at first by the impetuosity of their troops, were compelled in the evening to yield to the valour and superior numbers of the Imperialists. The retreat of these two divisions uncovered the flank of the French army; and had this incident occurred at an earlier hour, the success of the Austrians must have been decisive. The two other columns maintained their ground until the approach of darkness, after which they retired; and during the night the whole French army abandoned the field of battle and their camp.

GENERAL Kray estimates his loss, in this action, at two thousand killed and wounded; and that of the enemy at two thousand prisoners, besides their killed. The greater part of these prisoners were Cisalpines and Piedmontese. Scherer calculates his own loss at three thousand men killed, wounded, and taken; and that of the Imperialists at two thousand prisoners. The field of battle was covered with the dead; for the contest had

1799. continued seven hours, during which the ground was disputed with extreme obstinacy, and frequently gained and lost. Field-Marshal Mercantin, two Major-Generals, and seven other staff and commissioned Austrian officers were wounded.

Retreat of
the French
army.

SCHERER, pressed in every direction, now abandoned all his positions, and fell back beyond the Mincio. He was closely followed by the Imperialists, who had been reinforced by several Austrian corps, and a powerful body of Russian auxiliaries. Weakened, but not dispirited, the French army continued its retreat across the Adda, after throwing a body of troops into Mantua, and another into Peschiera. Field-Marshal Suwarrow, who had now assumed the command of the Austro-Russian forces, left General Kray with a corps of thirty thousand men to invest these fortresses, and with his characteristic rapidity followed the French, his main army amounting to fifty thousand men.

Passage of
the Adda.

THE French had, on the twenty-fourth, abandoned the Oglio, which the Imperial army soon after passed, and advanced in three columns to the Adda. General Moreau, who now commanded the French troops in place of Scherer, fortified Cassano, and erected formidable batteries along the right of the river, with a strong *tete de pont* on the left. He fixed his head-quarters at Inzaego, where two divisions of his army were posted. General Serurier defended the upper Adda, one half of his division occupying a position behind Lecco, a

part near Porto-Imberzago, and the rest near Trezzo. On the Lower Adda, towards Lodi, General Delmas was stationed with a detachment, having his flank covered by Pizzighitone. The Russians under General Vukassowich, forming the right of the Imperial army, attacked, on the twenty-sixth, all the French corps posted in front of Lecco, and after a stubborn contest drove them back to the *tete de pont*. The whole of the day was spent in some military movements: a body of French troops shewed themselves at Crema; and an Austrian detachment crossed the Po, and pushed towards Parma. 1799.

SUWARROW made preparations to force a passage on the twenty-seventh, and with this intent sent Vukassowich across the river near Brivio, where he occupied a good position. During the night he succeeded in establishing bridges opposite to Trezzo, which the natural difficulties of the country had led the French to regard as impracticable. By means of these the main body of the army passed, and attacked General Grenier's division, which was marching against Vukassowich at Brivio. Grenier took post between Pozzo and Brivio, and maintained his ground with great obstinacy. Having received a reinforcement from the division of General Victor, he was on the point of turning the right wing where the Austrian battalions had given way, when Field-Marshal-Lieutenant Zoph's division arrived. Part of these attacked the French in front, but paid dearly for their imprudence; the

1799.

rest fell on the enemy's flank, which was obliged to give way, still however preserving a steady countenance in its retreat.

By falling back towards the Po, the French not only left Milan uncovered, but lost their communication with Serrurier's division on the upper Adda. General Melas' column reached that capital on the twenty-eighth, while the right wing under General Rosenberg crossed the Adda at Brivio on the twenty-seventh. The Imperial advanced-guard attacked Serrurier at Bertero, who after a bloody engagement was defeated and forced to capitulate, his whole corps, which consisted only of three thousand men, laying down their arms. Marshal Suwarrow calculates the loss of the enemy in these actions at upwards of five thousand taken prisoners, and six thousand killed, besides the capture of eighty pieces of cannon.

Brescia

and Peschiera taken.

May.

BRESCIA, which was occupied by a garrison of one thousand men, capitulated, on the twentieth of April, in a cowardly manner after a few shots. Peschiera, with similar precipitation and pusillanimity, surrendered on the sixth of May by capitulation, the terms of which evince the prudence of General Kray, who did not wish to dissipate his time or strength by inflexibility. The garrison, scarcely fifteen hundred strong, were allowed to return to France on condition of not serving against the Emperor or his allies for six months. These articles were offered by General Kray, and accepted by

the garrison before any trenches were opened against the place.

1799.

AFTER leaving a corps of four thousand men to blockade the citadel of Milan, Suwarrow marched with his main body from that place to Pavia. In the meantime Moreau, with his beaten army, fell back between the Po and the Tanaro, his right extending to Aleffandria, and his left to Valenza. On the ninth, Pizzighitone, which was held by a Captain with only six hundred men under his command, surrendered to Field-Marshal Lieutenant Kaim, the garrison becoming prisoners of war. Early on the morning of the seventh, the Imperialists had opened their trenches against this fortress, and set fire to a magazine of hay and wood, which continued burning till night. In the evening, a small powder magazine blew up, several batteries were dismounted, and even the embrasures demolished. Still, however, the governor persisted in his defence, and notwithstanding the proximity of the Austrian batteries, and the apprehension that the powder in the casemates would catch fire, continued inflexible till the ninth at midnight.

Pizzighi-
tone surren-
ders.

THE Imperialists, after making a feint in several places to pass the Po, pushed a detachment across the river on the eleventh, but these were either killed or taken prisoners by the left wing of Grenier's division. A body of seven thousand Russians passed the Po at Basignana on the twelfth, and proceeded against Pecetto. Moreau had anticipa-

Engage-
ment at
Pecetto.

1799. ted their plan, and disposed Grenier's division in a proper situation ; but as this division was unable to withstand so great a number, he detached Victor's corps to its assistance. The Russians were attacked in front and in flank, and after a sturdy resistance gave way on all sides : one half of them only were able to regain the opposite bank, the rest being either drowned, killed, or taken prisoners.

ENFEEBLED by so many engagements and disasters, Moreau's army was now reduced to seventeen thousand men. His communications on the side of Piedmont were interrupted by incessant insurrections of the peasantry, and particularly the Barbets, or mountaineers, who are eminent in history for their robberies and assassinations. He had been obliged to collect all the French troops scattered through Piedmont, and encamp at Alessandria with this inconsiderable force. Meanwhile the right of the Imperial army advanced in the direction of Vercelli and Ivrea, with an intent to bear down on Turin, after occupying or blockading the fortresses on the Doria and to the north of the Po.

Suwar-
row's
proclama-
tion to the
Piedmon-
tese.

SUWARROW's progress now induced him to issue a proclamation to the inhabitants of Piedmont. Sensible, he said, of the necessity of establishing public order in the Piedmontese provinces happily conquered by the combined Austro-Russian forces, he considered it as a duty not only to watch over the distribution of justice, but also to maintain in

activity all the branches of public economy and administration on the footing, and according to the system, established by his Sardinian Majesty. He therefore directed that the laws, and political and civil establishments, existing before the order of things which had just ceased, should be re-established and enforced. General Latour was invested with the most extensive powers to make every necessary disposition, as well in the military as in the civil and financial departments; and to appoint persons who should be deemed, on account of their probity and talents, the best qualified to fill important places. The Marshal farther ordered, that all persons so commissioned should exercise the functions entrusted to them, conformably to the former laws and establishments; and act in unforeseen cases as might be most expedient for the maintenance of public order. The dispositions, relative to the financial department, and the extinction of the public debt, were to continue to be observed; but until otherwise ordained, the circulation and issuing of royal notes bearing interest were suspended. These ordonnances, altho' they faintly surmise the restoration of his Sardinian Majesty, do not warrant a decisive inference that such was the intention of the allies. At the same time they cannot be construed to sanction the impolitic pretensions, which Austria afterwards thought proper to advance, and which we will have occasion to notice in a subsequent part of this work.

1799.

A PROCLAMATION, addressed by Marshal Suwar-

1799. row to the nations of Italy, is conceived in language less ambiguous, and tends to develop the views of the allies, whose confidence has been deceived by the ambition and selfish policy of Austria. The energy and style of this proclamation, so characteristic of that eminent personage, would be injured by compression. After calling on them to take up arms, and unite under banners contending for God and the faith, he promised that they should triumph over the perfidious foe. "The army of his Majesty our most exalted Emperor and King," continued the General, "is fighting in consequence of the provocations given by France, and shedding its blood in defence of our most holy religion, for the recovery of your property, and the *re-establishment of your former governments*. Do not the French incessantly demand immense sums, and exact uncommon requisitions; and all this under the chimerical name of liberty and equality? Regardless of the injuries done to families, they bereave them of their dear children, and force them to bear arms and fight against your lawful sovereign, your loving father, and most zealous defender! Nations, be comforted!--there is a God who protects, and there are armies that defend you. See the number of our troops; see a new and complete army sent by the allied Emperor of Russia; ---behold these prudent nations, every where full of enthusiasm, about to terminate this bloody war in the most speedy manner. That faithful and numerous army, consisting of brave warriors, comes to deliver Italy. Fear nothing; ---wheresoever the

His proclamation to the Italian nations.

1799.

troops, combating against the French republic, may come, you shall see the laws restored, religion exalted, and private and public tranquillity revived, which, for these three years past, have been under a heavy yoke. The faithful ministers of religion shall be reinstated in their offices and property. But hear!--should there ever be found amongst you one so perfidious, as to take arms against our sovereign, or favour in any manner the enterprises of the French republic, such a perfidious man shall immediately be shot without regard to quality, birth, rank, office, or condition; and his family, houses, and property, shall be persecuted and destroyed. Your prudence, nations of Italy, induces a hope, that, being now convinced of the justice of our cause, you will furnish no occasion for inflicting those rigorous measures and irremissible punishments; but that you will rather manifest proofs of your fidelity and attachment to so beneficent and loving a sovereign."

THE citadel of Milan surrendered by capitulation on the twenty-fourth, the garrison, which consisted of two thousand two hundred men, (four hundred only of whom were French troops,) agreeing not to serve against his Imperial Majesty for the space of a year, unless wholly or partly exchanged in that period. Ceva was blockaded and taken by an assemblage of several thousands of armed peasantry; and the garrisons being only three hundred and twenty-five in number, were made prisoners of war. On the Lower Po, Ferrara, after

The citadels of Milan

1799:
 and Ferrara
 surrendered.

a few bombs had been thrown into the citadel, surrendered to General Klenau on the twenty-third, its garrison of fifteen hundred and twenty-five men being allowed to return to France, on condition of not serving against the Emperor or his allies during the ensuing six months.

THREE or four divisions of the Imperial army advanced against Turin, which they summoned on the twenty-seventh, and soon afterwards entered the town, the French retiring to the citadel. As the citizens had committed several acts of hostility against the garrison, the latter commenced a cannonade on the place, but were prevailed on to desist. During this, General Seckendorff approached the fortress of Alessandria; and as these diversified operations engrossed the attention of the Imperial commander for some time, we will resume the detail of transactions in other points of the theatre of war.

Position of
 the hostile
 armies on
 the Rhine.

WE left General Massena occupied in adopting measures, which might enable him to make a respectable opposition against a victorious enemy. But before proceeding to narrate the military occurrences in this quarter, we will endeavour to give a succinct view of the positions of the respective armies. The right wing of the united army of the Danube and Helvetia extended from Bormio as far as Reineck on the Lake of Constance, and consisted of three divisions, one of which commanded by General Lecourbe had fixed its head-quarters at

Zernetz near the Tyrolean frontier. The centre 1799.
reached from Arbon on the Lake of Constance to
the Frickthal, and was composed of four divisions.
Vandamme, with the first of these, was posted at
Andelfingen; the second, under General Audinot,
had its right supported by Munterlingen, and its
left by Stein; General Thurreau was stationed with
the third at Bulach; and the fourth, acting as a
reserve under the command of General Soult, oc-
cupied the town and vicinity of Weil. The left
wing comprised all the troops on the right bank of
the Rhine before Kehl and Old Brisach, and
stretched upward along the Rhine as far as Lauffen-
burg in Helvetia. The first division of this wing
was commanded by General Souham, and compre-
hended all the corps from Lauffenburg to Hunin-
guen; and the second, under General Legrande,
was composed of the troops before Kehl and Old
Brisach, having its head-quarters at Wilstadt. Be-
sides this army, a division under the orders of Ge-
neral Nouvion occupied the interior of Helvetia,
with its head-quarters at Lucerne. The division
of the Lower Rhine, under Collaud, occupied
Manheim and the adjacent country; and the first
military division lay at Strasburg and in its neigh-
bourhood. It was along the whole of this exten-
sive and circuitous line, that General Massena had
to make defensive arrangements; and his indefa-
tigable perseverance succeeded beyond the most
 sanguine expectation.

THE Imperial army occupied a counter line,
commencing in the vicinity of Rastadt, and

1799. stretching along the right bank of the Rhine, the head-quarters of his Royal Highness being established at Engen. Then turning the Lake of Constance to Feldkirch, where General Hotze commanded, it traced the Tyrolean frontier. Marshal Bellegarde held the chief command in this point, and maintained a communication with the Imperial army in Italy by the Valteline and the Lakes. General Stzarry remained inactive in Upper Suabia, where he was posted with a detachment to guard the passage of the Necker, and watch the movements of the French on the Lower Rhine.

Operations
on the Ty-
rolean fron-
tier.

ALTHO' Prince Charles imprudently continued in a state of inactivity for so long a period, the hostile divisions on the frontiers of the Tyrol had many desperate encounters. These it would be useless to relate, as they had little influence on the great military operations, and are chiefly remarkable for the uncommon fury with which they were fought. If, however, we recollect the critical situation of the French army at this period, the mere circumstance of their divisions on the right being able to retain their positions was of itself a victory, as they had to contend with partial insurrections in their rear, and with numerous bodies of the enemy in front, led on by a long list of experienced Field-Mmarshals and Generals. On the thirtieth of April Marshal Bellegarde attacked Lecourbe at Zernetz and Veranka, but was repulsed in four successive assaults with great loss, owing to the strong intrenchments and fortified defiles occupied by

the French. Massena calculates the loss of the Imperialists at four or five thousand men. General Bellegarde reluctantly acknowledges his success, without mentioning in his voluminous dispatches the loss sustained by either party. Several sharp encounters occurred in this point, but were not attended with any decisive effect.

1799.

To quash the commotions of the natives, General Massena issued a proclamation, in which he mentioned the intelligence he had received, that perfidious or fanatical persons committed acts of violence against the French troops, when marching singly or in scattered parties. "I also learn," said he, "that symptoms of insurrection have appeared in different quarters of Switzerland. Helvetians! why this sudden change? why destroy the indispensable harmony, which existed between you and the French army? and why disturb that peace, which reigned in your abodes? It would seem, you listen to the insinuations and atrocious plots of the enemies of the French and Helvetic republics. It would seem, that you conceive the French troops to be no longer in a state to resist the Austrian forces. Yet the army, which I command, has beat them at every point where it has been engaged, and will still beat them should they dare to enter your territory. But can you imagine, that amidst the efforts of courage, and the sacrifices which that army makes for your defence, it will coolly see its heroes falling under the attacks of cowardly assassins? And do you suppose, that

Massena's
proclamation to the
Helvetians.

1790. I myself will hesitate to take a terrible revenge for these infamous enormities?"

He called on the Helvetians, who remained attached to France and their constitution, to save their country from the evils which threatened it, by repressing the guilty, and pointing them out to the government, that their crimes might be instantly punished. As to himself, he had shewn that he knew how to protect the people, whilst he beheld in them a faithful ally; and he would shew himself capable of punishing them, if they became traitors and violators of the faith of treaties. A regard for their security, and that of the French army, would alone be the rule of his conduct. He declared, that he would hold the communes responsible for all events, happening within their jurisdictions to the injury of the French; and concluded with intimating, that columns of the army would enter the cantons displaying any disposition to insurrection, and ravage them with fire and sword,

Success of
General
Hotze.

It seems to have been the plan of his Royal Highness, by reinforcing Generals Hotze and Bellegarde, to create so powerful a diversion as might facilitate his passage of the Rhine. The former of these Generals had about seventeen thousand men under his command, and the latter fourteen thousand; while several bodies of Austro-Russians endeavoured to penetrate by the Italian frontier in the direction of Bellinzona and Chiavenna. To oppose Hotze in the upper Rhein-

1799.

thal, the French could only muster about seven thousand men, and very prudently confined themselves to acting on the defensive. On the 14th, Hotze marched from Feldkirch, and attacked the French post at Luciensteig. His troops, with great perseverance, climbed the heights in the vicinity, and after a spirited engagement obliged the enemy to fall back to Sargans and Ragatz, from thence to Wallenstadt, and thereafter to evacuate the canton of Appenzel, the county of Toggenburg, and the Thurgaw, not however without contesting every inch of ground with their usual obstinacy, and with great loss on both sides. Meanwhile Prince Charles, to further these operations, made a demonstration of passing the Rhine. By this feint he prevented a corps of about seventeen thousand men, who were at Schaffhausen, from sending any detachment to reinforce their troops acting against General Hotze.

On the twenty-third his Royal Highness published a second proclamation to the Swiss, in which he premised, that in the state of dependence and constraint they were retained by the oppression of the enemy, they were not only ignorant of what occurred beyond their frontiers, but what might encourage them in their misfortunes was concealed. He took for granted, that measures had been adopted to keep secret from a part of the inhabitants his former declaration, in which he had stated the pacific and amicable intentions of his Imperial Majesty by the entry of his troops

Archduke's
second pro-
clamation
to the Swiss

1799. into the canton of Schaffhausen. He had, therefore, determined to renew his proclamation, in order to disseminate the sentiments of his Majesty throughout the cantons.

“**HELVETIANS,**” continued the Archduke, “for three ages you have enjoyed uninterrupted peace, and never beheld foreign troops in your territories. It is the ambition of conquest in the French government, that has destroyed your happy tranquillity; and it is by a violence and perfidy unexampled in history, that they have seized upon your country. Injuries of every kind have been the result; and yet the enemy pretend to your assistance. Your population is to be sacrificed to promote their interest and to subject Switzerland to the dominion of France. It was through Switzerland, that the people of Germany were to be attacked and subjugated; for such was the object of the enemy’s plans, which their defeat has prevented from being carried into execution. The pursuit of our triumphs is not less necessary to our safety, than to your deliverance. If you dread the evils inseparable from war, consider that you have already had all its scourges in the midst of you. To liberate yourselves from these, to obtain repose, and to recover your former security and independence, no other means are left than to oppose with vigour the enemies of your country.”

His Royal Highness next reminded them, that equity and justice towards the Swiss always accom-

panied the Imperial armies. The troops under his command would observe a rigorous discipline, and only required lodging, as care would be taken to arrange an equitable indemnification for whatever their immediate wants might render indispensable. He repeated the protestations he had made in the name of his Majesty, both in this and his former proclamations; and expressed his confidence, that the Swiss would not undertake any thing hostile against the Imperial army, but that, for their own advantage, they would favour and second its pure and beneficent views. On the other hand, he declared, that every town, community, or individual, who should afford assistance to the French, or fight against the Imperial troops, would be excluded from these amicable assurances, and treated as enemies. He therefore required all thinking men, and those to whom the welfare of their country was dear, to oppose measures tending only to its destruction, and to unite against the common enemy for the deliverance of Switzerland, to save which he expressed his fixed determination.

1799.

AN Austrian corps, that had debarked on the left bank of the Rhine, and advanced as far as Keiserthul with an intent to intercept the communications of the French troops on the Thur with Zurich, was completely defeated on the twenty-third. But notwithstanding every effort of Massena, the combined operations of Prince Charles and General Hotze enabled the Imperial army, by the twenty-fourth, to complete its communications

Critical situation.
Massena.

1799. through the Thurgaw. The French commander could no longer retain the country lying between the Rhine, the Lake of Constance, and the Thur, without endangering the safety of his army. General Hotze hung on his right, and even threatened to penetrate to his rear. The Archduke's army fronted his left; and although he had defeated the Austrian detachment that crossed the Rhine in his rear, yet reiterated attempts in that quarter must have finally obliged him to retreat, and probably at a more inauspicious moment.

PERHAPS his Royal Highness, by exerting all his strength to effect a junction with General Hotze in front of the Lake of Constance, did not, with his usual judgment, avail himself of the favourable posture of affairs. Military men will determine, whether it would not have been more prudent to have endeavoured to amuse Massena by a mere feint in that point, while Hotze turned the French right, and a powerful detachment from the Prince's main army, by crossing the Rhine at Keiserthul, and occupying the left bank of the Glat, deprived the French general of the possibility of retreat. The superiority of his numbers enabled Prince Charles to undertake, with facility, an operation of this extensive nature; and it was otherwise worthy of his genius and his glory.

GENERAL Petrasch, with the right wing of Hotze's corps, marched in the night of the twenty-fourth from St. Gall towards Frauenfeld. His

purpose was to form a junction with the Archduke's army, the advanced guard of which under General Nauendorff had crossed the Rhine on the twenty-first, without opposition, between Dissenhofen and Schaffhausen, and moved forward to Andelfingen. The rest of General Hotze's corps advanced on the morning of the twenty-fifth to Schwartzenbach, where they encamped behind the Thur, having their van-guard posted two leagues in front of the river on the road towards Elck.

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To anticipate a combined attack which his information lead him to expect from the Imperialists, who had collected in great force on the left bank of the Thur, Massena resolved to make a general effort against that part of the Austrian army, in order, if possible, to drive them beyond the river. Accordingly on the twenty-fifth, he ordered General Audinot to push on with the advanced guard to Frauenfeld against Petrasch, while a French column on the left attacked General Nauendorff by Andelfingen, and another under General Ney bore down on the Austrian centre by Adliken. General Soult was directed to advance with his corps in three divisions, in order to support these operations. The right of the Imperialists made a long and vigorous resistance, but were at length compelled to retire with precipitation, and repass the river at Andelfingen. General Petrasch was attacked the moment he reached the heights of Frauenfeld. He fought with still greater obstinacy, and even repulsed Audinot; but Soult, having arrived with a de-

Battle on
the Thur.

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tachment to his assistance, decided the fate of the day, and obliged the Imperialists to fall back to Weil. At the same time, the advanced-guard of General Hotze's left was driven back on the main body: the French however, not being in sufficient force to maintain their ground, retired on the approach of night. In this engagement, which continued till late in the evening, a sanguinary combat ensued between a body of the French and the Imperial regiment of Szekler hussars, whose disgraceful murder of the French ministers at Rastadt had justly rendered them an object of revenge. Massena reduces his own loss to nearly four hundred men, while he states that of the enemy at upwards of four thousand. It is probable there was a considerable disproportion, though not to that extent, as the Austrians were rather taken by surprise. Colonel Craufurd, the British envoy at the Imperial head-quarters, does not mention the loss of either party.

Second
battle on
the Thur.

To repair this disaster, Prince Charles advanced towards Frauenfeld with a reinforcement of about twelve thousand men, and thereby enabled Petrasch to resume the post he had abandoned. Preparations were made to attack the enemy's position near Winterthur; and accordingly, at day-break on the twenty-seventh, the Imperial troops advanced in every direction against the whole of the French line on the Thur. The action continued until the evening; when the republican army, after a steady resistance, proved unable to

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withstand the numbers and valour of the Imperialists. Massena was driven from his position ; but the ground being extremely favourable and intersected by woods, he effected his retreat in good order, and took post behind the Thörs. The Archduke's right under Nauendorff was prevented from arriving in time by an unfortunate delay in the construction of a pontoon bridge across the Thur at Andelfingen ; and owing to this circumstance, the success of the Austrians was not so decisive as it might otherwise have been.

It has been already mentioned that the French troops experienced considerable difficulties, in the southern parts of Switzerland, from partial insurrections of the peasantry. The inhabitants of the northern cantons, and particularly of the Pays de Vaud, had, on the contrary, not only supplied them with provisions, but taken up arms in their favour. Even the female sex displayed their animosity towards the Imperialists ; and several hundred women of the canton of Zurich and adjacent districts, who had been taken in the late battles, or shewn themselves very active partizans in the towns, were carried prisoners to Constance, and afterwards sent to Ulm*. To repress this hostile conduct, Prince

Third proclamation
of the Arch-
duke to the
Swiss.

* AT Frauenfeld, and some other neighbouring towns, several of these modern Amazons poured boiling water on the Austrian troops in the streets. These fervent libations to the republican cause, would however, if not desisted from, have justly occasioned the burning of their habitations.

1799. Charles, on the 27th, issued a proclamation to the natives, in which he premised that, in some parts of Switzerland, certain ill-disposed persons had fired from the houses upon the troops while in pursuit of the enemy. This, he said, was the more contrary to his expectation, as he had given, in his former proclamations, the most positive assurances to the Swiss nation of the sincere and friendly designs of his Imperial Majesty. Fully convinced as he was, that none but individuals could commit such acts of hostility, the safety of the army under his command required him to take all possible measures of military precaution, and to hold the magistrates of the towns, and chief persons in the villages, responsible in the most rigorous manner for every occurrence of that nature.

Engage-
ment at Em-
brach.

To check the progress of General Nauendorff, whose van-guard had advanced as far as Embrach on the left of the Thörs, and to cover the further retreat of the army, a corps attacked and carried that town on the twenty-seventh, and drove the Austrian troops beyond the river. After this, the whole French line withdrew in good order behind the Glat, and the main body occupied a strong intrenched camp in front of Zurich. The Archduke's right wing now advanced towards Buelach, the centre to Klotten, and General Hotze's column to Bafferdorff.

Battle of the
Glat.

As the real strength of the enemy's position at Zurich was unknown, Prince Charles was in hopes of be-

ing able to induce them to quit it by threatening to turn their right flank. It was also necessary, in order to facilitate an attack on Massena's intrenchments, to drive the French troops from the left bank of the Glat, and establish there a strong advanced-guard. His Royal Highness accordingly ordered General Hotze to cross the river with the left wing of the army on the third of June, one column in the direction of Tubendorff, and another below the Greifensee, while, to second these operations, a general attempt was made on the rest of the French line. As the chief attack was on the right under General Soult, Massena had repaired in person to that point, and made the necessary dispositions for a vigorous defence. The villages between the French main position and the river were several times taken and retaken. Both sides fought with unabating fury until night, when the Austrians retired, abandoning what part of the enemy's posts they had gained.

1799.

June.

MASSENA had selected an excellent altho' not extensive position, in front of Zurich, and on a ridge of hills between the Glat and the Limmat, running nearly parallel to these rivers, and in most parts covered with woods. He had farther strengthened it by numerous intrenchments and redoubts, particularly its most interesting point called the Zurichberg, which is greatly elevated above the other parts of the ridge. On this hill he had posted his right wing, consisting chiefly of infantry, with their right flank stretching back towards the

Battle of Zurich.

1799.

town. The left wing occupied the rest of the chain of hills, and was covered on the left by a corps posted between Regensberg and the Glat. In the centre the ground being much lower, clear of wood, and of easy access, is traversed by the roads leading from Klotten and Winterthur to Zurich. This was the only point in which cavalry could act; but it was completely occupied by a chain of closed redoubts, considerably retired, and serving as a curtain to connect the two wings, which were not quite a cannon-shot asunder.

EARLY in the morning, of the fourth the Imperial army, having their front covered with fifty cannon, commenced an impetuous attack on the whole of the French line. As the chief object was to drive the enemy from the Zurichberg, the main point of their position, the contest was particularly sanguinary in that quarter, where General Hotze commanded the Austrian left, and Massena in person the French right. The battle raged with inexpressible violence till night, and the ground was strewed with the dead. Both armies displayed an undaunted intrepidity: the Imperialists attacked the enemy's intrenchments with the most resolute valour; while, on the other hand, the republican troops made no less desperate efforts to prevent them from penetrating to their camp. Having succeeded in bringing a number of batteries to bear on the Austrian left, the French right not only drove back General Hotze, although reinforced by a column under Prince Reuss, but

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even threatened the right flank of Prince Rosemberg's corps near Seebach. In the other points of attack the Imperialists were equally unsuccessful notwithstanding the most daring exertions, and finally repulsed. The Archduke does not mention either his own loss or that of the enemy, two of whose Adjutant-Generals were taken. Massena calculates the loss of the French at only five hundred killed and wounded, and that of the Imperial army at three thousand killed and wounded, and fifteen hundred prisoners. The Austrians suffered severely from the batteries and fire of the troops posted on the Glat, but still more in attempting to carry the French intrenchments with the bayonet. They had penetrated to the abbatis, when General Hiller and Field-Marshal-Lieutenant Wallis were both wounded, and the whole body impelled backward in extreme disorder. General Hotze received a musket shot in the arm early in the action, but it did not prevent him from continuing in the field.

NEXT day his Royal Highness reconnoitred the enemy's intrenchments; and resolved on another attempt to storm them on the day following. In the rear of the French army run the river Limmat, across which there was only one bridge, and that at Zurich. It was obvious, therefore, from the local nature of their position, that the loss of the Zurichberg might occasion the total destruction of the army. Their forced retreat along a narrow bridge would have been impeded by their numbers; and they

Massena
retires to
the moun-
tain of Al-
bis.

1799. had also to pass thro' the town, which was subjected by its situation to any attempt from the hills, and particularly the Zurichberg in its vicinity, if in possession of the Imperialists. General Massena, sensible that this station was no longer tenable against so superior a force, fell back behind Zurich in the night, and took a position on the mountain of Albis, extending his left to the Rhine, and his right to the Lake of Zug. The natural strength of this line was better adapted for defence, to which the inferiority of his numbers obliged him to confine himself. In all the preceding actions he had chiefly opposed intrenchments to the general attacks of the Imperial army, who seemed determined to carry them at any expence, in defiance of showers of cannon balls and a continued blaze of musketry. This rash valour, disdaining the tardy mode of military manœuvres, cost innumerable lives. But Prince Charles had resolved to debilitate his opponent by daily actions and reiterated efforts, in hopes that each successive battle would constrain him to evacuate Switzerland with the precipitation of a Jourdan.

Operations
on the Gri-
son frontier

In proportion as the centre and left of the French army retreated, General Lecourbe was obliged to fall back from the territory of the Grisons. Several desperate actions took place in this rugged and sterile country, and many thousands fell on both sides. In consequence of the fortunate change of affairs in the Tyrol and the Grisons, General Bellegarde had been directed to advance into Italy, and

1799.

support the operations of the Imperial army in that quarter. Part of his corps was destined to occupy the posts to the west of the Lake of Locarno, and thereby preserve a communication with the Archduke's army; whilst the rest proceeded, in the route of Como, through Milan and Pavia against Tortona. On the twenty-eighth of May, an engagement occurred between General Loison and Field-Marshal Hadick, who had marched from Bellingzone to force the passage of Mount St. Gothard, but without success. At the same time the Count St. Julien, having crossed Mount Urfula, attacked and carried the French post at the Devil's-Bridge. In consequence of this, the scattered detachments of the French abandoned Airolo and the defiles, and fell back to Waasen behind the Rufs in the canton of Uri, occasionally, however, pushing their advanced corps to St. Gothard, chasing back the Imperialists and recovering possession of the passes.

AFTER occupying the strong position on the mountain of Albis, General Massena established his head-quarters at Bremgarten. His left wing, as already mentioned, extended from the Rhine near Zurzach along the Limmat to the Albis; his centre was stationed on the mountain, and his right stretched to the Lakes of Zug and Lucerne. Prince Charles occupied the banks of the Limmat, his line extending from the Rhine to the Lake of Zug. Many sanguinary encounters took place between the advanced parties; but the main armies contented themselves with strengthening their respective positions by redoubts and intrench-

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ments. Their late murderous battles seem to have disabled both commanders from undertaking any decisive operation. General Massena was prevented by the inferiority of his numbers, and the inadequate supplies he received, from acting on the offensive. On the other hand, his Royal Highness wished to give some repose to his troops; and he also felt the necessity of waiting the arrival of the Austrian reinforcements, and a strong body of Russians who were marching to his assistance. It is unnecessary to relate a multiplicity of engagements which occurred in Suabia, as they were not attended with any essential consequences.

Operations
in Italy.

DURING these transactions in Helvetia, Marshal Suwarrow was employed in the reduction of Mantua and the citadel of Turin, and in watching the bold and active movements of Moreau. He detached a body of troops to oppose the progress of General Macdonald, who was advancing from Tuscany with the army of Naples, either to act on the flank and rear of the Imperialists, or, if circumstances required, to effect a junction with Moreau by Pontremoli and the defiles of the Appenines. The disasters, experienced by the French in the north of Italy, had obliged them to abandon the Neapolitan and Roman states, and concentrate their whole forces, a few scattered garrisons excepted, with a view to retrieve their affairs, or at least, aid Moreau's defensive operations.

Occurrences
in Naples.

MACDONALD had marched from Naples to Capua, on the 25th of April, with all his troops, leaving

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only five hundred men in the castle of St. Elmo. Before quitting the capital, he adopted every precaution which the emergency of circumstances admitted, to secure its tranquillity after his departure. On the day following that event, a numerous assembly of the inhabitants was convoked, in order to concert the necessary measures in so critical a situation. Various unpopular imposts, that pressed hard on the lower classes, were repealed; the new constitution, which was entirely democratical, was published; several legions of Neapolitans were inrolled, and batteries erected in different parts of the coast to prevent any attempts by sea. These measures of policy and defence effectually preserved the peace of the city. Some insurrections, however, broke out in Calabria, where the disturbances had never been completely quelled by reason of the paucity of French troops, the mountainous nature of the country, and the predatory disposition of the natives. A few Neapolitan battalions were dispatched to that quarter; and the aid of religion was employed in a proclamation by the Cardinal-Archbishop of Naples, inviting the insurgents to lay down their arms, and obey the new government.

SUWARROW has been blamed, and not without justice, for an unnecessary extension of his line. He blockaded Mantua, Alessandria, Tortona, and the citadel of Turin, and occupied the passes of Susa, Pignerol, and L'Affietta. This expanded scale of operations reduced him to a state of inactivity; at the same time his own head-quarters were kept

1799. in perpetual alarm by the advanced parties of Moreau, the extreme debility of whose little army prevented their General from undertaking any decisive measure. Military men will perhaps charge the Marshal with not availing himself of the weakness of his opponent, by attacking the French army, driving it from Piedmont, or entirely dispersing it. The issue of such an operation could not be regarded as doubtful, for the superior numbers of the Imperialists rendered success certain; and Macdonald, being thus completely isolated, could not possibly have escaped. Instead of following this plan, the Imperial General contented himself with detaching Count Hohenzollern with a considerable body of troops to Modena, and posting General Ott at Reggio with ten thousand men, whilst he himself remained at Turin with the rest of the army.

Engage-
ments at
Modena,

June

It would seem from the circumstance of General Montrichard having advanced by Bologna with the right wing, that Macdonald's first object was to create a diversion on the Lower Po, although future occurrences obliged him to alter that intention. The French commander approached the scene of action in the direction of Modena, where he encountered the Imperial General Hohenzollern on the eleventh of June, and after taking two thousand prisoners, and killing or wounding fifteen hundred of the enemy, drove the rest in disorder across the Po. In this action Macdonald received several sabre-wounds in an attack of cavalry.

THE main body of the army of Naples now marched to Reggio, and made a demonstration as if they intended to pass the Po, and penetrate to Mantua. At the same time the left wing drove General Ott from Parma beyond the Po with great slaughter, and advanced towards Placenza. Meanwhile the progress of the French had obliged General Kray to suspend the siege of Mantua, and send his heavy artillery to Verona. After this precaution he hastened in alarm to Suwarrow's headquarters, in order to concert more effective measures for opposing the enemy, whose strength the Marshal seems to have improvidently under-rated.

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and Parma.

UNCERTAIN whether Macdonald's object was to raise the siege of Mantua, or, after crossing the the Trebia, to advance to the Tanaro, part of the Imperial troops, that had occupied the Parmesan and Modenese, concentrated themselves on the left of the Po to cover that fortress. General Ott endeavoured to retard the enemy's left at Placenza, but was again attacked on the 17th, and obliged to fall back on Castel St. Giovanni. Suwarrow having collected all the forces he could retire from the distant points of his line, without weakening too sensibly his besieging corps, began his march from Alessandria on the fifteenth. A confusion appears in all his movements: he had sent General Ott from Turin to the Parmesan, and ordered Marshal Bellegarde to proceed from Como to Milan, and from thence to Tortona. Thus their line of march crossed nearly at right angles, while their troops

Suwarrow
marches a-
gainst Mac-
donald.

1799. were harassed by rapid, multiplied, ill-arranged, and distant operations; but the superior numbers of the Imperial General prevented disaster, and remedied mistakes. He had lost the moment for occupying the passes of Pontremoli and Sarzana, and thereby obstructing the communications of the two French commanders. To have effected this, would, indeed, have required a greater force than General Ott possessed; but so essential an operation ought certainly not to have been neglected.

Engage-
ment at St.
Giovanni.

MARSHAL Bellegarde was left with a strong body of troops to blockade Tortona, and make the best defence he was able in case of being attacked by Moreau. General Kaim, having a considerable detachment under his command, was to carry on the siege of the citadel of Turin, and watch the passes from Savoy and the Riviera towards Piedmont. The distance between Tortona and St. Giovanni is but short, and the Imperial army, by two forced marches, reached the latter place on the seventeenth. While the vanguard of the French left was following General Ott, and a column on the right advancing along the Po as if with an intent to gain Pavia, General Melas arrived with part of the army; and immediately thereafter, Marshal Suwarrow with the rest. This timely assistance enabled the Imperialists to arrest the further progress of the enemy, who, after several warm attacks, were forced on the approach of night to abandon the left bank of the Tidone.

ON the eighteenth the Imperialists crossed the Tidone, and moved towards the Trebia in three columns. Two of these, consisting entirely of Russians, were commanded by General Rosenberg on the right, and General Foerster in the centre. The left and strongest column, under General Melas, was composed of the divisions of Generals Ott and Froelich. It was Suwarrow's intention to clear the country of the enemy's corps posted between these two rivers. The attack, however, did not take place till five in the afternoon; when, after an obstinate engagement, the French retired towards the Trebia, the right bank of which was occupied by their main army.

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Engage-
ment near
the Trebia.

AWARE of Macdonald's inability to withstand the enemy's numbers, Moreau had detached Victor's division to reinforce his army, which, when thus increased, scarcely amounted to thirty thousand men, while his opponent mustered upwards of fifty thousand strong. Yet nowise intimidated by this disproportion, the French commander resolved to force the passage of the Trebia. He was in expectation of being joined by the Ligurian legion under General Lapoype, or of the co-operation of that officer, who had been directed to advance from the Genoese mountains above Bobbio, and fall on the right flank of the Imperialists. It was also probable, that Moreau would be able to gain their rear, and operate with effect, or, at least, make an essential diversion in his favour.

Battle of
the Trebia.

1799. THE Trebia is the most rapid torrent in Italy, but at this season was every where fordable. Its banks are nearly a mile distant from each other, and the intermediate space is composed of alternate streams and islands of sand. On the nineteenth, about ten o'clock of the day, the French left wing crossed the river, and, having succeeded in turning the right of the Russians at Cassaleggio, obliged them to fall back. They next assailed the village, and with redoubled violence attacked the columns composing the Imperial right under General Rosenberg, where it required the greatest exertions of courage, and the most unshaken perseverance, to withstand their impetuosity.

WHILST the French left was occupied in these reiterated attempts, Macdonald endeavoured by means of his artillery to keep in check the centre column of Lieutenant-General Foerster, and after a short cannonade passed the river under covert of his batteries. At the same time, his right wing crossed over, its infantry being preceded by a body of two thousand horse. On gaining the opposite bank, the right immediately advanced, and engaged the Imperial left under General Melas. To distract the enemy's attention, the French General had also detached a column towards the Po, in order to penetrate to the left flank of Field-Marshal Ott, and avail itself of circumstances.

It is in vain to attempt a description of the advances, retrogressions, and various manœuvres of

the hostile columns. Whatever fatigue the French infantry had sustained in fording the river, they seem to have forgot their uncomfortable condition the moment they arrived in sight of the enemy, and were the assailants in every point. They charged with fixed bayonets the Austrian cavalry on the left, and pursued them from the field. When any of the republican battalions gave way, the troops rallied in the rear of a chain of batteries, which their indefatigable commander had succeeded in forming on the left of the river. On the other side, in whatever point an impression was made on the Imperial army, their numbers enabled them to send immediate assistance, and their generals exerted themselves in repairing a disaster, or improving a success. The battle continued during the whole of the day with destructive fury; both parties alternately charged each other, in all possible directions, with maddening valour, and entire battalions were hewn in pieces in a moment. The issue continued doubtful until the approach of night, when the French retired across the Trebia to their former encampment.

1799.

MACDONALD's loss, rendered more sensible by the original paucity of his numbers, did not permit him to make a stand against the Imperial army on the right bank of the river. Accordingly, on the morning of the twentieth, he began his retreat towards Parma and Forte-Novo, whether he escaped with the loss of part of his rear-guard, which was overtaken at San-Giorgio by the Russian co-

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lumn on the right. The Ligurian legion, that he had so ardently expected for the three days preceding, was met by an Austrian detachment after the battle, and driven back to Bobbio. On the twenty-first the Imperial army advanced as far as Fiorenzuola, where they halted during the twenty-second; but having received intelligence of the defeat of General Bellegarde by Moreau, they left Fiorenzuola on the day following, and reached the Scrivia on the twenty-fifth by forced marches. The Vienna Gazette estimates the loss of the enemy during the whole contest of three days' continuance, at eighteen thousand two hundred and sixty-eight men killed, wounded, and taken prisoners, besides *seven* cannon and *eight* standards; and with its peculiar modesty states the loss of the Imperialists at only nine hundred and thirty-four killed, and two thousand one hundred and ninety-one wounded.*

* BY THE VIENNA GAZETTE.

Loss of the French.

6,000 killed

5,085 taken prisoners in the field of battle

7,183 wounded, made prisoners in Placenza

Amongst the prisoners, were

4 generals

8 colonels

502 officers of the Staff and commissioned officers

18,268 Total loss

7 cannons

8 standards

Loss

It has been already mentioned, that Suwarrow, when he set out on his expedition against Macdonald, entrusted the blockade of Tortona to General Bellegarde. With a view to throw succour into that fortress, create a diversion in favour of Macdonald, and distract the attention of the enemy, Moreau advanced with his little army towards it. On the twentieth, Bellegarde was attacked at St. Juliano by the division of General Grouchy. The Imperialists fought with great bravery; but Moreau having brought up Grenier's division, the

1799.

Battle of
Tortona.

Loss of the Imperial army.

Austrians wounded, 87 staff and commissioned officers
1,816 non-commissioned officers and pri-
vates

Russians 3 generals
3 colonels
41 commissioned officers
241 privates

Total wounded 2,191

Austrians killed, 10 staff and commissioned officers
244 non-commissioned and privates

Russians 5 commissioned officers
675 privates

Total killed, 934

If we may credit a letter from Lord Henley, the British ambassador at Vienna, published in the London Gazette of the ninth July, Macdonald could only have 7,000 troops remaining; for his Lordship states that general's original force, according to the most authentic information, at 25,000 men.

1799. enemy were completely defeated, fifteen hundred killed, and two thousand taken prisoners. The loss of the French was considerable, and the more injurious, as they were unable to replace it. Altho' by this victory the blockade of Tortona was raised, and the Austrians driven to Alessandria and beyond the Bormida, the weakness of his army did not permit the French General to follow up his advantage. Bellegarde continued his retreat beyond the Po and the Tefin, after taking the precaution to break down all the bridges on these rivers in order to embarrass the progress of the French. On the approach of Suwarrow, Moreau retired to Gavi, when the Imperial army again took a position to cover the siege of Alessandria, and renew the blockade of Tortona.

Thus terminated the sanguinary battle of the Trebia, in which French valour was eminently conspicuous, and left only a mutilated trophy to the victor. Considering the inferiority of his forces, Macdonald ought, in prudence, to have availed himself of the river in his front, and acted only on the defensive. In that position, and calmly waiting the attack instead of being the assailant, he would have obliged the enemy to undergo the fatigue and difficulty he himself experienced in the passage of the river. This fatal field is classic ground ; and the page of ancient history informs us, that by the same means Hannibal vanquished the Roman consul Sempronius on the disastrous banks of the Trebia. The wary Carthaginian had remarked the confidence of the

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Consul, and encouraged it in order to seduce him to pass the river, and fight on that side with which his own army was best acquainted, and where it was accustomed to form. He calculated that the Roman infantry, if they ventured to ford the river and continued for any time inactive, must suffer considerably from the effects of wet and cold. Accordingly at day-break, he sent a body of Carthaginian horse across the Trebia with orders to manœuvre in front of the enemy's lines, and, when attacked, to repass it in affected disorder. On the appearance of the cavalry, the Roman legions, altho' taken by surprise, formed in great haste, and pursued them to the river. Sempronius, flushed with his success, and hurried on by his rash ardour, ordered his troops to ford the Trebia, and continue the pursuit. In expectation of this, Hannibal had formed his men on the plain, as if with an intent to cover the retreat of his cavalry, while a detachment he had placed in ambush appeared on the rear of the Roman army. Dripping with wet, and nearly exhausted by the fatigue experienced in the passage of the river, the legions of Sempronius were attacked by the Carthaginian troops, and defeated with dreadful slaughter. Ten thousand veteran Romans, the residue of their gallant army, cut their way through the enemy's ranks, and escaped to Placenza.

MACDONALD continued his retreat in two divisions by Forte-Novo and Parma, and then bending his course towards the Genoese, effected a

1799. junction with Moreau by Pontremoli, Sarzano, and Sestri-di-Levante. After this, the French occupied all the passes in the chain of mountains, which cover the Ligurian republic. The divisions of Lapoype and others were stationed in the defiles of the Genoese Appennines. A body of troops was detached to the river Poenar, in order to secure the road of the Genoa leading to Nice, and oppose any attempts of the Imperialists, in case of their marching down Piedmont through the valley of Oleglia, or approaching Savona by way of Ceva, and thereby endeavouring to cut off the further retreat of the French army.

The citadel
of Turin,

THE citadel of Turin surrendered on the twentieth to General Kaim, the garrison agreeing not to serve against the troops of his Imperial Majesty or his allies, until exchanged. The surrender is ascribed to the total want of supplies, and the circumstance, so dishonouring to the French government, is the more probable, as the military reputation of its commander, General D'Assault, is unquestionable. Fort Urban capitulated on the

Fort Urban,

tenth July, its garrison of seven hundred men being allowed to return to France, on condition of not serving against the Imperialists for six months. On the seventeenth, the French troops, who were in Leghorn and Pisa, evacuated these towns, and defiled by Lucca towards the Genoese. Alexandria capitulated on the twenty-first after a brave defence, the besiegers having not only completed their second parallel, but being on the point of

and Alex-
sandria sur-
render.

making the assault. General Gardanne command-
ed its garrison, and the siege was conducted under
the direction of Marshal Bellegarde. 1799

GENERAL Kray, was enabled by the defeat of
Macdonald to convert the blockade of Mantua
into a regular siege. By the twenty-third of
July, the batteries were completed, and a most
tremendous fire opened on the place from one
hundred and eleven pieces of artillery. The third
parallel was nearly ready on the twenty-seventh,
and advanced to the glacis; while the garrison were
reduced to such a state of weakness, as to have
scarcely a sufficient number of effective men to
relieve their posts. In the night of the twenty-
seventh, they abandoned the hornwork; and Ge-
neral Kray, having sent a summons to the com-
mandant on the day following, availed himself of a
cessation in the firing to erect, without interrup-
tion, mortar batteries on that spot. At the same
time, he prepared battering redoubts for the third
parallel; so that in case the governor should not
accede to the capitulation offered, a breach might
be soon made, and the fortress taken by storm. In
the evening of the twenty-eighth, the governor,
Foissac La Tour, General of division, informed
Marshal Kray, that he would surrender on condi-
tion the garrison should be permitted to return to
France, but not to serve till exchanged. He likewise
offered, on this being granted, to remain with his
generals and officers, as prisoners of war, during
three months, after which they were to be allow

Mantua
surrenders.

1799. ed to depart on their parole. To avoid all further effusion of blood, prevent the destruction of the city, and, in fine, save time for future operations, General Kray accepted the governor's proposals. A capitulation was accordingly signed on the thirtieth; and on the same day the garrison, about ten thousand strong, marched out of the citadel, laid down their arms on the glacis, and proceeded in three columns towards the frontiers of France. In all the capitulations acceded to by the French garrisons a clause was inserted, importing that the Cisalpines, Swiss, Poles, and Piedmontese, should be considered, and treated in every respect, as troops of the French republic; and to this proposition the Austrian generals consented without hesitation.

THE capture of these strong fortresses not only tended to consolidate the conquest of the north of Italy, but enabled Marshal Suwarrow to blockade Tortona more effectually, and resume offensive operations against Moreau. He had been for some time reduced to an inactive state, both on account of the losses he sustained in his late battles, and the dispersion of his troops in conducting so many sieges. By the junction of these corps with the main body, the Marshal felt himself in a condition to overwhelm the shattered remains of the republican army. A column under General Kaim was detached against Coni, and another under General Melas proceeded in the direction of Savona. At the same time Suwarrow advanced to Novi, from

whence he issued a proclamation to the Genoese, 1799.
informing them, that the only object of the allies,
in entering their territory, was to re-establish the
ancient government and religion.

No effort had been hitherto made by the French Directory to succour their troops in Italy ; and the reader must have remarked the extreme impotency of all the garrisons in that country, both in point of numbers and supplies. Destitute of provisions and clothes, and labouring under privations of every kind, the wretched residue of that once puissant army sunk under the fatigue occasioned by incessant duty. In this exhausted state, they had to oppose the enemy in the field, and occupy numberless defiles and mountains along a widely extended line. But although vanquished, they had on no occasion given the enemy reason to infer, that they had degenerated from their former valour. Their reverses might justly be ascribed to the incapacity of their first commander, or the original paucity of their forces : in fine, they had been unfortunate, but not dishonoured.

As if to insult the lacerated sensibility of the people, and to proclaim to mankind the pre-eminence of their misconduct, the Directory planned a maritime expedition, devoid of object, and executed with disgrace. Admiral Bruix, the minister of marine, left Brest on the twenty-sixth of April, with a fleet consisting of twenty-five sail of the line, and a proportionate number of frigates.

Expedition
of the Brest
fleet.

1799.

A favourable wind soon carried him within sight of Cadiz, where he descried, on the fourth of May, the English fleet under Lord Keith. His Lordship, wishing rather to meet the enemy under sail, than to receive him at anchor with the Spanish fleet in view, stood out to sea with his squadron, consisting of fifteen sail of the line. Bruix however, altho' he detached some vessels to reconnoitre, and made a demonstration of preparing to engage, did not attempt to attack the British, or to effect a junction with the Spaniards. The hostile fleets having, on the day following, lost sight of each other in a storm, the French passed the Straits, and reached Toulon on the thirteenth. Lord Keith continued on his station until the ninth, when he proceeded to Gibraltar Bay, and anchored there on the tenth.

LORD Bridport with the channel fleet, on finding himself unable to come up with the French, had stretched towards the southern coast of Ireland to cover it from any attempt of the enemy. But certain intelligence of their route being received, Sir Alan Gardner was dispatched with sixteen ships to reinforce Lord Keith, Rear-Admiral Whitshed having previously sailed to his Lordship's assistance with five sail of the line. A Spanish squadron from Ferrol, destined to join the French fleet, missed it at sea, and afterwards took shelter at the isle of Aix. Lord Keith left Gibraltar on the eleventh, and being joined by Admiral Duckworth with five sail of the line from Minorca, reached Toulon

1799.

anterior to the twenty-third. In the mean time the Spanish fleet, consisting of seventeen or twenty ships, passed the Gut in two divisions on the fifteenth, and a few days afterwards was driven into Carthageua by a storm. As there were now in the Mediterranean upwards of a hundred sail of the line, belonging to the belligerent nations, and together forming the greater proportion of the navy of Europe, mankind sickened with expectation of great events. It was regarded as impossible, that so many fleets could be in motion in a narrow sea without meeting. Every hour, and every rumour spread alternate pleasure and alarm, yet all this dreadful note of preparations evaporated in air.

AFTER leaving Toulon the French fleet visited the coast of Genoa, where its commander had a slight communication with General Moreau. It was universally supposed, that the Directory would have availed themselves of this favourable moment to pour into Italy a liberal reinforcement; but all the plans of the French government were calculated only to baffle the common sense of mankind. A body of sixteen or twenty thousand men landed at Leghorn, or on the shore of the Gulf of Spezia, or, in fine, any where between Savona and Tuscany, would have restored victory to the republican standard. From the lofty summits of the Genoese Appennines the French troops beheld their fleet steering along the coasts; but neither men nor supplies were sent by their ungrateful country.

1799.

BRUIX now shaped his course towards Carthage-
na, where he was joined by the Spanish fleet;
and having passed the Gut on the eighth of July,
reached Cadiz two days thereafter. The combined
fleets left that port about the twenty-first, and en-
tered Brest on the thirteenth of August without
seeing an enemy. Lord Keith was off Genoa on
the twenty-fifth of June, passed the Straits on the
twenty-ninth of July in his return, and arrived
at Torbay on the seventeenth of August. We
forbear to make any comment on this extraordi-
nary operation ;—the road of the ocean is broad, and
the elements are not under the controul of man.

Transac-
tions at
Rastadt.

WHILE the republican troops experienced these
disastrous reverses, the French people beheld with
indignation the ruin of their armies by the miscon-
duct of the government. But before proceeding
to narrate the political fermentation excited in
France by these events, it will be necessary
to recur to the diplomatic transactions at Ras-
tadt. The commencement of hostilities had
created a kind of schism in the Germanic bo-
dy. Several of the northern states, and those
particularly in the immediate vicinity of France,
shewed a disposition to negotiate. To counteract
this intention, the Imperial plenipotentiary, Count
Metternich, left Rastadt on the twelfth April, hav-
ing previously refused to receive a note transmitted
him by the French ministers. At the same time,
the Austrian Generals pushed forward a detach-
ment to that place, in the vicinity of which their

1799.

troops committed some irregularities against the French Legation, and likewise insulted the Prussian and Danish envoys. Several of the deputies, whose pacific inclinations had been cooled by the defeats of the French, withdrew ; and as the safety of those who remained was considered to be in danger, the Directorial minister of Mentz was requested to make a representation on the subject to Colonel Barbacsy, the Austrian commandant at Gernsbach. In his answer that officer regretted the necessity he was under of placing patrols at Rastadt and in the environs. It was impossible, he said, to give any satisfactory declaration respecting the maintenance of the diplomatic body, as his Imperial Majesty, since the recal of his plenipotentiary, could no longer consider Rastadt as a place which the presence of a congress protected against hostile events, or which was not necessarily obliged to conform to the laws of war. He concluded however with assuring the minister, that, except in the case of precautions imposed by warfare, the Austrian soldiers would consider personal inviolability as sacred.

WHEN the French army entered Germany, General Jourdan shewed the utmost respect to the place where the congress was held, the freedom of its deliberations, and the safety of its members. By this conduct, he deprived calumny of every pretext ; and it is deeply to be regretted, that the Imperial General did not, for the same reason, enforce a similar deference. In consequence of Bar-

Note of the
French mi-
nisters.

1799. — **Barbacy's letter, the deputation expressed their intention of quitting Rastadt. The French ministers likewise intimated to Baron d'Albini, the Directorial envoy, their resolution of leaving the place within three days. But wishing to give to Germany a last and signal proof of the moderation of their government and its desire of peace, they added, that they would repair to Strasburg, and there wait the recommencement of the negotiations momentarily impeded by military excesses, and attend to such propositions of peace as should be made. This note also contained a protestation against the infringement of the rights of nations, which the Imperial troops had committed by acts equally contrary to the independence of the republic, and subversive of all the principles hitherto practised among civilized nations. The ministers farther protested against the answer of the commandant at Gernsbach, which they regarded as the expression of the general orders of the Austrian army.**

French
courier ar-
rested.

IN the evening of the twenty-fifth, the courier of the French legation, furnished with his insignia and a passport by the Directorial minister, and charged with dispatches for Strasburg, was arrested on the road to Seltz between Plittersdorf and Rastadt by some Austrian hussars, and conducted to the head-quarters of Colonel Barbacsy, after having his papers taken from him. On the requisition of the French plenipotentiaries, the envoy of Mentz in name of the deputation, and the Prussian ministers, made application to have the courier set at li-

berty and his dispatches returned, and likewise requested, that the correspondence of the French mission should not be interrupted during the short stay of three days fixed for their departure. Barbacsy answered, that he had rendered an account to his superiors of the French courier's arrestation, and that he could not yield to the views of the Deputation until he received further orders. He returned a similar answer to Count Bernstorff, the counsellor of the Prussian Legation, and to the minister of the Margrave of Baden, whose protection the French plenipotentiaries had claimed ; but all other explanation was positively refused. 1799.

MEANWHILE the French ministers prepared to leave Rastadt at eight in the morning of the twenty-eighth, and every thing was in a state of readiness for their departure. But on weighing circumstances, and considering that patrols of hussars were continually traversing the road to Seltz, and that they had on the nineteenth arrested several German deputies, and among others the minister of Wurtzburg from whom they had taken and detained his papers, it was impossible not to experience uneasiness. All the diplomatic agents therefore who had continued at Rastadt, and still communicated with the French ministers, advised them to defer their journey some hours, or to the next day, a reply from Barbacsy to the representations of the ministers of Prussia, Mentz, and Baden, being expected every moment. The French Legation, sensible of the propriety of waiting the result of

1799. — these steps, yielded to this advice. But as no answer had arrived at eleven in the forenoon, Baron D'Albini wrote again to Barbacsy, requesting from him an explicit answer to the question, Whether the French ministers who were ready to depart, and who were furnished with passports from him, D'Albini, were likely to meet with any interruption?

It was hoped the Margrave of Baden's minister, who was dispatched with this letter, would return to Rastadt about three or four in the afternoon with a reply; but these expectations were disappointed. Between seven and eight in the evening an officer with a squadron of hussars, followed by the greater part of the regiment, arrived at Rastadt, and occupied the town and its vicinity. The officer then proceeded to the minister of Mentz, and declared in his Colonel's name, who was too busy to reply in writing, that the French Legation might travel in perfect safety, and that the period of twenty-four hours was fixed for their departure. No answer, either written or verbal was received, by the Prussian Legation from Barbacsy; but the officer delivered a letter from him to the French ministers, containing an order to leave Rastadt. From an impulse of national pride and independence, similar to that which induced Lord Malmesbury, on the like intimation, to quit Paris and Lille, the French ministers resolved to set out immediately, and would not be persuaded, that they could not arrive at the Rhine before night, and that the passage of the river might then be dangerous. The carriages had

been in readiness during the whole day ; and about half an hour after the receipt of the letter alluded to, the plenipotentiaries departed with their suite. 1799.

THE Szekler hussars who accompanied the officer that brought the letter, after taking possession of all the gates of the place, intimated that they had received orders not to allow any person belonging to the Congress to enter or leave the town. But although this prohibition was restricted to the diplomatic body, no person whatever was permitted to pass even the bridge of communication between the town and the suburbs. The Danish minister applied to the Captain for liberty to leave the place, but was told that the orders were not to allow any person to pass. When reminded that the French ministers were summoned to depart, he replied, that he was not directed to prevent them ; and when application was made for an escort, he said he could give none as he had no orders to that effect, but that the Legation would find no interruption in their route. At last, between nine and ten o'clock, the plenipotentiaries began their journey, and as the night was dark, torches were carried before the carriages. But scarcely had a quarter of an hour elapsed when intelligence arrived, that the carriages had been attacked by the Austrian hussars, and the ministers murdered.

The ministers
Bonsier
and Robert
were assassinated.

As we have annexed to this part of our work copies of all the state-papers, respecting that a-

1799. — trocious deed, we must refer the reader to the affecting memorial of the Prussian, Danish, and other envoys. * These ministers, jealous of the honour of the German nation, and of their respective sovereigns, have published an accurate, impartial, and dispassionate statement of particulars. To posterity, and to the future historian, that memoir will prove an interesting and valuable document: but the contemporary annalist must suppress animadversion; *he* treads on dangerous ground.

THE minister Bonnier was dragged out of his carriage, and cut in pieces. Roberjot was slaughtered, almost in the arms of his wife, with circumstances of peculiar atrocity. Jean Debry, after being torn from the embraces of his affrighted family, was wounded in several places, and thrown into a ditch. The hussars, supposing him dead, left him in this mangled condition: but he recovered strength enough to escape into a forest, where he wandered during the night amidst rain and cold, and in the morning took refuge in the house

* The *corps diplomatique* left Rastadt next day: but fourteen of the deputies remained at Carlsruhe for some days, where they drew up conjointly a narrative of the transaction, that it might be made known in its true light to their respective courts and to mankind. This memorial, which was sent to the Archduke Charles in order to obtain satisfaction, was signed by the ministers of Prussia, Denmark, Hanover, Nassau, Wetteravia, Francfort, Darmstadt, Baden, and Bavaria. See Appendix, No. IV.

of the Prussian minister at Rastadt. Rosenthiel, 1799.
 the secretary of Legation, being in the last carriage, had the good fortune to effect his escape thro' the gardens in the commencement of the affair. He reached the house of the minister of Baden, where he was for some time in a state of delirium. The hussars pillaged the carriages, and stript the ministers and most of their suite of the *opima spolia*; but no person was murdered except the two ministers. The papers of the Legation were carried off, conveyed to the Austrian commandant, and claimed in vain.

ON receiving the first intelligence of this horrid massacre, the regal and princely envoys repaired in a body to the Austrian captain who commanded at Rastadt, and implored him to take every measure to save whoever could be saved. Their reiterated entreaties were in vain. "Finally," continue the deputies in their memorial, "passing from all considerations which we ought to have felt, after the treatment we were obliged to endure, we pressed, prayed, and supplicated him not to lose a moment in endeavouring to save as many lives as he was able, and to rescue the honour of his service. He asked us where the carriages of the ministers were, and required other explanations from us, whom his orders detained prisoners in the town,---from us, who came to him to obtain information, and to learn what measures he had taken to prevent, if possible, a crime which so intimately concerned his own honour and that of his sovereign." At last,

1799.

after much hesitation and painful delay, Major Harrant, minister of state to the Margrave of Baden, was permitted to visit the field of carnage in the immediate vicinity of the town. He there found the carriages surrounded by about fifty hussars of Szekler with flambeaus, who were employed in conducting them round the town with the unfortunate persons within them, still in a state of stupor. M. de Harrant informed the hussars, that the carriages must be brought into the place : but the soldiers would not listen to him, declaring that the whole was their booty ; and it was only in consequence of the strongest menaces, he succeeded in making them desist from their project.

THE diplomatic body, who had hitherto been occupied in ameliorating the misfortunes of others, became alarmed for their own safety and that of their families. On the morning of the twenty-ninth they dispatched M. Jordan, secretary of the Prussian Legation, with a letter to Barbacfy. When he arrived at Gernsbach, he sent notice to the Colonel that he came not only in the name of the Prussian ministers, but of all the Deputation of the empire assembled at Rastadt. The reply he received was, " that the Colonel could not speak to him, even though he were come in the name of God the Father, and God the Son." But notwithstanding this rough language of a soldier, and the refusal to see M. Jordan, the letter which Barbacfy sent by him to the Deputation, was conceived in

the style of a man of honour and humanity.* 1799.
On the same day, Jean Debry and the rest of the
French, accompanied by an escort of the troops of
Baden and an Imperial officer with a party of Szek-
ler hussars, resumed their journey and arrived in safe-
ty at Strasburg.

PRINCE Charles wrote a letter to General Mas-
sena on the second of May, mentioning the intelli-
gence he had that day received from the officer
commanding the outposts, that the French minis-
ters Bonnier and Roberjot, having crossed the chain
of his posts during the night, were attacked by
hussars, and had unfortunately perished. The
circumstances of that transaction were still un-
known to him; but he had in the meantime caus-
ed the commander of the advanced parties to be
arrested, and appointed a commission to make the
most exact and rigorous inquiries respecting the
cause of the accident. He assured the French
General, that if the troops should be found in the
slightest degree culpable, he would exact signal sa-
tisfaction from them, as his orders relative to the
personal safety of the French ministers were precise
and reiterated. "I cannot," concluded his High-
ness, "sufficiently express my regret, that such a
disaster should have happened in the line of my
advanced posts. I reserve to myself, General, the
opportunity of communicating to you without de-

Archduke's
letter to
Massena.

* See Appendix, No. IV.

1799. lay, the result of the inquiries I ordered to be made the moment the intelligence reached me."

AN Imperial rescript of a similar tenor was presented to the Diet of Ratisbon on the eleventh of June, forty-three days after the occurrence. His Majesty called on the empire to be on their guard against the illiberal suspicions, rash conjectures, and licentious fabrications of Journalists. He asserted, with becoming dignity, his own integrity; expressed his deep regret at so unfortunate and atrocious an act of barbarity; and concluded by requesting the empire to unite with him in instituting an inquiry, to which proposition the Diet readily assented. *

How happens it that the result of this investigation has not yet been communicated to the world? Whence comes it that a deed, which will be transmitted to the execration of posterity, was not rapidly followed by the most exemplary punishment of a soldiery, who profess to be the champions of social order and religion? Is the Imperial cabinet callous to its own character, or has it forgot that the honour of its allies, and of the common cause in which they have engaged, is implicated in the transaction? And you, illustrious warrior,---you, who maintain with so much glory the military reputation characterising the House of Lorraine,---you whose deeds, whether fortunate or un-

* See Appendix No. IV.

successful, the future historian will contemplate with corresponding sensations,---will you suffer in silence your laurels to be tarnished? And shall it be asserted of you as of Sylla, that you overlooked marauding, nay murder, because your soldiers would atone for it in battle? In fine, does not every motive, sacred amongst mankind, imperiously call on you not to suffer the faintest surmise to remain with contemporaries or posterity, that may tend to sully the lustre of your fame?

1799.

LANGUAGE is inadequate to describe the indignation, which the intelligence of this murder excited in France; and the government did not neglect to profit by the incident, in order to rouse the people from that state of apathy which the defeats of their armies had produced. A message, announcing the occurrence, was sent by the Directory to the two Councils, and accompanied with a letter from Jean Debry giving the details of it.* When these papers were read in the Council of Five Hundred, not fewer than fifteen members inscribed their names to speak. After several desultory and furious harangues the Council adopted the following resolutions on the report of Bailleul: 1. That the legislative body, in the name of the French nation, denounced to all governments, and to all just men of every country, the massacre of the French plenipotentiaries for the negotiation of peace at Rastadt, which was ordered by the cabinet of Vienna, and executed by its troops; and the legislature consigned to the

Proceed-
ings of the
French le-
gislation.

* See Appendix No. IV.

1799. valour of the armies the care of exacting vengeance for it. 2. That on the eighth of June next a funeral ceremony should be observed in both Councils, in all the cantons of the republic, and in the armies, in memory of the citizens Bonnier and Roberjot : in the celebration of it, the government, guilty of their assassination, should be devoted to the vengeance of every people, and to the execration of posterity. 3. That the names of the conscripts, who had joined the armies, should be displayed in the most distinguished place of each canton, and solemnly proclaimed ; while the names of those, who had not joined them, should be exposed in a shameful manner, and not effaced until they had set out for that purpose. 4. That there should be placed, in the most conspicuous part, in all the administrations, tribunals, and public and private schools, the following inscription :---“ On the eighth Floreal (28th of April,) in the seventh year, at nine o'clock at night, the Austrian government caused the French ministers, who were sent to Rastadt to negotiate peace, to be assassinated by its troops.” 5. That each of the French armies and fleets should have a standard with the following inscription, “ Vengeance to the manes of the citizens Bonnier and Roberjot, plenipotentiaries at Rastadt.” The three subsequent articles contained provisions for the families of the deceased, and directed that a medal should be struck to perpetuate the remembrance of the deed.

EVEN the sedate wisdom and rigid decorum of the Council of Ancients yielded to the impulse of

1799.

the moment. Sentiments of revenge, conceived in the most impassioned language, burst from every speaker, and the members openly charged Austria with preconcerting the commission of the crime. Some papers were produced giving further details of that unfortunate incident, and asserting, what we hope and believe to be untrue, that the Austrian hussars said they only executed the orders they had received. A memorial containing a narrative of the transaction, and addressed to all nations and governments, was published by the Directory.* At the same time, in their usual manner of availing themselves of success or disaster in order to quicken the financial operations of the legislative body, they took the opportunity to transmit a message to the Council of Five Hundred on the inequality of the revenue to meet the public expences.

TIME alleviates the deepest sorrow, and weakens, the strongest impressions. From the assassination of their plenipotentiaries, the French nation turned their attention to the miserable condition of their armies. In a report by the committee of finance, an allusion had been made to the depredations on the revenue. It was stated, that in the month of Vendemiaire (September and October), and before the requisitionists and conscripts were embodied, the accounts for the payment of the troops were calculated at the rate of 437,000 men

15 May.

* See Appendix No. IV.

1799. in actual service, without including those in Holland and Egypt ; yet to complete the number of 68,000 cavalry, it was necessary to purchase 40,000 horses. The reporter of the commission added, that they would deem themselves unworthy of the confidence of the Council, and guilty of treason against the nation, if they did not propose to demand of the Directory documents, properly detailed, for the purpose of discovering the authors of so many calamities. After a multiplicity of animadversions on the conduct of the public agents, the Council resolved to send a message to the Directory, demanding circumstantial accounts of the administration of the ex-minister Scherer, of the exaggerated statement of the expences of his ministry during the first six months of the seventh year, and of the causes of the deficiency which existed in the nominal and actual force of the armies when hostilities recommenced.*

* THIS discussion was superinduced by a spirited address to the Council of Ancients from the republicans of Grenoble, who on this occasion set the example to their countrymen. The following passages are particularly interesting, as they exhibit an impressive view of the alarm of the French nation at that period.

" How happens it, that the military administrations are wallowing in money, and that the troops are left in a state of such complete privation, that the conscripts, on arriving at Milan, found neither bread to eat nor straw to repose on, and were thus provoked to desert ? How comes it, that these blood-suckers of the people basely fly in a body, with their treasure, to scatter dismay in the interior ? Whence is it, that one of the Cisalpine Directors and the Minister of Finance joined the Imperial troops with the great-

1799.

PERHAPS in any other country than France, an examination into the failure of military operations would have been carefully quashed. But among that restless people, a disaster is the certain

er part of the pecuniary resources of the Cisalpine republic, immediately after the enemy had passed the Tefino? How happens it, that hirelings of the enemy audaciously traverse the territory of the republic to publish our defeats, impede the departure of the conscripts, revive the hopes of the priests and royalists, create factions and divisions, and circulate the report that one of the princes of the House of Austria will soon be seated on the throne of France? And how happens it, that fear has repressed the enthusiasm of liberty in the interior of the republic, and left only distrust and dejection in the breasts of the citizens?"

An address of this nature generally gives more satisfactory information of the state of things, than it is possible to derive from the tempestuous debates of the Councils. The citizens of Grenoble, undaunted by the insuccess of their first application, presented a second, which was read in the Councils on the tenth of June. It is the more important, as it is explicit and particular.

Grenoble, 5th June.

LEGISLATORS AND DIRECTORS,

IN our first address we called your attention to the evils of the country, and to traitors and dilapidators. Since then we have obtained facts in contradiction of the falsehoods and mistatements of the guilty. We were occupied in publishing these with their proofs, when the success of the enemy forced us to consider of our personal defence,---as it seemed we were abandoned even by ourselves.—Legislators and Directors, this idea is more afflicting to our minds, than the certainty of being soon overcome. Hasten to remove our painful doubts. Our forces increase an hundred-fold; and if we must for a moment give ground, the enemy shall only penetrate thro' heaps of the slain. Already are they masters of Suza by the retreat of General Ledoyon, who has retired to Mount Cenis. Already have parties penetrated into the Novaraise, which confines on Mont Blanc. General Moreau has only about ten thousand men to make head against an army of forty thousand before him. All his communications are cut off by the same number of armed rebels, whose ravages are the more to be feared as they are directed by fanaticism. A courier expedited by that General, who has only escaped destruction by marches and countermarches, gives a

1799. prelude of an internal convulsion. Impatient of the remedies which deliberate and provident reason may suggest, they seek consolation in change, and sooth disappointment by sanguine expectations of the future. New difficulties arise, and new vio-

true account of his position. It is such, that if it be not succoured before the lapse of fifteen days by our army in Helvetia, or by other means, his troops will be obliged to lay down their arms, being without provisions and artillery, and having lost all hope of being joined by the army of Naples, or the divisions of Rome and of Tuscany.

THESE are facts; and they are positive. We may also add, and the truth of it is certain, that the citadel of Milan has capitulated. Peschiera and Pizzighitone have surrendered to the enemy; and the department of the Maritime Alps, being in a state of insurrection, cuts off all hopes of retreat from General Moreau.—Thus there is no further obstacle to the invasion of the French republic, since the fortresses and posts of the five departments of Isere, Mont Blanc, Lemane, the Upper and Lower Alps, are nearly stripped of provisions, military stores, arms, artillery, and soldiers. Fruitless have been the precautions of the administrations and generals of the interior, whose zeal was so recently blamed by the minister of war, unacquainted with the melancholy situation to which we are reduced. No doubt, there are conscripts; but these new defenders not being disciplined, clothed, equipped, or armed, can oppose only a feeble resistance. If these administrations and generals had money at their disposal, they might yet provide for the most pressing wants. But without resources, what can be undertaken,—what can be done?—Nothing but acts of despair,—of despair that leads to the most dreadful catastrophes.

THE wounded defenders who have arrived from the army, and the conscripts who are to commence their military career, but who at present happen to be sick, are left without succour, the hospitals being unprovided of every thing necessary for their comfort. These circumstances, independent of the agitation excited by our enemies in the interior, create so general a dependency, that there is reason to fear an absolute disorganization will soon be effected.—Legislators and Directors,—all you whom we have not ceased to consider as the fathers of our country, adopt, at length, the necessary means to save it. Order every species of sacrifice; republicans, do not doubt it,—republicans are ready to acquiesce. Postpone all complaints and divisions, for it is not the moment to be occupied in these, when the enemy is at our gates.

1799.

lence ensues ; while, in the eternal routine of turbulence and innovation, the great actors fleet across the political stage, and vanish for ever. It was, therefore, to be expected, that the rapid annihilation of their armies should recoil with increasing force on the government ; and that the cry of speculation, being once begun, should provoke inquiry, and demand a victim. The public indignation was particularly directed against Scherer. Reubel, who had vacated by lot his office of Director, and been succeeded by Sieyes, was accused of being the patron of that General, and consequently implicated in his malversations. In the Council of Ancients, the ex-director repelled these vague suspicions with great firmness, disclaiming all acquaintance with Scherer till after his first return from the army of Italy, or any further connection with him since that period than what their respective offices rendered indispensable. He averred, that he had even opposed the General's nomination to the command in Italy on account of his advanced age ; and concluded with professing his readiness to submit his own conduct to the most rigid investigation. The three Directors, Treilhard, Merlin, and Reveilliere Lepaux, in like manner incurred the popular odium, or rather the displeasure of the predominant party in the Councils, that great arena of political gladiators. But it is impossible to assign a reason, why the Director Barras, who must have participated in their official conduct, whether criminal or blameless, should escape even suspicion.

1799.

PROTRACTED discussions, relative to the liberty of the press, and the responsibility of ministers, occupied for some time the attention of the legislature. At last, the Council of Five Hundred, roused by the pressure of external and internal dangers, sent a message to the Directory on the fifth of June, demanding immediate information as to the state of the republic. At the same time they published an address to the French nation, calculated to revive their enthusiasm, and animate them against the perils that threatened their country.* Whether the delay of the Directory, in com-

* ALTHO' the proclamations of the French government are rendered less interesting by their multiplicity, they occasionally merit attention, as they display the disposition of the legislative body towards foreign powers or tend to develop the germ of new revolutions.

In their address to the nation, the Council stated, that the moment was arrived when the representatives of the people could no longer remain silent without being criminal, when to conceal their sentiments would not only be a public misfortune, but a crime against the state; and when to address the people had become the most urgent and most sacred of duties. "Liberty," continued they, "liberty, which you have acquired at the price of so much blood, and of so many sacrifices, is again threatened; and our common country, so long triumphant, is exposed to new dangers. Two months have scarcely elapsed between Italy, a republic and victorious under our banners, and the same country attacked by a savage conqueror.

"THE ambitious and bloody house of Austria, those ingenious and perfidious artificers of all political crimes,

plying with the request of the council, resulted from disinclination or from adventitious causes we are unable to ascertain. But on the 16th, Poulain Grandprè, in name of several united committees, expref-

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have joined to their plans the Porte and Russia. By a monstrous alliance they flatter themselves, that they shall be able to divide among them the territory of France. It only remains for you to decide, whether you will be freemen or slaves, whether you will be Frenchmen or Austrians, whether you would preserve your own property, or become yourselves the property of a barbarous conqueror, who would chain you to his dominions, and force you to march under his standard. A foreign power makes no distinction of the different opinions which divide you ; he confounds you all in one indiscriminate hatred. To be guilty, it is enough that you are Frenchmen, — to make him desirous of your spoils, it is enough that you are industrious or rich. The man whose corrupted heart secretly wishes and calls for the aid of a foreign power, would behold, if his wishes were gratified, the fatal consequences that must ensue,—his house burnt, and his children killed by barbarians whom he has had the folly to consider as his deliverers. The object of the new coalition is to revive in Europe the ancient barbarism, to destroy all knowledge and all republics, to remove from the face of the earth all the monuments and institutions which could call great objects to our recollection, to banish all liberal and generous sentiments from our hearts, to recal all our prejudices and superstition ; and in the midst of this gloomy night, to aggrandise and strengthen two or three * * * to whom are attached an oppressive nobility, a ruinous feudal system, an inquisitorial treasury, and all the dreadful train of misery and slavery connected with these evils. The assass-

1799. fed their anxiety with respect to the silence observed by the government on the situation of the country. He proposed that a second message should be sent, and that the sitting should be declared

nation of our plenipotentiaries, while negotiating a peace, demonstrates what they would attempt when in hostility against the people. Would those, who have never respected the law of nations, pay any regard to the rights of the people? This war then is the cause of all Frenchmen; and there is not an individual, whatever may be his political opinion, who must not lose every thing by an invasion which would confound all in one general ruin and servitude.

“FRENCHMEN! you who inhabit the Alps, and have hastened to the defence of those bulwarks with which nature has been pleased to cover our country, throw your ferocious enemies from the summit of your mountains. The armies may have been surprised in Italy, but they have not been conquered. Directed by another minister, commanded by skilful generals, and reinforced with new warriors who daily increase their phalanxes, they will soon recover the path of victory. But as the interior is the source which feeds and nourishes the army, it is that which must be animated and enlivened. Let the friends of liberty, too long proscribed and pursued by royalism, assume the attitude which becomes their virtues, and manifest the just pride of having served their country. Let the purchasers of national domains become sensible, that they have nothing to hope from the interference of a foreign power, and that all, which has hitherto supported the republic, still supports it. Let them judge what kings are preparing for them, by the swords which their troops wave over our heads. Let those who are enlightened, instruct their

permanent until it was received. To this proposition the Council immediately assented, and a similar resolution was adopted by the Council of Ancients. At seven in the evening the Directory

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fellow-citizens: let those who are energetic communicate to them a portion of their electric fire. Let him who has strength come forward to defend them, and him who has wealth to assist them. It is in this general display of our moral and physical faculties, that the enemy should recognise the French people. Let all those, who are destined by law to march to the frontiers, obey the command: let the cowardly be punished, the taxes paid, the royalists carefully watched, the disturbers of the public peace restrained, and assassins arrested and punished. Finally, let the government be assisted, not only with all the means duty commands, but also with all those which zeal can suggest.

“ It is in vain, that odium is attempted to be thrown on pure republicans by the hackneyed and opprobrious epithets with which they are loaded. The legislative body cannot be deceived by manœuvres, which, by discouraging republicans, and increasing the courage of royalists, have so often endangered the republic. That body is not desirous of alimenting the revolutionary passions, but of exerting the liberal and generous affections, and of making liberty, not the patrimony of some, but the birth-right of all Frenchmen. It is the wish of your representatives, that the law should be the right as it is the duty of all, and that no one should invoke it in vain or violate it with impunity. This year you have beheld with what religious respect all your choices have been regarded by your representatives. Schisms, and ambitious plots, have

1799. transmitted a message, intimating that they were engaged in drawing up an answer which they hoped to present on the 19th. They added, that in consequence of the late message of the Council

vanished before the great principle, which has every where made legal majorities triumph ; and laws shall be passed to prevent the ruinous consequences of these divisions.

“NUMEROUS complaints have been made against the conduct of several agents of the Directory, accused of dilapidation and plunder, as well in the interior, as in the allied republics. The law will place the guilty under the hand of justice, and the Directory will drive away that cloud of vultures, who follow the armies, and besiege all the avenues to power. The responsibility of the executive agents shall be organized, the accounts of the ministers solemnly published and rigidly scrutinized, the most rigorous economy introduced respecting the expenditure, and the liberty of persons and opinions secured by severe laws. But the great means of administering and executing these laws are in the hands of the Directory. As faithful observers of them, we will never exceed the limits prescribed by our duty ; and the Directory, on their part, shall never exceed theirs. Tyranny begins where powers are invaded, or where they accumulate too greatly. The liberty and security of all consist in the balance of these powers ; and it is to causes deranging that balance, or preventing it from being established, that faults and reverses are to be ascribed. . . . Frenchmen ! the difficulties that surround us are great ; but the courage of your representatives is greater. They can have no other fear than that of not fulfilling their duty, no other passion than that of seeing you free and triumphant ;—they have vowed to save you or to perish, and they will keep their word.

the Directory had likewise made their fitting permanent, and that the documents demanded would be furnished on the morrow. A feeble and unsuccessful attempt was made in the Councils to procure an adjournment. At eleven at night, the Ancients received a resolution of the Five-Hundred, declaring the nomination of Treilhard to the office of Director unconstitutional and void, as contrary to the 136th article of the constitution *; and to this annulment the Ancients agreed,

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ON the 17th the Directory transmitted an answer to the first message of the Council of Five Hundred, in which they stated, that, with regard to the external situation of France, their official duties had been executed, and the information communicated, as required by the constitution. If the republic were menaced by new enemies, of whose movements it might be requisite to acquaint the legislature, the necessary communications would likewise be furnished. As to its military situation, the greatest people had experienced reverses, which had always been to them the signal of more intimate union and victorious exertion. The deep wound in the revenues, and the exhausted state of the public treasury, had impeded the display of the

Message of
the Direc-
tory to the
Councils.

* *A compter du premier jour de l'an cinquieme de la republique,* &c. After the first day of the fifth year of the republic, the members of the legislative body cannot be elected members of the Directory or ministers during the continuance of their legislative functions, or during the first year after the expiration of those functions.

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national force, and the success of negotiations. Their views, they said, had been solely occupied by two great objects, the army and the finances ; and to these objects also ought the Council to determine to consecrate all their efforts. They were preparing the means of completing the armies, rendering effective the materials which composed the national force, and directing its efforts to useful purposes. Afflicting as the picture of the disorders in the interior was, the Directory expressed their readiness to state to the legislature the measures they judged necessary. But they were assailed by complaints and accusations respecting projects calumniously ascribed to them, and informed of menaces to which they gave no credit, though reported to proceed from the most august source. To those execrable assertions the Directory gave the lie, and all the members solemnly protested, that they would sooner perish than the constitution should sustain the smallest injury, or threats be directed against the inviolable security of the established authorities. In expectation of the details to be communicated in a second message, they requested the Council to receive this fraternal effusion with the frankness and cordiality by which it was dictated ; and added, that the enemies of the country were awaiting, at this moment of difficulty, a result favourable to their iniquitous projects ; but it would be remarkable only for the closer junction of the two principal branches of the republican fasces.

As the language of this message obviously re-

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flected on the legislative body, and indirectly accused them of calumniating the government, it threw the Council into a flame. Several members, in defending the legislature, not only repelled the insinuations of the Directory, but commented with great severity on their conduct. A partial or general convulsion now seemed inevitable. Soon after the receipt of the message, it was announced, that Treilhard had given in his resignation ; and in the evening Gohier, ex-minister of justice, was nominated by the Ancients in his stead. As a movement was apprehended against the national representation, the Council of Five Hundred voted, that every individual, or the public authorities, who should make an attempt on the safety or liberty of the legislative body, or any of its members, either by giving an order for that purpose, or by executing it, should be outlawed. In the evening, a message, signed by Barras, intimated to the Council the resignation of the Directors Merlin and Reveilliere-Lepeaux. Their letters, which accompanied that of Barras, were conceived in the same words. They began by observing, that when an alarming schism threatened the country, those persons should hasten to quit their employments, who by their continuance in office opposed an obstacle to harmony, or afforded a pretence for discord. It was this motive alone, they declared, which induced them to resign their station as members of the Directory. No personal fear, no sentiment unworthy of a generous mind, had dictated that measure. They would remain in the midst of their families,

1799. ever ready to give an account of their conduct, which they pronounced to be free from reproach, as the motives of it had originated from the most ardent affection for the republic.

Two men, Roger Ducos and General Moulins, hitherto unknown in the history of the revolution, were appointed to supply their places. Various resolutions, calculated to curb and narrow the authority of the executive power, and to regulate the erasures from the lists of emigrants, were passed by the Councils. The conscripts of every class were declared to be in a state of active service, and ordered to be formed into battalions and companies. An address to the nation was published by the Councils; and after passing a vote for raising an extraordinary loan of a hundred millions, to be reimbursed by the sale of the national domains, they repealed their decree of permanence.

Address of
the Legis-
lature to
the people.

IN their address to the French people, the legislative body observed, that a system had been followed by a majority of the Executive Directory, which was the deplorable fruit of want of foresight, of error, and of inexperience. The treason of several agents, and the corruption of others, had rendered that state of things still worse, and endangered the internal and external safety of the republic, as well as the security of the most patriotic citizens, and the sacred principles of the revolution. Placed in the first rank of the political order, act-

ing for the interests of the greatest people in the universe, and for their republican allies, in this dangerous crisis, the Councils paid no consideration to their own personal danger. In the midst of the emotions excited by such important objects, they regarded only the great and sublime cause, which the national confidence had charged them with defending, and which they had sworn to save, or to perish. A new Directory, inspired by that patriotic courage, which was ever the presage of victory, had been formed; and the reins of the state were in the hands of firm republicans. "Frenchmen," continued the Councils "your frontiers are threatened with an approaching invasion, and men, money, and arms are necessary to save you. When you were oppressed by a tyrannical government, when the transports of the purest citizens were treated as the effusion of anarchical conspiracy, you dreaded to express your zeal. Now that we have sworn fidelity to you, it is your duty to make the oath of victory to us. Go and reinforce our armies that expect you, and unite yourselves to eternal fame. Sound the hymns of liberty, form your battalions conformable to the law, and let a generous impulse direct you to the frontiers to avenge the blood of our plenipotentiaries. Use with zeal and with prudence the right of assembling, as secured by the constitution. Mistrust strangers who would tempt you to step beyond the line of the law, and the respect due to the public authority. Vivify our

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1799. republican institutions? . . . they give vigour and grandeur to the state ; they gradually disengage the human mind from the odious fetters of superstition, and elevate it to those liberal principles, by which energy is increased and courage exalted." In the same impressive style, the Councils cautioned the people to be on their guard against those who instigated citizens to violate the laws, excited re-actions, or stimulated to vengeance. They concluded by observing, that the legislative body had fulfilled its duties with zeal and firmness, and that it belonged to the courage of the French nation to ensure the triumph of the republic without, and the reign of a wise liberty within.

MEANWHILE numberless charges of peculation were brought forward, particularly against General Scherer. The financial committees accused the minister Ramel of presenting false calculations, and covering embezzlements to an enormous amount ; and to enforce this charge, a detailed account was produced, proving that the grants of the legislature had exceeded the sums demanded. However consonant with political prudence the plan of equalising the annual receipt and expenditure may be, it appears to be productive of insuperable difficulties during the existence of war. On the other hand, the borrowing system, by requiring a smaller contribution, presses less severely on the immediate generation, and thus enables a government to protract warfare unnecessarily. By the report of Ramel, the whole sum requisite for

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the current year, including the expence of the conscription levies, amounted to twenty-nine millions sterling: and when the amount of the imposts, &c. appropriated to meet it was deducted, there remained only a deficiency of seven millions. During the last year the expences of Great Britain, altho' not then engaged in military operations, exceeded fifty-two millions, independent of that floating capital which may be indefinitely increased. The national income amounted only to about twenty-four millions, and thus left a deficiency of twenty-eight millions. Had Mr Pitt, therefore, ventured to introduce the equalising system, the distress of this country must have exceeded the limits of human endurance. Britain pays the annual sum of twenty millions as the interest of her national debt, while France, being without credit, is unable to contract any. The peace establishment of England, by retaining on foot a greater military force than heretofore, cannot be less than twelve millions additional. Thus she incurs a greater annual expence during peace, than France during a war carried on against the major part of Europe. Were we, therefore, to assent to the deduction of theoretical reasoning, which however is not unfrequently contradicted by experience, an inference might be drawn prejudicial to the export trade of Britain. For the high price of labour, and the increase of imposts, must inevitably, on the return of peace, and the uninterrupted intercourse of nations, prevent the British merchant from coping in the foreign market, with others who do not experience the same extent of restriction.

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It is an unprofitable and disgusting task to narrate the internal convulsions of France, continually the sport of parties, whose successive misconduct paved the way for new revolutions. The French people had become so habituated to innovation, that the removal of men from the Directorial office, men who but a few months before menaced the world, scarcely excited surprise. There was no popular movement in their favour, not even an expression of indignation; and the citizens of Paris contented themselves with following, each his own interests and pleasures. But whatever opinion may be formed of this acquiescence, it is grateful to humanity, that these political fermentations have become progressively less sanguinary. The elementary principles of civil discord, which had been in a quiescent state for the short-lived space of two years, were now in motion. Frenchmen, who could triumph for liberty in the field, were destined to degrade it by their domestic violence; and wary nations, instructed by the melancholy experience of a neighbouring state, have learned to prefer the calm of despotism to the turbulence of freedom. Happy Britain! your constitution has now rode out the storm. Although you may have no eulogy to bestow on the foresight or prudence of your rulers, and although you may experience the pecuniary difficulties ever attending a state of warfare and increasing imposts, remember that, at a distance from the theatre of military operations, the din of arms does not disturb your repose, nor an enemy devastate your fields.

END OF PART FIRST.

APPENDIX.

No. I.

CANDOUR imposes it as a duty to notice the following letters, said to have been intercepted by the French, and published by the Directory as a kind of *pieces justificatives*. For their authenticity we do not vouch: they have been branded as forgeries, on account of Sir *Horatio* Nelson being styled in the first Sir *Georges* and Sir Nelson Nelson; but this remark is perhaps rather too fastidious, for such a mistake can be regarded only as a mere typographical error. In Baron Awervech's letter, the British ambassador at the court of Berlin is called Sir Sydney, and this appears to form a more solid ground of suspicion. Lord Elgin had left Berlin, and we know not who occupied his station at this time; perhaps no person bore a public character. Some however have regarded it as a decisive proof of forgery, that any secret or ostensible agent of the British government, who, like Awervech, had resided at Berlin, should be so ignorant as to be unacquainted with the name of the English minister at that court. An argument, which has been overlooked, might also be advanced against these letters; there is in them a suspi-

cious coincidence of sentiments and style. Yet all circumstances considered, there does not appear to have been any necessity on the part of the French government to have recourse to fabrications, as the aggressions of Naples, and facts of public notoriety, sufficiently warranted a declaration of war.

I.

PRINCE PIGNATELLI TO THE CHEVALIER PRIOCA, HIS
SARDINIAN MAJESTY'S MINISTER.

Naples, October 2.

PROVIDENCE is at last tired of favouring crimes, and the cause of kings shall no longer be blighted by the rude hand of capricious fortune.— The battle of Aboukir is the signal which ought to awaken the energy of Europe, and the English nation enjoys a glory, to which some other powers might have aspired, had not particular interests prevailed over the general interest of Europe. But we may now assert, that Sir H. Nelson has dissipated the charm, which seemed to have subjugated every country. Even while I write this letter, I think I hear a pleasing murmur circulating over Europe, and announcing to its several states, that with prudence and courage they may each contribute to the downfall of that regicide government, which is the scourge of kings and the oppressor of nations. I shall repeat to you what Sir H. Nelson said to the king my master, when his Majesty deigned to go on board the English Admiral :—" Sire, a

revolutionary government is a torrent swelled by audacity and crimes; but when a dyke is opposed to its inundations, its stagnant waters dry up in the immense meadows it has overflowed;—it soon retires into its ancient bed, and is then no more than the feeble stream it at first appeared." Yes! be assured that the French nation has finished its chivalrous career, and that the brilliant destruction of its marine must necessarily produce the decay of its continental power. The English have set an example, which all governments ought to follow;.. they have struck the clayey feet of the colossus, and it totters.

You may assure his Sardinian Majesty, that the most agreeable news have just reached us from Berlin. I cannot however inform you, that this court accedes to the coalition; French influence still reigns there, and the indecision of the cabinet of Berlin appears to communicate itself to that of Vienna. But great events will, perhaps, determine the conduct of these two powers, and those decisive events are preparing by the vast genius of Prince Repnin. I need not observe to you, that behind Prince Repnin we may perceive the powerful empire of Russia, the Ottoman Porte, and all the strength of Great Britain.

THE Russian ambassador has written to the Chevalier Acton, that he has made no impression on the mind of Frederic, and that he even renounces

the project of detaching the court of Vienna from its system of timid temporising; but that if Naples declares herself, and you in Piedmont continue to dig, in the silence of a prudent circumspection, the grave of the French, he will then answer for a great revolution in the system of Europe, and that, when once the campaign commences, it will not terminate without producing some very unexpected changes. Upon the receipt of these dispatches, a council was held in the Queen's library. The Chevalier Acton, with that logical eloquence, which is admired even by his secret enemies, developed all the circumstances, that seem to assure success to the coalition. He demonstrated the value of the triple alliance of the north in protecting us by a mass of power, which might enable us to hazard offensive operations with the most perfect security. "Fire but one gun," said he frequently, "and the Congress at Rastadt is instantly dissolved: the Imperial and German armies are in motion; and if Prussia remain neuter, at least let her pay dearly for her neutrality." The military position of the republicans in Lombardy, the Ecclesiastical States, and Piedmont, this minister likewise observed, were such as to induce him to rely with the greatest confidence on the success of the campaign.

I AM convinced, that I shall fulfil the intentions of the King, my master, by assuring you, that the deliverance of Italy depends at this moment upon the interest, which his Sardinian majesty may

be inclined to take in the cause of his friends. Our country may once more become the grave of the French nation, if the Piedmontese, still brave even under the incumbent weight of the fetters with which that regicide people has loaded them, conspire, in the silence of their servitude, the death of their tyrants.

WE know here, that the members of his Sardinian Majesty's council, who are circumspect even to timidity, revolt with horror at the idea of perjury and assassination, as if the treaty of alliance, which binds his Majesty to the French government, was a political tie that ought to be respected. Was not that treaty dictated by the oppressive power of the conquerors? in concluding it, did you not yield to the hard necessity of the most unfortunate circumstances? Such treaties are injuries, which ought to be avenged on the first favourable opportunity that presents itself. What! while your king is a prisoner in his capital, and surrounded with bayonets, can the partial massacre of the soldiers of your tyrants be called assassination? Have the weak then no legitimate resources against oppression? because the enemy has bound you in the chains of a disgraceful peace, is it a crime to break them? According to the maxim of the republicans, the only fraternal kiss, which a tyrant should receive from us, ought to be a mortal blow directed against his bosom; and to speak in the French manner, Brutus stabbed Cæsar,

while he embraced him, and called him his friend. ---Thus then his Sardinian Majesty, although unarmed, without fortresses, and surrounded with republican battalions, may still aspire to the glory of delivering Italy. The French troops are dispersed over Piedmont under the faith of treaties: all then a-wanting is to rouse the patriotism of the Piedmontese to sentiments of the most exalted enthusiasm, and to inculcate that each man should aspire to the honour of extending an enemy at his feet. These partial massacres will be more decisive in behalf of Piedmont than a pitched battle; and never will a just posterity stigmatise, with the name of assassination, the energetic acts of a whole people marching over the dead bodies of their oppressors to the recovery of their liberty. I hope that you will make the value of these considerations be felt in the councils of his Sardinian Majesty, and that they will not be opposed in a court, which has been so cruelly rendered the victim of republicans, and which the coalesced powers take under their special protection.

Believe me to be, with sentiments, &c.

II.

From the same to the same.

Naples, October 4.

I HAD finished my letter when the arrival from Berlin of Monsieur the Baron D'Awervech, the secret agent of his Britannic Majesty, induced me to delay the departure of the courier, in order to inform you of some circumstances very highly interesting.

THE Baron D'Awervech, one of the most active diplomatic agents on the continent, and who seems to multiply himself, that he may be present wherever he can serve the cause which is to unite all the princes of Europe against France, after having been at Carlsruhe, as you know, for the purpose of holding a conversation with Count Metternich, went off to Berlin, there to concert with Prince Repnin the means of re-attaching to the coalition all the powers who are interested. He is now arrived here; and after the conference I have had with him, I cannot but repeat how highly important are the observations, which I have taken the liberty of transmitting to you. The Baron is to write to Monsieur N-----, (the emigrant Governor of Turin, whose name I have forgotten,) desiring him at the same time to communicate the letter to you. You will see, Count, that fortune must cease to rebel against us, if we have only the courage to follow her. The genius of Prince Repnin, seconding

the vast conceptions of the cabinet of St. James's, is preparing to convert into mournful cypress those laurels, with which the republicans have covered Italy. Our brave Neapolitans, commanded by General Mack, will first sound the tocsin of destruction against the common enemy ; and from the summit of the Capitol we will announce to Italy, we will announce to Europe, that the moment of action is arrived. Then, unfortunate Piedmontese, it is for you to break the chains you are constrained to wear, that with them you may overwhelm your oppressors.

THE Ligurian and Cisalpine republics, which now appear as political ramparts erected by France for her defence and the subjugation of Italy, are about to be converted into a volcano, that will engulf their protectors. The demagogic furies already rage in the bosom of these republics, their minds are exasperated, and the military force is become the support of a turbulent faction. Their political state every day wears a new form : the French general has, of his own private authority, destroyed the work of their government by annulling their appointments, and replacing those they had dismissed. You must perceive, Count, of how much use this confusion is to us, and how necessary it is that we should seize on so fortunate an occasion to offer ourselves as the avengers of all the discontented, whom so many arbitrary acts must have greatly multiplied. I take the liberty therefore of recommending to your particular attention the

letter, which you will communicate to M, --- (the emigrant whose name I have forgotten.) I am, with the highest consideration, &c. &c.

III.

BARON AWERVECH * TO M. --- GOVERNOR OF TURIN.

Naples, October 6.

I ARRIVED here two days ago from Berlin. Prince Pignatelli has informed Count Prioca of the happy result of the negociation. In spite of the obstinate neutrality of the King of Prussia, and the timid steps of the Cabinet of Vienna, Prince Repnin will be able, by powerful alliances, to support all the princes who shall be disposed to deliver Europe from French influence; and the British Government, uniting its efforts with those of Russia, will have the glory of giving peace to the continent, since certain powers, detaching themselves by private treaties, appear to behold with an incredible apathy the subjugation of the rest of Europe. They will, perhaps, hereafter reproach England for her alliance with the ancient enemy of all Christian princes, and allowing the interposition of Russia in the affairs of the continent; but the extraordinary circumstances, which have taken place, compel her to a bold development of her political system. France is become a colossus destroying the proper

* THIS Baron Awervech, the intimate friend of Pitt, is the secret director of his spies on the Continent.

balance ; it is therefore necessary to create a powerful counterpoise. It must be confessed, Sir, that no power at present assumes so grand a character, as that which Great Britain at this moment displays ; her glory will necessarily be reflected upon all those states, which shall be disposed not to partake her dangers, but to associate themselves with her triumphs. Piedmont, above all, should interest itself in her cause, since England guarantees to it the resumption of its place among the continental powers. If, joining prudent circumspection to courage the most determined, it oppose to the French legions, which inundate the country, those partial attacks to which a people, even the most patient, feel themselves incited by a sentiment of national pride when raised to fanaticism.

THE ambassador from the Court of London to Berlin has just concerted with Prince Repnin a measure the most bold, that modern diplomacy could suggest in the present circumstances, to put an end by force, as it were, to the indecision of Austria. They will cause hostilities immediately to be commenced by the court of Naples : a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, concluded between these two powers, will authorise his Sicilian Majesty again to call to his aid the Austrian contingent. Thus all Europe will be put in motion, on the shores of the Bosphorus as on those of the Danube, and on the banks of the Nieper as on those of the Rhine, in order to precipitate themselves *en masse* upon a nation of usurpers. It is then

that, with a just pride, the Thames, mixing itself with the waves of the ocean, shall carry to all the European shores the triumphant laurel intertwined with the olive of peace.

WE propose war with the more security, since the enemy is obstinately inclined to peace: he even supplicates it as the greatest favour. The Directory, no longer haughty, seems to break its iron forehead on the steps of all the thrones in Europe, to delude us with respect to the gigantic aggrandisement of France, and the poverty of its domestic resources. The enemy would thus deceive us as to his real power, and persuade us, that he is actuated by a spirit of excessive moderation; but that government shall not make us mistake the essence which constitutes it. We know that the revolutionary effervescence, which seemed hitherto to have formed its principal force, is at last exhausted by the continual efforts it has so long directed against the repose of Europe. The French government no longer regards the Cisalpine state as a rampart, which it can oppose to foreign attacks: that conquest even alarms its masters, by the factious spirit, with which we aliment the war, and by which we neutralize the kind of regular policy they endeavour to organize in that country.

THE flames of civil war already rage in the provinces of Brabant; the Grisons will hold Helvetia in check; and the Cisalpines display a republican quackery, but it is by their demagogic turbulence

that we shall combat them. Prince Repnin has informed me, that all the instructions, which he has sent to personages of the greatest influence in Lombardy, who wish to rescue their country from the French yoke, tend to promote the destruction of republicanism by its own follies, in order to oppose to the influence of the Directory even the principles of that liberty, of which it constitutes itself the universal apostle. You, therefore, ought not to have been surprised at the changes, to which we provoked the haughty spirit of the French General who commands at Milan; certain disputes, which took place between him and the ambassador Trouve, did not escape our attention. The diplomatic agent wished to modify the political institutions of the new republic according to that spirit of conciliation, which seems to have been adopted by the French Directory as their system to consolidate their authority amidst the turbulence of faction. But the General, through a sentiment of jealous rivalry, surrounded himself with all the revolutionary elements, which were in a state of collision under the new organization. The Jacobin clubs were closed, and his palace became the rallying point for the most furious demagogues. He interposed his military authority to protect the principles which were violated, and to re-establish, in all their plenitude, the rights of national sovereignty. He overturned every thing to inoculate, as it were, the Cisalpine republic with the perfection of demagogy: the former magistracy was restored, and the work of the ambassa-

dor was not only annihilated, but it was declared, in proclamations, to be injurious to the political rights of this sovereign nation under tutelage.

THE Ligurian republic is about to feel the same critical convulsion, and the French troops will be scattered in order to protect this political jumble. It is then that Italy will have it in her power to avenge herself on her oppressors : and it is then the brave Piedmontese soldiers will find the way prepared for them to unite under the standard of the formidable coalition. Such, Sir, is the plan concerted by the vast genius of Prince Repnin, and of which you now see the first dawning. You may assure your court, that Great Britain has not formed an alliance with the Emperor of all the Russias, but for the purpose of securing the political existence of every prince, who shall find himself surrounded by those revolutionary whirlwinds, which have hitherto subjected so many provinces to the dominion of republican France.

IV.

COPY OF A LETTER ADDRESSED TO GENERAL MACK,
AND INTERCEPTED BY GENERAL CHAMPIONNET.

October 4, 1798.

My General, --- I learn from the public papers, that the court of Naples, threatened with an invasion by the French government, has determined to oppose to it your reputation and talents, and

and has therefore appointed you commander of the Neapolitan troops. If you arrive in time, the kingdom will be saved; and if, in the general conduct of the war, which appears to be inevitable, you obtain the full extent of that confidence which all Europe would grant you, its salvation will also be your work.

AFTER I parted from you, my general, I returned to my native country, as I had the honour to inform you. I have, therefore, been enabled to observe the situation of France, the spirit which prevails there, and particularly that which governs the armies.

I AM of opinion, my General, that the information I have obtained; that the connections I have formed with men who were the enemies, and who have since been the victims of the Directorial tyranny, and principally with Pichegru and Willot who have escaped from Cayenne and returned to Europe, where their names, and the parts they shall perform, will not be without influence; that a long residence in Switzerland, which is destined to become the theatre of war, and the most important point of attack for arresting the devastating progress of the French armies, hurried forward in spite of themselves by a government which is the enemy of social order; and finally, that the correspondence, which I have had with men distinguished by their knowledge and capacity, may render it possible for me to prove to you, in an useful manner, the long and constant attachment I have borne you.

NOTHING but a sentiment that is most dear to me, nothing but the desire of being near you and serving again under your command, could determine me to leave a tranquil asylum and a placid life for a situation of trouble and danger. It is true, I also feel, that, besides the duty which requires every individual to use his efforts for the maintenance of civilized society, it was more particularly mine to combat for a country which is the native land of a great part of my family. Prince Vintimille Belmonte, my cousin, to whom I have written, will have the honour of seeing you, and will adopt such measures as you may think proper; besides, the testimonies of friendship, which you have bestowed on me, will be the best recommendation I can have with a King and a Queen, whose remarkable character creates a desire to serve them. If they will give me the place of Colonel or Lieutenant-Colonel in your staff, I will immediately set out to join you. The rank I ask may, perhaps, appear to you rather high for an old Lieutenant in the Austrian army: but my relations in Naples can certify, that I was formerly in France *Colonel-propriétaire* of a regiment, which bore the same name with them, and consequently with me.

I WAS obliged to leave Switzerland where I received your last letter, and to come to Hamburg on business which I had with England; but after you shall have returned me an answer, I can speedily join you, and shall take the route of Vienna.

Baron Vincent having sent me a passport for that city, I address this letter to him, in order that it may the more certainly reach you. Have the goodness to transmit, through him, the reply you shall be pleased to make me ; he will address it to me at the place where I now live, which is at Madame the Princess of Lorraine's, Altona, near Hamburg.

I KNOW not whether Maurice Dietrichenstein be with you : it appears to me so natural to abandon all to follow you, that it is almost impossible he should have separated from you ; for his excellent heart is worthy of being excessively attached to you. If he be with you, and have good news to announce to me on your part, I do not doubt but that he will write to me directly, to Altona, at Madame the Princess of Lorraine's. Though the way by Vienna be certain, the direct post may convey your letter to me more speedily.

ADIEU, my dear, my respectable and admirable General ; nothing can ever efface from my mind the recollection of your kindness and your friendship. The want of opportunity only has hitherto prevented me from testifying the devotion I entertain for you : may it prove agreeable to you, and procure me the means of giving you more convincing testimonies of my attachment. Deign to accept the assurances of the respect, with which I have the honour to be, my General,

Your very humble and obedient servant,

VINTIMILLE DULUC.

APPENDIX, No. II.

MANIFESTO of the Executive Directory against the Kings of Naples and Sardinia, in a message to the Council of Five Hundred, 14th December, 1798.

CITIZENS REPRESENTATIVES,

THE Executive Directory, in their message of the sixth instant, announced to you, that they would shortly transmit details manifesting the long train of perfidy, of which the court of Naples has been guilty, and which it has now consummated by an audacious attack on the French republic. They now also lay before you details, proving no less clearly the hostile connivance of the court of Turin, which, joined to the machinations of the Sicilian monarch, has rendered necessary the proposition made to you to declare war against the Kings of Naples and Sardinia.

EUROPE has long resounded with accounts of Neapolitan perfidy, and must have been astonished at the magnanimous moderation of the Executive Directory; while the sincere desire of the French government to live at peace, with his Majesty was open and manifest. Superior to the just

indignation, which this court had provoked in so many ways,---a court that, during the whole course of the war of the coalesced monarchs, distinguished itself by the most insensate fury against the republic, the French government received with the most pure benevolence the first proposition for a good understanding between the two states; and made no other use of the superiority which victory gave them, than for the purpose of moderation: in fine, all the advantages of the treaty were reciprocal, as if the successes of the war had been equal. This generosity should have forever stifled the malevolent disposition of the Neapolitan cabinet, and attached it to the republic by ties of gratitude as well as of interest. But instead of abandoning its hostile prejudices, it embraced without reserve all the hopes, to which the idea of the destruction of the republic gave rise, and took advantage of peace for the sole purpose of concerting secret hostility, while France evinced the most rigid observance of the treaty. This contrast will be demonstrated by incontestable facts.

It would be endless to recal to your recollection the odious and revolting conduct, which distinguished the cabinet of Naples during the continuance of the war. Since October 1795, when the republic, putting a stop to the progress of her victories, consented to grant peace to Naples, by what inexplicable conduct has that perfidious court been distinguished? When France shewed herself determined to overthrow that impious government

which caused her warriors to be assassinated, the court of Naples, whose agents were not strangers to these crimes, after having in vain attempted to aggrandise itself with the ruins of that Rome it pretended to respect, opposed all the resistance in its power to prevent the establishment of a republic on the soil, which had become the conquered land of liberty. That court increased its armaments, and marched, toward the frontiers, troops ready to enter the Roman territory. All these extraordinary preparations Naples justified on futile pretences, while she received the discontented Romans with open arms, fomented the troubles she had excited in that state, furnished the rebels with provisions and an asylum, and never ceased to display the most threatening attitude towards the new republic. Thus not daring openly to declare war against France, she sought to destroy in Italy all the free states under its protection. The French government might doubtless have inflicted signal vengeance for the countenance publicly granted to the frequent insurrections formed at Rome against the French army, as well as for the number of spies with which our envoy at Naples was surrounded. But far from giving way to this just sentiment, the Directory did not oppose the taking possession of the Duchy of Benevento, and even offered their mediation to liberate his Majesty from the feudal pretensions which Rome had to his states. But this was not all: they sent to Naples a new ambassador, furnished with the most amicable and conciliatory powers; and at the time when the ar-

my, commanded by Buonaparte, sailed from Europe, the Directory were anxious to satisfy his Majesty as to the object of that expedition. In short, they addressed to him the most repeated protestations of their unalterable desire to maintain tranquillity in Italy; adding, it is true, a no less energetic wish, that the Roman republic, which had been placed by the current of events under the special protection of France, should be allowed to consolidate its political existence. But the desire of friendly intercourse, the voice of reason, or the necessity of peace, could not inspire that court with similar sentiments: every pretence was employed to justify her complaints, her threats, and at length her numerous infractions of treaty. The French republic replied to the manifesto of Malta by the conquest of that island: at that moment, the court of Naples, with the most ridiculous arrogance, dared to revive its pretensions to a country, which it had governed neither by its laws nor by its arms; and the French government did not disdain to reply at length to that absurd pretension, as if it could have been supported by the least appearance of reason. From the moment of signing peace, all the acts, as well public as private, of this court have been distinguished for perfidy and hatred towards the French. The treaty was signed; but the court forbore to publish it from motives of respect for the courts of London and Vienna. The seventh article promised liberty to all the French who were detained for political opinions, and to all the imprisoned Neapolitans suspected

of having any connection with them. At the urgent solicitation of the French agents, some of the peaceful friends of the republic were restored to liberty, but, upon the most vain pretences, were again loaded with chains; and at last, the French, whom commercial affairs alone detained in the states of the King of Naples, were every day publicly insulted, attacked, and even assassinated; . . and this conduct remained unpunished.

THE third article of the treaty stipulated, that "his Majesty, the King of the Two Sicilies, should observe the most strict neutrality towards all the belligerent powers; he therefore engaged to forbid, without distinction, the entry into his ports of all armed vessels belonging to these powers, exceeding the number of four, according to the known laws of neutrality; and that all ammunition or merchandize, known as contraband, should be refused to them." How has this article been executed, the sense of which is by no means ambiguous? Forty days after the conclusion of the treaty, the English had seven frigates in the port of Naples: on the twenty-seventh July, the fourteen vessels of Admiral Nelson's fleet entered the ports of Augusta and Syracuse; and in whatever manner the article may be interpreted, it is obvious that this was an infraction of it. The government of Naples thought themselves obliged to justify the proceeding, by representing that it was not in their power to resist force; a contemptible subterfuge, for it did not even attempt resistance, and

the senate of Syracuse received the English Admiral with honours. About the same period, (4th August,) five Portuguese ships of war, and three English ships, were received with equal eagerness into the port of Naples. With respect to the furnishing of articles forbidden by the treaty, was it not notorious, that immediately after the conclusion of the peace, when the French attempted to prevent the English from getting provisions, the Neapolitan government gave orders to the governor of Orbitello to hinder them from passing, while he suffered a considerable corps of emigrants, who were in the service of England, to be disembarked? Was it not notorious, that the fleet of Admiral Nelson was first victualled in the ports of Sicily, and that on its return to Naples it received, from the arsenal of the King, the stores of which it stood in need? Was it not notorious, that long before this period, when the whole of the English fleet on the seventeenth of June appeared before Naples, a brig anchored in the port, and two British officers had a conversation with General Acton and the Queen, in order to secure whatever might be necessary to the success of the attack upon the French fleet; that in addition to the assistance and assurances they received, pilots were also furnished to clear the Straights of Messina, a passage which no squadron, without such aid, would have ventured to attempt, and in consequence of which they hoped to be able to cut off the French fleet, which was supposed to be then at Malta? In a word, was it not apparent, that nothing,

likely to prove injurious to France, had been refused by the court of Naples to the implacable enemies of the republic?

If, in addition to this, the conduct be considered which Naples had directly manifested towards her; if it be recollected, that, in spite of the fourth article of the treaty which stipulates, "that the King of Naples shall be bound to grant, in his roads and ports, surety and protection to all French merchant ships however numerous, and to all ships of war which shall not exceed four," when some of the convoy of the French fleet were obliged to anchor in the roads of Sicily, commotions, evidently excited by the government of Naples, broke out at Trapani, at Gergonti, and at Messina, in which several of the French soldiers who went on shore were assassinated: if it be recollected, that since Malta had been in the possession of the French, the Maltese boats, which came as usual to take in provisions in Sicily, were prevented, the gates shut against them, and those on board repulsed with fire-arms; that the plan of surprising Malta, while it remained in the hands of the French, was not even dissembled by the Neapolitan government, and that a Maltese bark, which was carrying French commissaries sent to the Viceroy of Sicily, having been forced by an English shallop to take refuge at Alciata, the crew, on landing, were immediately pursued with musquetry by the Sicilians, and forced to reembark, when the vessel was immediately taken by the English, without the Neapolitan go-

vernment making the smallest representation to cause the neutrality to be respected : if it be added, that on another occasion one of the French corsairs having been carried off by force in the port of Barratto, the governor of that place did not condescend to take any measures to prevent such an attack upon the sovereignty of the King of the Two Sicilies ; and in short, that such is the hostile delirium and hatred of his Majesty towards the French and their allies, that in contempt of all the ties which should bind him to the King of Spain, he has had the imprudence to receive in his ports a Spanish prize taken by the English : if we also recollect the inconceivable joy which was manifested at Naples on the sight of the English fleet, the public honours lavished on Admiral Nelson by the court itself on going out to welcome him, his triumphant entry, the large reward granted to the messenger who brought the first account of his victory, and the illuminations and rejoicings which took place on the occasion : if it be remembered, that since the period of this victory the audacity of the Neapolitan government has known no bounds ; that lately an unrestrained populace broke the windows of the French Consul at Naples, without the Neapolitan government having taken any measures to repress such an insult ; that the late sedition at Malta was openly seconded by Naples ; that the markets, and all the public places resounded with the most terrible invectives against us ; that all, who were inclined to encourage peace with France, were persecuted with the most acri-

monious rage ; and that at length a barbarous order was issued by the King of Naples, menacing with death whoever should carry provisions to the French at Malta : if all these circumstances be considered, it must be allowed, that more hostile sentiments never were manifested than on one side, nor more patience shewn than on the other.

THE Executive Directory, however, postponed as long as possible the moment, in which it was to wreak the vengeance of the nation. To them it was made clear to demonstration, that the court of Naples did not confine its hostility against the republic to complaints, menaces, or fury. After having shewn the most hostile disposition for a long time posterior to the conclusion of peace, it had at last been at open hostility, and lavished succours of all kinds on our most cruel enemy. In short, it had become the ally of Great Britain, and as useful to that power as prejudicial to us ; and yet the French government, faithful to its desire of preserving peace even with Naples, was willing to hope that there was yet a possibility of repentance.--But this honourable illusion was dissipated by the Neapolitan government, which has now completed its long train of perjuries. It has dared to attack suddenly the French army, and to accompany this aggression with the most insolent menaces. The republican energy, so long confined, will now burst forth with the strength of thunder. This court too long time spared, and imitating the illegal conduct of the British government, has dared to be guilty of violating the laws of peace without ha-

ving the courage to declare war; but it will at length receive the reward of its demerits.

BUT it is also necessary, that those, who have shewn themselves its accomplices, should experience its fate. The Sardinian government has been the associate of its perfidies, and a similar fate awaits it : its guilt, as an accomplice with Naples, is manifest from a thousand circumstances ; its sentiments, its language, and even its actions, in proportion to its means, have been the same, and its artifice and hypocrisy exactly resemble those of Naples. It would be difficult to account for its recent conduct towards France, if history did not, in all ages, manifest the cunning and versatile politics of that court, constantly occupied in fomenting war among its neighbours, in taking a part in all the wars of Italy, in shamefully deserting its allies, in constantly joining that side which appeared to be the strongest in order to oppress the weak, in gratifying its revenge or ambition, and in offering for sale its support to whoever was inclined to purchase it. Independently of every other cause of complaint, who would believe that the treaty, which we have concluded with the court of Turin, and which they ought to have considered as a signal favour, has not yet been published in the states of the King of Sardinia ? The agents of the republic have in vain requested that this might be done : the resistance has been invincible, and the most futile reasons have been assigned as a pretence for delay, or rather for refusal. In fact, the Sardinian

court has never ceased to make war in every way, which its imbecility and cowardice suffered it to put into execution. Our most cruel enemies, the emigrants and refractory priests, have constantly met with a welcome reception in its dominions, where they have been suffered to give free vent to their hatred, and to the expression of their barbarous wishes against the republic; while they have been allowed to excite the people against the French by the most atrocious calumnies. This is not all; from the moment in which peace was signed, the French, almost under the eye of their ambassador, have been assassinated in cold blood, and that chiefly by the regular troops. These assassinations have been committed almost daily, and the number of them is dreadful, when the total amount shall be known. Some have fallen by the filetto, and some have been mutilated in the most dreadful manner. A volunteer of the 68th demi-brigade was buried alive, after having been barbarously wounded: he was seen coming alive out of the grave in which he had been buried, and was destined to escape to afford a proof of this horrible cruelty. The agents of the French republic have expressed in its name the most energetic indignation; but they have been unable to prevent these crimes from passing unnoticed or unpunished. Some banditti, enrolled under the name of *Barbets*, whose business is to rob and pillage, but whose amusement is to kill republicans, far from being dispersed by the public authority, appear to have been encouraged by it, and their thefts on

the Piedmontese were forgiven in consideration of their murder of the French. On this subject a long negotiation was entered into, which was considered by the Sardinian government as a public calamity, and the object of which was not to obtain the final suppression of these banditti, but merely a promise to repress them. The support of our arms was promised upon that condition; but the Sardinian government was unwilling to obtain tranquillity at that price, and would not consent to issue a law against *stiletto*s and concealed arms, so fearful were they that the French should, by any means, be secure in their states. During the course of the negotiation, and in spite of the formal promise to suspend a proceeding in which the most serious passions were manifested, several Frenchmen, who were implicated in an unhappy affair, were shot without pity. Besides these enrolled banditti, the Duke d'Aost, a monster, the brother of the King, and heir to the throne, like another *Old Man of the Mountain*, never ceased to keep, under his orders and in his pay, a band of cut-throats, to whom he issued directions to assassinate such and such a Frenchman; and these orders were but too faithfully executed.

It is in vain to suppose that all these crimes were not imputable to the Sardinian government, since the whole of its conduct has proved that it was privy to every one of them.--The principal places in Piedmont were occupied by French troops, for whom no provisions could be obtained: the friends

of the republic were constantly thrown into prison, Frenchmen were insulted, and even their dress was turned into derision. The emigrants were encouraged in their audacity, the public officers who were most distinguished for their hatred towards the French chiefly promoted, the Barbets protected even openly by the chief magistrates, and a vast number of poniards forged and distributed: in fine, the most dreadful plots against the French were planned and ready to be carried into execution. From an interrogatory exhibited to one of the chiefs of the Barbets it appears, that a person who was employed in the custom-house at Turin, and who was commissioned to pay the banditti, had received orders from the Sardinian government to distribute among their chiefs boxes of poison, which were to be thrown into the wells lying nearest to the French camp.

It is evident, that there exists the most intimate connection between the conduct of this government and the court of Naples in their hostility to the French republic. This connection, maintained and supported by so many crimes, would alone be sufficient to implicate the court of Turin in the guilt of the other. But a stronger additional proof arises from the circumstance of the preparations for war being increased at Turin, in proportion as those at Naples were multiplied. The militia in the former place were called forth, and thirty thousand stand of arms delivered to them: the Piedmontese troops marched towards Loano and Oneglia, at the very moment

in which the Neapolitan army attacked the French troops in the territory of the Roman republic, in which six thousand Neapolitans disembarked at Leghorn, and in which a new disembarkation was threatened on the coast of Liguria. It was at the same moment that the order to march on the first signal was given, that Turin was filled with troops, that fifteen hundred poniards were distributed, that the citadel was nearly besieged, that the heights which command it were furnished with an extraordinary number of cannon, and that the Sardinian government dared to require the evacuation of the citadel and the diminution of our troops in Piedmont. In this situation of affairs, it was impossible for the French government to separate two courts, so obviously hostile, and united against the French republic. But the Directory declare solemnly to Europe, that whatever may be the result of this war, no ambitious views shall intermeddle in the purity of the motives, which have induced them to take up arms; and they declare to all governments guiltless of the perfidy of the Neapolitans, that the treaties binding them shall never have been more faithfully observed in times past, than they shall be in times to come.

LA REVEILLIERE LEPAUX.

APPENDIX, No III.

MANIFESTO OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC;

OR,

MESSAGE of the Directory to the Councils, stating the reasons of France for declaring War against the Emperor of Germany and the Grand-Duke of Tuscany.

CITIZENS REPRESENTATIVES,

WHATEVER may have been the magnitude of the events that have occurred since the conclusion of the treaty of Campo-Formio, we still cherish the remembrance of those which preceded it. We have not forgotten, that it was after five years of triumphs, and at the moment when the French armies were only thirty leagues from Vienna, that the Republic consented to suspend the progress of her victories, and preferred the immediate establishment of peace to the success of further efforts. It will also be recollected, that when the treaty was concluded, the moderation of the conqueror appeared so great that it required in some measure an apology. Could we have foreseen, that this compact, in which power shewed itself so indulgent,

and in which the most liberal compensation ought to have silenced all regret, so far from attaining the promised stability, would have been, from the beginning, only the deceptive pledge of an ephemeral reconciliation; and that the infractions, it was so soon to experience, should come from a state, which was indebted to that compact for an ample indemnification for the losses it had experienced by the war! What a strange contrast! Whilst the Republic with unremitting care fulfilled every stipulation of a treaty, which was proportioned neither to her successes, nor to the legitimate revenge she was entitled to claim for the plans of destruction formed and pursued against her; Austria, instead of shewing herself satisfied with a pacification that had saved her from the greatest misfortunes, appeared to be occupied only with deteriorating or entirely destroying a compact to which she owed her salvation.

AMONG the violations of the treaty which that power has been guilty of, some are so manifest, that they have already excited the surprise of Europe, and the indignation of republicans. Others, altho' less public, or less obvious, have not however been less hostile; and the Directory can no longer defer pointing out to the legislature the circumstances, which have marked the conduct of the Austrian cabinet; a conduct truly hostile and invasive of the state of peace. But no effort or example has been able to bring back that court to the observance of plighted engagements.

AT the period of concluding the treaty of Campo-Formio, it was reciprocally stipulated by an additional act that all that part of the German territory, which extended from the Tyrol and the frontier of the Austrian states to the left bank of the Main, should be evacuated at the same time by the French and Imperial troops, with the exception of Kehl which was to remain with the republic. A convention still more particular, concluded and signed at Rastadt on the first December 1797, renewed that engagement, and marked a fixed term for its execution. On the part of the republic, that execution was prompt and entire : on the part of Austria it was deferred and eluded, and is not yet obtained. In Philipsburg the Emperor has kept a garrison and magazines, notwithstanding the pretexts employed to cover them ; and in Ulm and Ingolstadt he has not ceased to keep troops, and an Etat-Major prepared to receive more. All the posts in Bavaria have remained at his disposal, and so far from that duchy having been evacuated, according to the terms of the treaty, we find, that it at present contains one hundred thousand Austrians destined at once to resume hostilities against the republic, and to secure a country so long coveted by the court of Vienna. If that court had ever intended to shew itself faithful to the treaty, the first effect of such a disposition would doubtless have been to press the reciprocal establishment of the respective legations. But so far from Austria having entertained a wish of taking any step toward that object, the Directo-

ry learned with surprise, that, at Vienna, the plenipotentiaries, sent on both sides to the congress of Rastadt, were considered as sufficient to keep up a communication between the two states, and that the treaty of Campo-Formio was to receive ulterior developments by the peace with the Empire, before the habitual relations of a perfect understanding could be entirely established. So cold an interpretation of the treaty, and so formal a distance did not presage that it would be long respected.

IN the mean time, a government, whose existence attested also the moderation of the republic, dared to provoke anew her vengeance by the most atrocious outrages. The Pope expiated his crimes, and Rome acquired liberty. But the Directory, foreseeing that certain persons would not fail to alarm the Imperial court, and give to the most just reprisals the aspect of ambitious aggression, thought proper to wave all considerations of etiquette. They sent to Vienna the citizen Bernadotte, as ambassador from the French republic, to declare that the destruction of the pontifical government at Rome would make no change in the limitation of the states of Italy, and that the existing and acknowledged republics would not be increased by any part of the Roman territory. This left the treaty of Campo-Formio in all its integrity, since, by fixing the extent of the Cisalpine republic, that treaty could not foresee or prevent the consequences of future events, which might change the form of other states of Italy on account of their own ag-

gressions. But the ambassador of the republic was received at Vienna with coldness: and this mark of eager sincerity, this mission of an agent invested with the most august character, was not returned.

Soon afterwards an event, less injurious by the circumstances accompanying it than by the impunity it obtained, manifested the secret sentiments of the court of Vienna.* If, at the first news of this event, the Directory had not had some foundation for seeing in it only the work of two courts eager to revive the war upon the continent; if they could have believed that the Emperor was acquainted with the plot fabricated under his eyes, they would not have hesitated a moment to incite the national vengeance against so outrageous a violation of the state of peace and the rights of nations, which had been so religiously respected by the republic, even in the midst of the most violent storms of the revolution. But it was possible, that the cabinets of London and Petersburg might have prepared and directed by their agents a tumult, neither known nor approved by the Emperor. The expressions of regret conveyed, in the first moments after the occurrence, by M. De Colorado to the ambassador of the republic, and the announced appointment of M. Degelmann to Paris, were motives for thinking that the Imperial court would hasten to inves-

* This alludes to Bernadotte leaving Vienna, in consequence of a tumult.

tigate and punish an attack, whose existence it acknowledged, and of which it feared to appear the accomplice. When it was also known, that the minister, who was accused of having seconded the fury of England and Russia, had resigned his place to the Count de Cobentzel, and that the latter was to proceed to Seltz, to make reparation, the Directory could not repent having occasioned these conferences. They shewed themselves less ready to yield to the first impulse of a legitimate resentment, than eager to remove by mutual explanation, every thing that might oppose the establishment of the most perfect harmony. Such was their desire to produce conciliation, that the envoy-extraordinary of the republic was definitively instructed to content himself in reparation for the event at Vienna on the 10th of April, with a simple disavowal, and a declaration that endeavours would be made to discover the guilty. But scarcely had the conferences been opened at Seltz, when the Imperial court altered its tone and its conduct: Baron Degelmann did not proceed to Paris; M. de Thugut returned to the ministry; ---and the investigation, which had been commenced, remained unavailing and ineffectual. The Count de Cobentzel, instead of offering or giving the reparation which was the principal object of his mission, affected to direct the discussion to other points. He concluded by declining all satisfaction, even that with which the republic would have contented herself, *when he was convinced that the Directory would not listen to the insinuation, by which the court of Vienna wished to*

render her, in the midst even of peace, an accomplice in the strangest spoliations.

THE negotiators separated, and soon afterwards the person, who had been sent to Seltz by his Imperial majesty to make profuse and vain protestations of peace, received a mission to Berlin and Petersburg, there to connect himself with the incitements of the British government to revive the war. Nothing but a profound love of peace could have prevented the Directory from yielding to the evidence of a hostile disposition on the part of Austria, and induced them to forbear resenting its provocations. They saw that at Rastadt, from the very opening of the congress, the Imperial plenipotentiary and the minister of Austria had incessantly shewn themselves adverse to all the propositions of the republic, and to all those which might lead to a definitive and stable pacification. The Directory also knew the difficulties made at Vienna to the acknowledgment of the Cisalpine minister; a circumstance calculated to bring in question points decided by the treaty of Campo-Formio. They were informed, that (whatever might be their personal opinion of the Emperor), the Austrian cabinet influenced more than ever by England, gave to the cabinet of Naples a confidence which led it into the most extravagant measures; directed, in a more secret manner, Piedmont which a short time before it had devoted to dismemberment; and endeavoured to detach from its neutrality the Prussian government, which Austria wished to arm against

France, after having endeavoured to arm France against Prussia.

WHAT motives for abjuring a treaty not acknowledged, violated by Austria, and which ceased to be binding on the republic! But the patience and resolution of the Directory had yet to shew themselves superior even to a more direct provocation. At the moment when some factious persons, who had usurped the power in the Grison league, testified uneasiness on account of the vicinity of a French army, and the projects which they pretended were formed against their independence and neutrality, affecting at the same time a perfect security with respect to Austria, from whom they said they had received the most encouraging protestations, the Directory thought proper to make known to the inhabitants, that their territory would be respected by France, so long as it should be respected by Austria. A few months only had elapsed after this declaration, when a corps of Austrian troops invaded the country of the Grisons, and established themselves there. The hostile nature of that invasion, and the secret machinations included in it, did not escape the Executive Directory. It was evident, that Austria was thus preparing the means of disturbing Helvetia, of making an irruption into the Cisalpine republic, and of giving, at the decisive moment, her aid to the King of Piedmont in an attempt concerted with him, to deprive the French of every possible means of retreat, who were to be attacked

by one hundred thousand Neapolitans, and whom these courts dared to suppose conquered. The Directory were not ignorant of these perfidious combinations, but they still avoided regarding them as a formal aggression. It was not until the moment in which the premature attack of the King of the Two Sicilies opened a new war, that the Directory having full proof of the King of Sardinia being an accomplice, and wishing to turn aside the effect of it, seized his strong places. Thus they anticipated by some days the intentions of the Austrians who were to have occupied them themselves, the anterior invasion of the Grison territories being but the prelude to that step.

BUT, while the republican armies repelled aggression in Italy, and anticipated perfidy, the Directory, though they had intelligence of the treaty between Vienna and Naples, tho' they saw an Austrian General at the head of the Neapolitan army, and though they knew the movements of troops which had taken place in the Tyrol and the north of Italy, still persisted in expressing a desire to remain at peace with the Emperor. The sincerity of their wishes was sufficiently apparent from their conduct to Tuscany; for they had long since found it impossible to make a distinction between the courts of Florence and Vienna. The Directory knew that the journey of M. Manfredini to Vienna related to the same object, which had brought the Prince of Montechiaro from Naples. He had carefully prepared the success of his mission by

contributing to incite in the Emperor a desire of increasing his influence in Italy, of seeking a new aggrandisement there under the pretence of indemnity, of obstructing the establishment of the Cisalpine republic, and, above all, of opposing the existence of the Roman republic. The Directory also learned, that at the period when the King of Naples was making dispositions to march his army to Rome, the Grand-Duke was employed in making preparations for war, and accelerating and extending them in a manner very unusual to that country. He ordered, in addition to the complete armament of his troops, voluntary enrolments in every town and village, established a forced loan, demanded their plate from the churches, monks, and nobles, and adopted measures that denoted a secret participation in the greatest enterprises. But notwithstanding the art with which these marks of hostility were sought to be concealed, the Directory obtained proofs that the Grand-Duke relied so much on the defeat of the French, that he shut up all the passes by which they might have retreated through his states, and fortified them with a numerous artillery. This measure was to have completed the destruction of the remnant of the French army; whilst, a corps of Neapolitans, and some English ships took possession of Leghorn; an event which would never have taken place, if that Prince had only declared he would not consent to it.

Thus the first movement of the French army

ought to have been to march to Leghorn and Florence. If the Directory, who only knew since with certainty to what an extent the Grand-Duke, who is still arming secretly, had carried his culpability, suspended the effect of their resolution, it was because, looking upon the court of Tuscany as less immediately connected with the interests and enterprises of the court of Naples than with those of the court of Vienna, they still hesitated in believing that the latter wished to revive the war. Soon, however, a fact, more decisive than all the former ones, left no doubt of the disposition of Austria, and consequently afforded a full insight into that of the Grand-Duke ;---twenty-five thousand Russians advanced towards Germany, and were to be followed by several corps equally numerous. The Russian monarch had proclaimed throughout Europe his hostile designs against the republic ; and whilst his fleets, having obtained leave to pass the Straits, entered the Mediterranean to attack the possessions of France, his troops sought a passage on the continent to attack the armies of the republic. It was at the moment when the Emperor was still in a state of peace ; when the Empire, neutralised by a special armistice, was near the period of pacification, that a Prince committing an aggression, and that an ally of London and Constantinople, wishing to unite his efforts to theirs, appeared upon the limits of the Austrian territory. His army was received without any obstacle, and it is evident that this was expected. The Emperor quits his capital, goes himself to meet the Russians, ac-

cepts their congratulations, and associates himself to their projects by heaping upon them presents and attention.

STRUCK with the scandal of such a conduct, and instructed that the Russians were to pass from the Austrian territory to the territory of the empire, the Directory, still repressing the first impulse of national pride, contented themselves with demanding explanations from the Emperor and the empire. The Emperor was silent : --- his plenipotentiary even wished to deny that he had received the note of the French ministers : the Deputation of the empire referred it to the Diet, and the Diet to the empire. The march of the Russians continued ; they traversed Moravia and Austria ; they approached Bavaria ; and the amicable representations of the republic were as little regarded as the interest of Germany, which is incompatible with this foreign invasion. The moment was now arrived, in which the Directory could no longer temporise, and hold a language that might compromise the national dignity, and the safety of the state. The republic had given peace as soon as it was asked : she had exhausted herself in efforts to maintain what she had granted ; but it was at length necessary, that she should know her enemies, and that those who wished for war should be forced to explain themselves. Such were the spirit and object of the two notes transmitted, on the first of January last, to the Austrian minister at Rastadt and to the deputation. A period was fixed for his

Imperial Majesty to give a categorical and satisfactory reply, in failure of which his silence or refusal would be regarded as an hostile act : that period expired on the fifteenth of February last, and no reply is yet arrived.

SUCH, citizens representatives, has been the conduct of the court of Vienna. It is by such a succession of facts, that the treaty of Campo-Formio not acknowledged from the commencement, unexecuted on the part of Austria in several of its principal articles, compromised and invalidated daily by hostile preparations or acts, is at length sacrificed to ***** of the Russian monarch, and the perfidious combinations of England. It is thus that the Emperor, carried perhaps beyond his own resolutions, compromises at the same time the fate of the empire, deprives himself of the benefits of a peace begun, and gives up Germany anew to all the chances of a war, in which the Emperor and the empire are no more than the auxiliaries of Russia. And thus the determinations of the court of Vienna carrying with them those of the court of Tuscany, it is not permitted to the Directory to separate them. Forced then, in terms of the declaration made at Rastadt, to consider the silence of the Emperor as a hostile measure ; instructed besides, that the Austrian troops have already made aggressive movements in Bavaria towards Suabia, the Directory, renouncing with regret the hope of maintaining peace in Germany, but still disposed to listen to suitable propo-

fitions for a new and complete reconciliation, inform you, citizens representatives, that they have already taken such measures as they thought necessary for the defence of the state ; and propose to you to declare war against the Emperor, King of Hungary and Bohemia, and against the Grand-Duke of Tuscany.

BARRAS President.

LAGARDE Sec.-General.

APPENDIX, No IV.

STATE PAPERS

RELATIVE TO

THE ASSASSINATION OF THE FRENCH PLENIPOTENTIARIES AT RASTADT.

I.

MESSAGE from the Executive Directory to the council of Elders and the council of Five Hundred, respecting the assassination of the ambassadors Bonnier and Roberjot.

CITIZENS REPRESENTATIVES,

THE Executive Directory transmit to you the recital of a new crime by the court of Vienna,—a deed to which for a long time they refused to give credit. But it is too true, that the ministers of the republic at the congress of Rastadt have been assassinated: two perished, and one escaped only by a kind of miracle. The details of this execrable catastrophe are contained in a letter from Jean Debry, which the Directory annex to this message, and which they forbear to recapitulate, fearful of

awakening the afflicting impression and deep horror the perusal of that letter will make on your minds. Anterior to this event, the court of Vienna, by the arrest of several of our civil and diplomatic agents, and by their long and cruel captivity, had openly infringed the sacred rights of nations. It had recently transgressed them, in a more particular manner, by causing it to be announced, that the presence of a congress at Raftadt would be no protection to the city against the events of war.

BUT between these outrages and that which has succeeded, the space was still immense. Austria might have deliberately committed every kind of perfidy and treachery toward her allies as well as enemies, but without disgracing her own soldiers by transforming them into public assassins, and by directing their attacks against the sacred agents of treaties, the organs of the peace of nations, and the members of an assembly of European negociators. The French plenipotentiaries, far from entertaining any such apprehensions, repelled every surmise respecting their personal safety. Penetrated with the maxims of sincerity and public faith which their nation professes, they were persuaded that these maxims could not fail in serving as a safeguard to them, after having so constantly served as their rule in the course of a laborious mission.

CITIZENS representatives, when we are seeking for the motives, and, above all, for the hopes which might have led the Austrian government to this

last excess of fury, it is impossible not to remark how much they reckoned on the manœuvres, by which they too effectually labour to perpetuate agitation, penury and discord in the bosom of the French republic. Would they thus hold themselves up to the execration of all people and of all ages, if they did not flatter themselves with soon seeing the horror of their crimes covered and concealed by their successes? And upon what could Austria found this hope, but upon the progressive diminution of our pecuniary means, and, since it must be published, upon the errors of those Frenchmen she deludes, upon the criminal concurrence of those who wish to serve her, and on the unfortunate dissensions of those who desire to oppose her? For whatever may have been, within a few days, her military advantages crowned by so cowardly an outrage, experience has instructed her, that such reverses would be to the French nation only the presages of ultimate triumph, if the restoration of our finances were fully to second the valour and attachment of our republican phalanxes. It is because the Austrian knows, or rather because he exaggerates, the momentary distress of our finances, that he thinks he is strong enough to shew himself ferocious, and that he celebrates his ephemeral victories by solemn assassinations.

AFTER so fatal a recital, citizens representatives, the necessity of directing our thoughts to acts of loyalty and virtue is peculiarly impressive. You

will see by the letter from Jean Debry, that this minister owed his safety to the generous care of the members of the diplomatic body ; --- that they transmitted to the Austrian Colonel a formal act, signed by all of them, to declare in the name of their constituents that officer responsible for the crime and all its consequences ; --- and that the inhabitants of Rastadt, after having loaded it with all the execration it merits, have been the first to announce the opinion of Europe and posterity, by accusing the Austrian government of having conceived, directed, and accomplished it.

CITIZENS representatives, the manes of our plenipotentiaries, the indignation of the armies, the menacing voice of the French nation, the unanimous voice of every people, of your allies, and of your enemies themselves, the voice of all nations who wish for peace or resolve to preserve it, the common interest of governments whatever they may be, in fine, every thing loudly demands the most exemplary vengeance. --- The Executive Directory, in order to make it prompt and tremendous, will employ all the means you have already placed, or may hereafter place in their power. But they cannot dissemble that circumstances require all the energy, as well as all the wisdom, of republican patriotism, the severe repression of robberies of every kind, harmony between the constituted powers, concord between citizens, and, above all the restoration of public credit by an equilibrium between the receipt and expenditure. Citizens represent-

atives, when, by a sudden impulse, the French people rose in a mass against the enemies of the republic, then scarcely proclaimed, Austria had not yet run her career of perfidy and crime. She had not violated the most holy engagements, and the most sacred laws of nature ; --- she had not massacred the negotiators of peace. Let then this new impulse of the people be formidable, and let their efforts and their sacrifices be generous, since they are to avenge at the same time the liberty of France, and the morality of all civilized nations.

BARRAS President.

II.

LETTER of JEAN DEBRY, Minister Plenipotentiary of the French Republic to the Congress at Rastadt, to the Citizen TALLEYRAND, Minister for foreign affairs.

Straßburg, 1st May 1799.

CITIZEN MINISTER,

I ENDEAVOUR to recollect myself, in order to dictate the details of the dreadful events, of which the French Legation were the victims on the twenty-eighth April, and from which, wounded and mutilated, I have escaped by a kind of miracle. Long before the nineteenth April, the French Legation perceived that every means were employed by the enemies of peace to produce the dissolution of the

congress ; and we reckoned upon seeing it expire insensibly by the successive retreat of those who composed it. But on that day the carrying off of the ferrymen, who served to transmit our correspondence by way of Seltz, informed us, that our enemies would not undoubtedly have the patience which the French government shewed. We exclaimed against this violation of the rights of nations; the Deputation exclaimed on their side; and the result of these steps was a military letter, which announced to us that no tranquillising declaration for the safety of the members of the congress could be given. The Deputation assembled anew, and declared that they were no longer free; that the recal of several members also rendered them, according to the terms of their instructions, unable to adopt any deliberation whatever. It was upon this conclusion, officially transmitted to us by the Directorial minister, who himself was recalled, that we founded our note of the twenty-fifth April, protesting against the violence exercised, and declaring that we should repair within three days to the commune of Strasburg to continue the negociations there.

THE next day, (I give you all these details from memory, because our papers were carried off, as you shall hear; but I do not think I am mistaken respecting dates,) the citizen Lemaire, courier of the Legation, was seized at Plittersdorff by an Austrian patrol, and sent to Gegenbach, the Colonel's quarters. Informed by us of this outrage, unheard

of till then, but which was soon to be surpassed, all the members of the diplomatic body, especially the ministers of Baden, the Prussian Legation, and the Directorial minister, applied to the Austrian Colonel for reparation. They demanded from him particularly the assurance that we should be respected in returning to France :---no answer was given. On the twenty-eighth preparations were made for our departure: we might doubtless have gone with safety, had we stolen away on the twenty-seventh, when there were no Austrian patrols on the Rhine. But having once introduced the question of the right we had to return in safety, we should have thought ourselves wanting to the dignity of our character, had we not required some solution; and perhaps this sentiment facilitated the execution of the crime which I am about to narrate.

I RESUME my recital, citizen minister.---On the twenty-eighth April, at half past seven in the evening, a Captain of hussars of Szekler, stationed at Gegenbach, came on the part of his Colonel to declare verbally to Baron D' Albini, that we might quit Rastadt in safety; and afterwards came to signify to us an order to leave that city in twenty-four hours. The hussars of Szekler had already taken possession of it; and occupied all the avenues. At eight o'clock we got into our carriages: when we arrived at the gate of Rastadt, we found a general prohibition to let no one enter or go out:---an hour was spent in parleys. It appears, that they stood in need of this delay in order to organise the

atrocious execution which followed, and of which, I say it with conviction, all the details had been commanded and combined beforehand. At length the Austrian commandant gave an order for the departure of the French Legation only. We demanded an escort: it was refused, and the commandant declared, that we should be as safe as in our own rooms.

IN consequence of this, we began our journey. We were not fifty paces from Rastadt, ourselves and the Ligurian Legation who did not quit us, and who participated our dangers with unequalled devotion, when a detachment of nearly sixty hussars of Szekler, in ambush upon the canal of the Murg, fell upon our carriages, and made them stop. Mine was the first of them. Six men, armed with drawn sabres, tear me out with violence: I am searched, and robbed of all that I had. Another, who appeared to command this expedition, arrives on horseback, and asks for the minister Jean Debry: I thought he came to save me. "*It is I,*" I answered, "*who am Jean Debry minister of France.*" Scarcely had I said so, when two cuts of a sabre stretched me on the ground. I was immediately assailed on all sides by fresh blows. Tumbled into a ditch, I feigned to be dead; the banditti then quitted me to go to the other carriages. I availed myself of this instant and escaped, wounded in different places, losing blood on all sides, and indebted for my life, perhaps, only to the thickness of my clothes. Bonnier was

killed in the same manner I was to have been, and Roberjot massacred almost in the arms of his wife.

THE same question was put to my ill-fated colleagues as to me : *Are you Bonnier ? Are you Roberjot ?* Our carriages were pillaged, every thing became the prey of the brigands : the papers of the Legation were carried off, conveyed to the Austrian commandant, and claimed in vain. The secretary of the Legation threw himself into a ditch, and by favour of the night escaped the blows of the assassins. I crawled to an adjacent wood, hearing the yells of the cannibals, the screams of the victims, and particularly of their companions, of the wife of Roberjot, of my wife seven months gone with child, and of my two daughters calling out for their father. My private secretary, citizen Belin, was held by six men to be witness to all these scenes of horror. My valet-de-chambre was thrown into the river.

I KNOW that all the members of the diplomatic corps made the greatest efforts to break through the line of the assassins, and to come to the assistance of those, to whom assistance might yet be administered. But it was not till one in the morning that the wife of Roberjot could get to M. de Jacobi's, the Prussian minister ; and my wife and daughters to M. de Redon's minister from Bremen and Hanover. I wandered about the wood during the whole of that dreadful night, fearful of the approach of day, which might expose me to

the Austrian patrols. About six in the morning, hearing them go about, and feeling that I could not avoid them, penetrated besides by the rain and the cold, and growing more and more enfeebled by the blood I lost, I took the desperate resolution of returning to Rastadt. I saw on the road the naked bodies of my two colleagues. The dreadful weather, and perhaps the weariness of the assassins, after the commission of such crimes, facilitated my journey ; and I arrived at length, out of breath and covered with blood, at the Count de Gortz's, the King of Prussia's minister.

It is out of my power to depict to you the torment, and to relate to you the narratives of all the persons attached to the Legation, who were the witnesses or the objects of these execrable scenes ; I will collect them when I have strength. Notwithstanding her virtuous courage, the wife of Roberjot is like a mad person with grief. I implore for her all the interest of the government. Fatigued with the recital which I have just made at two different times, I confine myself now to express to you, how much gratitude each of the persons saved, owes to the generous devotion of the members of the diplomatic corps. I name none of them, because it would be necessary to name them all. Besides generous attentions and soothing consolations, we are indebted to them for our return here : a formal act, signed by all of them, was conveyed to the Austrian Colonel, declaring to him, that their constituents made him responsible both

for the crime and all its consequences. The minister of the Margrave gave us an escort of his troops for our return. It was necessary to suffer it to be joined by the hussars of Szekler, who appeared to see with regret that I had escaped. The Prussian Legation, prevented by them from accompanying us, charged their secretary M. de Jourdan not to quit us till we had embarked. My God ! why was it that so much care could not prevent the fatal catastrophe of my two ill-fated colleagues !

I SHOULD also add, that almost the whole inhabitants of Rastadt, shedding tears at the outrage, loaded it with merited execration, and did not dissemble the opinion, which ascribes the atrocious conception and all the direction of it to Austria ; to Austria, whose minister L'Herbach, now commissary with the army of the Archduke, obtained, without the smallest difficulty, at his departure from Rastadt, all the passports he demanded from the French Legation ;---to Austria who dared to signify to us by Count de Metternich, the Imperial commissioner, that he could no longer remain at Rastadt, in consequence of the want of safety for his correspondence ; --- to Austria, in short, who according to every probability gave the order for massacring three ministers and carrying off their papers, and promised their plunder as a reward.

THERE are many other approximations that might be made ; but they will be felt. Pardon

the disorder of my ideas: the horrible images which I have incessantly before my eyes, do not leave me free reflection, and oppress me more than the pain I feel. My wounds are in a good state, and hitherto announce nothing dangerous.

Health and respect,

JEAN DEBRY.

III.

MEMORIAL of the Executive Directory of the French republic, to all people, and to all governments.

THE intelligence of an atrocious outrage has already resounded through Europe, and the circumstances of a crime, unparalleled even by those which stain the pages of the history of civilised nations, are now collecting with horror from all parts. It was at the gates of Rastadt, on the territory of an independant and neutral prince, and in sight of all the members of the congress, violently detained in that town, and forced to be the impotent but indignant spectators of a crime which affected them in the deepest manner and threatened them all ;--- it was there, that, in contempt of a sacred character,---in contempt of assurances given,---and in contempt of every thing which constitutes humanity, justice, and honour, the plenipotentiaries of the republic, victims ever to be regretted of the mission

of peace with which they were intrusted, and of the unlimited devotion with which they fulfilled the instructions of government and maintained the national dignity, were massacred in cold blood by a detachment of Austrian troops.

BUT how much more detestable do all the circumstances of this assassination render it? Prior to its occurrence, and in the first days of the month of Floreal, the communication of the French Legation with the republic had been interrupted. One of its couriers had been carried off, and the spirited remonstrances of the congress had only produced an insolent declaration, which made the separation of the deputies necessary. On the twenty-eighth April, at seven in the evening, the Colonel of the regiment of Szekler caused an intimation to be made by a Captain to Baron D'Albini, that the French Legation might leave Rastadt in security. The captain proceeded afterwards to the French ministers, and signified to them an order to depart from Rastadt in twenty-four hours. At eight o'clock, they got into their carriages, but were stopped at the gates of the town. Doubtless, so sudden a departure, had not been expected, and the assassination was not completely organized:---another hour was still wanting. At nine o'clock, the prohibition of passing the gates was taken off, with respect to the French Legation only. The French ministers demanded an escort, but the Austrian commander refused to grant it, and answered in the following terms: *You will be as secure on your journey as in your apartments.* Scarcely had

the Legation advanced fifty paces, when it was surrounded by a numerous detachment of the same corps, whose commander had just before promised every kind of security. The carriages are stopped ; Citizen Jean Debry, who was in the first, is forced to alight, and he is asked, *Are you Jean Debry? --- Yes*, answers he, *I am Jean Debry, minister of France* : he instantly falls to the ground, pierced with wounds. The Citizens Bonnier and Roberjot are stopped in the same manner, and interrogated : they tell their names and are killed ; Roberjot is massacred in the arms of his wife. The crime being perpetrated, the papers of the Legation are carried off, and conveyed to the Austrian commander.

IN considering these faithful details, who does not perceive the premeditated plan of this assassination ; and its author ? Such a sacrilege will doubtless only tend to the accumulation of infamy and execration ; and should any other punishment be wanting, history reserves one for those who have been guilty of the crime. It would be in vain for the court of Vienna to attempt to shake off the dreadful responsibility that attaches to this accusation : all its previous conduct now comes forward in evidence against it. It will be recollected, that it commenced hostilities by an outrage of a similar nature, in causing two French ambassadors to be arrested on the territory of the Confederacy, who were afterwards thrown into the dungeons of Mantua. It will be remembered, that the prisons of Olmutz also received, and confined for three years, representatives of

the people and a minister who were delivered up by treachery. It will be remembered, that Austria was not unacquainted with the assassinations committed at Rome on the French, and that she received and protected the authors of them. It will, finally, be recollected, that the first ambassador of the republic at Vienna experienced there only outrages and affronts.

THESE statements are sufficient to impress conviction, that the assassination, recently perpetrated at Raftadt, is but the consequence, and the horrid completion, of the series of atrocities, with which Austria has astonished Europe, since Charles V. first furnished the example of stepping beyond all social laws, by causing the ambassadors to be massacred whom Francis I. had sent to Venice and Constantinople. The proofs existing in history of the indignation, which was manifested at that period by all the European powers, convince us, that a crime still more execrable will also excite greater horror and detestation. Let the constant moderation and boundless generosity of the French republic be compared with the armies of Austria. Even in the midst of the most violent storms of the revolution, the law of nations has not received the slightest injury in France. The envoy of the British government entered twice into the territory of the republic, and departed from it free and respected, although he was justly suspected to have come rather to excite troubles than to negotiate peace. The minister of Naples obtained permission to re-

turn to his master, and to continue his journey in a secure and uninterrupted manner, at the very moment when the French General had repulsed the Neapolitan troops, and when he was informed, that the ambassador of the republic had been refused passports to retire by land, and thus compelled to embark at Naples, with a certainty that such a measure was only to deliver him into the hands of the African states. The cruel treatment, to which the French have fallen victims in the dominions of the Grand Seignior, however great and just the national resentment on that account may have been, has not given rise to any reprisals. Let the congress of Rastadt, peaceable and respected as long as the French armies were near it, be compared with the congress thrown into confusion and dissolved on the approach of the Austrians; and let the voluntary departure of M. M. de Lehrbach and de Metternich, protected by French passports, be compared with the premeditated massacre of the ministers of the republic.

THESE different contrasts, already so odious, will become still more dishonourable to Austria by a comparison between the conduct of its satellites, whose cowardly ferocity is a subject of astonishment even to the northern nation called on to co-operate with them, and the conduct which the agents of an European government, the most determined enemy of the republic, have recently displayed at Constantinople. These agents evinced, that they

understood the law of nations, and set a value on preventing the violation of it. Is it possible then, that any people, that any government who may not have abjured every principle of civilization and of honour; can hesitate for a moment to declare itself in favour of good faith against perfidy,---in favour of continued moderation against unmasked ambition,---and in favour of abused confidence against atrocious and premeditated crimes? It is therefore with the just hope of being attended to with effect,---of inciting a just regret for the illustrious victims, who have been immolated at Rastadt,---and of obtaining for the French republic an honourable approbation, and an union of execration against Austria, that the Executive Directory now address this solemn appeal to the conscience and honour of every people and government. They accept, as a pledge of the generous determination which will be formed by every people, the particular indignation expressed with so much energy at Rastadt by all the members of the congress, and at Paris by the ambassadors and ministers of friendly or neutral powers.

THE Executive Directory decree, that the preceding manifesto shall be transmitted to all governments by the minister of the foreign department; that it shall be printed in the bulletin of the laws, and solemnly read, published, and affixed in all the communes of the republic, and be inserted in the general orders of all the armies.

BARRAS, President.

LAGARDE, Sec. General.

IV.

LETTER from Colonel BARBACSY to the Deputies at Rastadt, in reply to a note from them, respecting the Deputies Roberjot and Bonnier.

I FEEL myself deeply oppressed with anxiety, occasioned by the account of an horrible act, which was perpetrated on the persons of the ministers of the French nation by some common plunderers, who had availed themselves of the protection of the night for that purpose. Your Excellencies must be persuaded, that in a breast, which may be hardened by battles, there still beats an heart which shudders at such cruelties, and is afflicted at so unnatural a revenge as that which has been perpetrated. I gave orders on the spur of the occasion, that an officer with a command should afford a safe escort, as far as the Rhine, to that part of the embassy which had the good fortune to escape. It has ever been the practice of my life to put in confinement every man under my command, who has been guilty of wanton trespasses.

WITH respect to the safe escort of the embassy in question, the situation of the country did not permit me to restrain my troops from over-running that neighbourhood. I am convinced, that no danger would have arisen, nor would this cruel act have been committed by any criminals blinded by a thirst for plunder, if the French embassy, who had twenty-four hours to arrange their affairs, had

set out on their journey in the day-time. I beg your Excellencies will vouchsafe to believe, that I remain, with the profoundest reverence,

Your obedient servant,

VON BARBACSY, Colonel.

V.

EXAMINATION of the four coachmen belonging to the Margrave of Baden, who were to have driven the French plenipotentiaries to Seltz.

IN compliance with the demand of the subdelegation of Baden, the undersigned proceeded to the examination of the four coachmen, who were yesterday evening to have conducted the French ministers by the way of Plittersdorff to Seltz.

I. **ANDREW CASPARD** declares in his deposition, that he drove the carriage of the Minister Jean Debry ;---That at his departure, he had been ordered by the Minister Bonnier to answer, in case he should be stopped and asked whom he drove, that they were the French ministers ;---That he was stopped by some of the royal Imperial hussars, at the entrance of the valley of Rheinau :---That the aforesaid question was put to him, to which he gave the answer as directed :---That being asked where Bonnier was, and the name of the person whom he drove? he answered, Bonnier was in the

second carriage, and Jean Debry in his :---That on this information, a greater number of hussars rode up to the carriage, and dragged out of it the minister Debry and the ladies with him, and immediately attacked the former with their sabres, pulled the women after them, and searched them : That he himself received a blow with the flat of a sabre, on which he dropped down between his horses : That he was then asked who he was, and having answered he was coachman of the Margrave, he was assured no injury would be done to him.

2. JAMES OHNWEILER deposes, that he saw Jean-Debry receive several blows with sabres ; but at the same time some hussars rode up to his carriage which was the third, and asked him who was in it? That having answered he drove Bonnier, several hussars rode up to the door on both sides of the carriage, and cried, *Alight, Bonnier* : That they instantly broke the windows, dragged the minister out, and massacred him before his eyes at the side of his saddle-horse : That they afterwards plundered the minister, and the contents of the carriage ; That he also thought he heard Bonnier make lamentations in French, and pronounce the word *pardonnez*.

3. JAMES WEISS deposes, that he drove the fourth carriage, in which was the Secretary of Legation Rosenthal :---That he saw Debry and Bonnier dragged out of the carriages which were before :---That the treatment experienced by the former happen-

ed at too great a distance for him to make observations, but he distinctly heard the hussars cry, *where is Bonnier* ? That he saw them drag Bonnier out of the carriage, strike him at the same time with their sabres on the legs, and cut him to pieces, when he fell on the ground : That with respect to Roberjot the hussars, after the massacre of Bonnier, galloped to his carriage, and cut him to pieces : ---That Roberjot, bathed as he was in his blood, giving some signs of life, a hussar on foot struck him six times with his sabre.

4. THE fourth coachman deposes, that his carriage was at the same time attacked by the hussars : ---That he was asked the name of the minister whom he drove, but as he did not know, they applied to the servant on the coach-box ; and having learned that it was Roberjot, they said, *Ab, 'tis he* !---That they opened the door, dragged out the minister, and, by the order of one of the under-officers who spoke Hungarian, massacred him in a horrible manner, stripped him of his clothes, and renewed their attacks while there appeared the least sign of life :---That Madame Roberjot was also torn out of the carriage, and entreated them repeatedly in bad German to put her to death with her husband.

J. H. W. MULLER.

Done at Rastadt, 29th April.
in the presence of M. POSSELT.

VI.

REPORT of the Ministers Plenipotentiaries at Rastadt on the events of the 28th and 29th of April.

THE Imperial plenipotentiaries being recalled from Rastadt, and having quitted that town on the 13th of last month, the Deputation of the empire declared in its sitting of the 23d, that its functions were suspended, and notified to the French Legation the motives of that declaration. On the 25th the ministers of France also declared, that they would depart within three days.

IN the evening of the same day, the courier of the French Legation, furnished with a passport and his badge, and charged with dispatches for Strasbourg, was arrested on the road to Seltz, between the village of Plittersdorff and Rastadt, by some Austrian hussars, and conducted to the head-quarters of the Imperial Colonel Barbacfy at Gernsbach, after having had his papers taken from him. On the requisition of the French Legation, the Directorial envoy of Mentz, in the name of all the members of the Deputation, interposed his good offices in the same manner as the Prussian Legation, in order that, "according to the universal principles of the rights of nations, the courier, who had been arrested, should be set at liberty, and his dispatches returned; and that the security of the correspon-

dence of the French mission should not be interrupted during the short stay of three days fixed for their departure." This letter of the minister of Mentz was sent on the same night to Gernsbach by a courier, who returned with a short reply from Colonel Barbacsy, stating that " he had rendered an account to his superiors of the arrestation of the French courier; and that he could not yield to the views of the French Deputation until he received farther orders." The letter of the Prussian Legation was sent on the 25th at five in the morning, by the Count Bernstorff, Counsellor of the Legation, with an injunction to support the contents of it verbally. The French Legation having also addressed themselves to Baron D'Edelsheim, minister of state to the Margrave of Baden, to claim the protection of the Margrave, that minister judged it proper to accompany Count Bernstorff, and to make every representation suitable to the circumstances of the case to Colonel Barbacsy. The verbal answer of the Colonel was, that " he would transmit these representations to his superiors, along with the letter of the Prussian Legation, and that he would communicate the result as soon as possible; but that until then he could not, in any manner, farther explain himself." The account of the mission written by the Count de Bernstorff proves, that this refusal to explain himself was positive.

MEANWHILE the French ministers resolved to depart for Seltz on the third day, (the twenty-eighth,) at eight in the morning. Every prepara-

tion was made, and the carriages, loaded with their baggage, were already in the court of the castle. But looking at circumstances, --- considering that patrols of hussars were constantly passing on the road from Rastadt to Seltz, and that they had already on the nineteenth arrested several German ministers, and among others the minister of Wurtzburg from whom they had taken and detained his papers, --- considering besides, that the declarations of Colonel Barbacsy, both on this affair, and on the arrest of the French courier, were no way encouraging for the journey of the French Legation, it was impossible to be without some uneasiness on that subject; for it appeared at least possible, that the ministers might be arrested out of contempt; a transaction from which great inconvenience might result. For these reasons, all the diplomatic persons, who still communicated with the French ministers, advised them to defer their journey some hours or to the next day; the reply of Colonel Barbacsy to the representations of the ministers of Prussia, Mentz, and Baden, being expected every moment.

THE French ministers yielded to this advice, particularly on the observation, that it was proper to wait the result of the steps taken by the other ministers, towards whom the French Legation testified much gratitude. As at eleven in the morning no answer had arrived, the minister of Mentz, Baron D'Albini, wrote again to Colonel Barbacsy, and required from him a categorical reply to this

question: "Whether the French ministers, who were ready to depart, and who were furnished with passports from him (D'Albini,) were likely to meet with any interruption?" It was hoped, that the officer of the Margrave of Baden, who was dispatched with this letter, would return about three or four o'clock in the afternoon with a reply; but these expectations were disappointed.

IN the evening, between seven and eight o'clock, an officer of hussars arrived with some soldiers. The officer proceeded immediately to the ministers of France and Mentz in the castle, according to the testimony of the under-designed ministers, the Counts de Goertz, de Dohm, and de Solms, who were present,---begged them to excuse Colonel Barbacsy, who was too busy to reply in writing; but he declared in his name, that the French ministers might travel in perfect safety, and that the term of twenty-four hours was fixed for that purpose. As to the Prussian Legation, they received no answer from Colonel Barbacsy either written or verbal.

THE Imperial officer delivered a letter to the French ministers; M. de Dohm is the only other minister who saw it, and that was by accident.* He guarantees its contents to be as follows:

* It happened that M. de Dohm, who, with the other diplomatic persons, was eager to know the object of the Imperial officer's mission, and the arrival of the troops, passed before the chamber of the Secretary of Legation, Rosenthal, as he came out of that of Jean Debry, where the

MINISTERS,

You will easily conceive, that no French citizen can be tolerated within the chain of posts occupied by the Imperial troops ; you will therefore excuse me if I find myself obliged to signify to you, that you must quit Rastadt in the space of twenty-four hours.

BARBACSY.

Gernsbach, 28th April.

THE French ministers resolved to depart immediately, and would not be dissuaded by the observation, that they could not arrive at the Rhine before night, and that the passage of the river might then be dangerous. They set out on the twenty-eighth, within half an hour after they received the above letter, in four carriages, chiefly drawn by horses belonging to the Margrave. With the officer who brought the letter, there arrived fifty of the hussars of Szekler, who were posted at the gate of Etlingen, and had caused the other gates to be occupied in the same manner. It was soon known, that an order was given to allow no person belonging to the congress to enter or to leave the

three French ministers had assembled. Citizen Rosenthal had then the letter alluded to in his hand, which, of his own accord, he gave to M. de Dohm to read ; and while the Secretary wrote a receipt, which was required by the Imperial officer, he (M. de Dohm) had time to read the letter twice over with attention.

town. The captain of the hussars signified to Major Harrant, commander of the troops of Baden, that the soldiers of the Margrave should remain at the gates to point out to the Austrians the persons belonging to the congress, whose passage in or out of the town was prohibited. Notwithstanding this restriction of the prohibition to the members of the congress, no person whatever was permitted to pass even the bridge of communication between the town and the suburbs. The commandant of the town himself could not obtain leave to go without the gates, though he demanded it very pressingly when he was informed of subsequent events. The Danish minister had fixed his departure for the same day, and only waited the result of the steps taken by the Deputation relative to the French ministers. After having learned the reply of Colonel Barbacsy, he went home to make preparations for his journey. But on being informed as he passed near the gate, that no person was permitted to go out of the town, he crossed the garden of the castle towards the causeway, where the captain of the hussars was posted with his troop, and asked if he might depart that evening. The officer replied, that he was ordered to allow no person to pass; but when he was informed, that the French ministers were summoned to depart, and that they were that moment leaving the town by the gate of Rheinau, the captain replied, that he had no orders to prevent the departure of the French Legation. The minister of his Danish Majesty afterwards asked, if he would

give them an escort : he said he had no orders to do that. When it was strongly represented to him how much the honour of the German nation required, that every means should be taken to prevent any disorder from happening on the departure of the ministers, the captain replied, that he had nothing to do but to provide for his own security ; adding also this remark, that the Imperial plenipotentiaries had gone away a sufficient time ago to have allowed all the other German envoys to depart.

WHEN the members of the French Legation presented themselves at the gate of the town, they were informed that they could not be allowed to pass. The three ministers immediately alighted, and leaving their carriages with their families and suite, proceeded to the minister of Mentz in the castle. No one could reconcile this contradiction, the order to leave the town within twenty-four hours, and the obstacle opposed to the departure of the ministers at the gates of the town. The envoy of his Danish Majesty, who had, after this new incident, repaired with several others to the minister of Mentz, gave an explanation, founded on his conversation with the captain of hussars ; and this explanation was soon after officially confirmed by M. de Munich, secretary of Legation, who had been sent to that officer by M. D'Albini. He stated, that when the Imperial officer took possession of the gates of the town, and ordered that no person should be permitted to pass, he had forgot

to except the French ministers from that order : but M. de Munich added, that this neglect was now repaired, and that the ministers might depart without interruption. The French Legation thought it necessary to demand a military escort, in order that they might not be stopped by the patrols, which they would probably meet on their road, as far as Plittersdorff. The secretary of the Legation of Mentz charged himself with requesting this escort from the Captain, and the French envoys proceeded in a carriage of the Margrave's to join the others at the gate. They were obliged to wait there a long time for the answer, which was at last brought by M. de Harrant, a Major in the service of the Margrave of Baden, and stated, that " the captain could not give an escort, because he had no orders to that effect; but that the French ministers would find no interruption in their route." On Major Harrant's asking, if it was to be understood by this answer, that the French ministers might pass to the other side of the Rhine in safety, and if he might give them that assurance, the captain answered *Yes*. After some deliberation, the plenipotentiaries preferred departing immediately, without an escort, to returning to the castle and waiting there until next morning,---a step to which several persons advised them, and which the women were anxious they should take. At last between nine and ten o'clock the French ministers left the town: the night was very dark, and torches were carried before the carriages.

A QUARTER of an hour had scarcely passed, when the news arrived from different quarters, that the French Legation had been arrested by the violence of some Austrian hussars, who had struck the coachmen and the bearers of the flambeaus with their sabres. The greater part of the members of the diplomatic corps were at this time assembled in Cassino. The Ligurian envoy, Boccardi, and his brother, who had escaped, brought the first intelligence of the affair. It was instantly determined, that the different ministers should repair to the captain to demand an explanation, and, above all, the most speedy succours. In a few minutes after this, the report arrived that *one*,---that *two*,---that all the *three* French ministers were assassinated by the Emperor's soldiers. . . . To reason such a crime appeared improbable, and the heart could not believe it possible ;---it was the universal opinion, that the report was false. The desire, however, of terminating as soon as possible a disagreeable uncertainty, caused the deputies to hasten towards the commanding officer, whose quarters were about twenty paces distant from the gate of Etlingen, at the inn called *The Lantern*. The guard of the gate would not allow them to pass, altho' they declared themselves to be the envoys of the regal and princely courts ; and it was not without the greatest trouble, that an inferior officer was prevailed upon to announce their arrival. They were again asked what envoys they were : and it was declared to them with a troublesome exactness, that only *three*, *four*, or *six* ministers could be

permitted to go to the captain : at last that officer appeared. Count de Goertz, the underdesigned envoy of his Prussian Majesty, in the name of all the other deputies, made a short statement to the captain, requesting to know what measures he had taken in consequence of the melancholy intelligence which had doubtless reached him. He replied, that in consequence of the application of the minister of Mentz, who had already called upon him, he had dispatched an officer with two hussars. We thought that this was not sufficient, and we entreated him in the name of all the sentiments of humanity,---in the name of the welfare of Europe, and of the German nation about to be stained by a crime unparalleled in the annals of civilized countries,---in the name of his august sovereign, --- in the name of the honour of his Imperial Majesty's service,---in the name of his own honour, and of his life, to take as quickly as possible every measure in his power to save whoever could be saved. The captain replied, that the affair was an unfortunate mistake : that doubtless the patrols roamed about the environs during the night ; that such a misfortune might easily happen, and that the French ministers should not have departed at night. He was reminded that he had refused an escort, and that he had said to Major Harrant there was nothing to fear for the French Legation ; he replied, that he had no orders to give an escort, and that it should have been asked from the commandant. Count Bernstorff, counsellor of the Prussian Legation, said, that he himself asked the

Colonel, when he was sent to him, for an escort: "Did he grant it to you?" was the captain's reply. The undersigning envoy of Denmark having afterwards reminded him of the conversation which he had with him as stated above, "Would you," said he, "establish an inquisition upon me?" Finally, passing from all considerations which we ought to have felt after the treatment we were obliged to endure, we pressed, prayed and supplicated him not to lose a moment in endeavouring to save what lives he was able, and to rescue the honour of his service. He asked us, where the carriages of the ministers were, and required other explanations from us, whom his orders retained prisoners in the town,--- from us, who came to him to obtain information, and to learn what measures he had taken to prevent, if possible, a crime which so nearly concerned his own honour and that of his sovereign. At last we procured from him the promise of detaching an officer and six hussars to accompany Major Harrant and two hussars of Baden, on the great road of Plittersdorff.

MEANWHILE there arrived several fugitives from the field of carnage, who confirmed the report that the French ministers had been assassinated by the hussars of Szekler. The murder of Bonnier was reported by an eye-witness, viz. the flambeau-bearer. Major Harrant of Baden, with whom there was only a Marechal-de-logis instead of an officer as had been promised, found the carriages on the spot where the scene of horror had passed. They

were surrounded by about fifty hussars of Szekler holding flambeaus (among whom however he could not discover any officers), and employed in conducting around the town the carriages, and the unfortunate persons within them, who were still in a state of profound stupor. When M. de Harrant declared to the hussars, that the carriages must be brought into the town, they would not at first listen to him, *maintaining that they were their booty*. It was not without the strongest menaces, and after M. de Harrant had declared to them that, in his quality as commandant, the disposition of the carriages belonged exclusively to him, that he succeeded in making them desist from their project. M. de Harrant found the dead bodies of Roberjot and Bonnier on the ground, horribly mangled; but not finding the body of Jean Debry, he took every imaginable pains in searching for it. He even proposed to search for it in the forest, and for that purpose demanded an escort of some Austrian hussars, who had joined him and the two hussars who accompanied him. But this escort was refused him, under the pretext that other Austrian patrols might easily be met with, and that in the obscurity of the night they might run the risk of being attacked. M. de Harrant was, therefore, obliged to delay the execution of his design until day-light; but in the meantime he brought the carriages into the city. The wives of Jean Debry and Roberjot, the daughters of the former, and the domestics, came with him: none of them were wounded, though several of them had been robbed of

their money, watches, &c.; the three ministers only were attacked by the *murderers*. The carriages stopped before the castle: every one hastened to approach the unfortunate persons, who were in them, in order to give them assistance. But all were kept back without distinction, even the most considerable of the foreign ministers; because no officer being present, it was found necessary to wait for orders.

At last permission was obtained to carry to the apartments of M. de Jacobi, minister of the King of Prussia, Madame Roberjot, who was extended half dead in her carriage which stopped before the door of that minister. Madame Debry and her two daughters were obliged to descend from their carriage into the street, on the pretext that carriages were never permitted to enter the court of the castle. They were conducted to the gate of Erlangen: the horses of the court were demanded to conduct them the next day to Gernsbach; but this was countermanded the same day. The women were conducted on foot to their former lodgings in the castle by several members of the diplomatic corps; but they were soon after removed to the house of the undersigning minister of Brandenburg, in order that they might be more within the reach of succour. The details of the assassination of Roberjot were learned from his valet-de-chambre, who was in the same carriage. He deposed that, "some hussars presented themselves at the door of the coach, broke the glasses, and asked

the minister if he was Roberjot, upon which the minister answered *yes* in French, at the same time producing the passport of the Directorial envoy of Mentz; that the hussars tore this passport, that they forced the minister out of his carriage, and struck him several very violent blows; that Roberjot still giving some signs of life, and his wife having cried, *save him, save him*, the hussars redoubled their blows; that Madame Roberjot then threw herself on the body of her husband; but that he (the valet-de-chambre) seized her fast in his arms, and covered her ears to prevent her from hearing the groans of her dying husband; that he (the valet-de-chambre) had been dragged out of the carriage by a hussar, who asked him if he was a servant; and having answered in the affirmative, the hussars gave him to understand by signs, that he had nothing to fear for himself; that notwithstanding this, his watch and purse were taken from him, and that Madame Roberjot experienced the same usage." It was remarked, however, by several of us, that the carriage was not entirely pillaged, but that money and valuable effects were left in it. When Madame Roberjot came out of her carriage, she fell repeatedly into fits, calling out frequently, "They have torn him away from me, before my eyes!"

THE Secretary of Legation Rosenthiel, who was in the last of the carriages, and consequently nearest the town, escaped through the gardens about the commencement of the affair. He was found at

the house of the minister of Baden, in a state of delirium. All the other persons attached to the French Legation arrived in succession, either as fugitives on foot, or with the carriages. The minister Jean Debry was still missing; no proof of his death was established by eye-witnesses; it was therefore considered as absolutely essential, that every thing should be attempted to save him. Some of us applied to the Captain of the Austrian hussars, and solicited him to grant an escort to Major de Harrant, who, accompanied by some hussars of Baden, wished to go in search of Jean Debry. The undersigning Count de Solms de Laubach offered to accompany him, in order to call the French minister by his name, as his voice was known to Jean Debry. The captain granted the escort; and at day-break about four in the morning, Count Solms, Major Harrant, and two hussars of Baden, under the escort of a corporal and four Imperial hussars, mounted on horseback, went to search the environs, and particularly the forests of Steinmaner and Plittersdorff. They had not the satisfaction of finding the minister Jean Debry, but they learned some circumstances connected with the transaction. Major Harrant having addressed himself to the Baillie of Rheinau to obtain information of the absent minister, the Baillie informed him, that some Imperial hussars had already made very strict inquiries relative to a wounded Frenchman, whose discovery, they said, was of great importance to them; that they had recommended strongly, in case a Frenchman should be found resembling the

person they described, to take care not to conduct him to Raftadt, but to make him pass without the town, and bring him to them at Muckenstrum by a road which they pointed out ; or simply to take care of him, and give them notice of his being found.

EVERY thing had hitherto been done to ameliorate, as much as possible, this horrible state of things : the present business was to provide for the safety of the members of the diplomatic body and their families. The undersigned, therefore, addressed themselves to Colonel Barbacfy, by a letter (No. V.) with which M. Jordan, secretary of the Prussian Legation, was charged, who set out at four in the morning of the twenty-ninth, accompanied by an Imperial ordonnance. At seven in the morning, Jean Debry came to the house of the Prussian minister M. de Goertz ; and his appearance caused as much pleasure to those who were present, as the state, in which he was, inspired them with interest. They were the witnesses of the first transports of his joy, and his gratitude to Providence, when he learned that his wife and children were still in life. His clothes were torn ; he was wounded in the left arm, the shoulder, and the nose : his wig and his hat had saved him from the cut of a sabre in such a manner, that he only received a contusion from the blow. Every necessary succour was immediately administered to him, and we heard the affecting relation of the miraculous manner in which he had escaped. " A hussar asked

him in French, if he was Jean Debry? to which he answered in the affirmative, and produced his passport, which was instantly torn. He, his wife, and his daughters, were then dragged out of the carriage. The hussars struck him, and threw him into a ditch by the side of the highway: he had the presence of mind to counterfeit death, and to allow himself to be stripped; and this saved him. When the hussars went off, he rose and ran into the forest: not wishing to lay himself down on the ground which was wet with rain, and notwithstanding the severe wound in his left arm, he climbed a tree, where he slumbered from time to time, in consequence of lassitude and fatigue. He remained there until morning, when he proceeded towards Raftadt. On approaching the town, he mingled with the multitude, who had come out to see the dead bodies; and without being observed either by the Austrian patrols, or the guards posted at the gate, he arrived safely in the town. The most distressing spectacle for him was the dead bodies of his two colleagues, by which he was obliged to pass."

THE answer of the Colonel had not yet arrived; but in the meantime we were extremely desirous, that those of the French Legation who were saved should have an opportunity of passing the Rhine. M. M. Rosenkranz and Gemmingen, therefore, waited on the captain about nine o'clock, and stated to him, that as soon as the situation of Jean Debry and the widow of Roberjot would permit them

to be removed, they would proceed to the Rhine with their effects under the escort of the military of Baden, if the captain would answer for their safety on his honour, and give them the escort of an officer and a few hussars. After having started some difficulties, the captain granted this request, but required that it should be presented to him in writing, which was done. During this conversation, several expressions dropped from the captain which deserve notice.---“ It was a misfortune, but who was to blame?---it was not ordered !” M. M. Rosenkranz and Gemmingen expressed to him the horror, which they thought the mere mention of such a supposition ought to excite in the mind of every man of honour. He then endeavoured to extenuate the crime by saying,---“ Our generals have been killed also.” The sensations which such discourse could not fail to excite in us, since it was held by a man to whom our safety was confided, were only capable of being calmed by the answer of Colonel Barbacsy, which M. de Jordan at last brought about eleven o'clock. He had not seen the Colonel himself ; on his arrival, he sent notice to him, that he came not only in the name of the Prussian Legation, but of all the Deputation of the Empire assembled at Rastadt. The reply he received was, *that the Colonel could not speak to him, even though he were come in the name of God the Father and God the Son.* M. de Jordan had indeed much trouble in engaging the Captain, whom he met at Rotenfels, to transmit his letter, because, said he, “ the Colonel has already received couriers and e-tafettes enough during the night.” The reason

why M. Jordan was detained so long, was a false report circulated at Gernsbach of an attack being made by the French on the side of Rastadt. The letter of the Colonel, however, announced a man of honour and humanity : he promised an escort for the French Legation ; as for us, he declared it was useless and inconvenient that we should accompany them.

EVERY measure was immediately adopted for a speedy departure. The physician and the surgeon were of opinion, that the journey would be less dangerous to Jean Debry, than the continuation of the alarming crisis in which he was placed. He and Madame Roberjot were equally desirous of setting out ; and our sentiments coincided with theirs. The captain had received orders to accompany them ; but declared, that he was expressly prohibited from allowing us to do so, and that the German Legations might retire to their own states, but not towards the Rhine. However disgusting this treatment was, our representations might have created farther delays : we were therefore silent. Baron de Gemmingen began to stipulate for the conditions of the journey. The escort was to consist of Major de Harrapt with six hussars of Baden, and an Imperial officer with eight hussars of Szekler. M. de Jordan, the Prussian secretary, who had become acquainted with these troops in consequence of his mission to Gernsbach, was the only person who obtained permission to accompany the carriages ; and his company afforded much satisfaction to the per-

sons attached to the French Legation. They commenced their departure for the third time at one o'clock. Was it surprising to see these unfortunate victims covered with the paleness of death on exposing themselves anew to the greatest dangers, or to find that it was impossible for us to convince them that they had nothing to fear? They seemed to place confidence in our assurances; but among themselves, and to those who were near them they whispered, *We are going to death,---we shall be assassinated.* Jean Debry took leave of his wife, who was big with child, and his daughters, in the most affecting manner. M. Rosenthal recommended his family, who had long been at Strasburg, to his brother-in-law M. Wieland, counsellor of the Legation of Weimar. Our reason blamed them; but could it be expected, that they should have already forgotten what had happened? They were shocked to see among their escort the uniform of their murderers. God be praised, their terrible apprehensions were vain: the journey was made without any disagreeable accident.

THE escort of Imperial hussars increased on the road to about the number of thirty men, and it was not yet known whether the French or the Austrians occupied Plittersdorf: the latter were however found at that place. After having travelled five hours, the ferry-boat was hailed with a trumpet, and every person belonging to the French Legation was soon embarked. It is impossible to describe the expression which appeared on all their

countenances ; it was the transition from the fear of a terrible death to the hope of being saved. No words can express the gratitude they testified towards Major de Harrant and M. de Jordan. Jean Debry also thanked the Imperial officer of the escort in a few words, which M. de Harrant translated to him. He assured him, that although it was impossible to forget the past, he should always remember the escort he had at least obtained ; and that if ever the fortune of war should occasion any of his regiment to fall into the hands of the French, he would do his utmost to make this last action be recollected, and to repress every sentiment of vengeance. He made a present to the escort ; and on leaving Rastadt, his wife gave one hundred louis to Baron d'Edlesheim for the poor of the town. In half an hour they reached the French side of the Rhine : the horrible crime was not yet known there ; and according to the report of the coachmen of the Margrave who are returned, Jean Debry himself endeavoured to prevent it from being immediately known. M. M. Harrant and Jordan returned to Rastadt, which the German Legations had left at five o'clock. Not having heard any accounts of the travellers, they had every reason to believe, that they had accomplished their journey in safety.

THE undersigning attest upon their honour and their duty, that all the facts above stated are most correctly true. We have been eye-witnesses of the greater part of these events, and we have verified

the others with the most scrupulous attention, upon the evidences of persons who were present and concerned in the transactions. We have had only in view to ascertain facts in all their purity, and place them beyond the reach of any future misrepresentation. We have avoided as much as possible giving any opinion of our own, making any observation, or yielding to the impulse of sensibility.

The Count de GOERTZ.

The Baron de JACOB, de DOHM, de
ROSENKRANZ, de RECHBERG, de
REEDEN.

The Baron de GATZERT.

The Count de SOLMS-LAUBACH.

The Baron OTTO de GEMMINGEN.

The Baron de KREUSN.

The Count de TAUBE.

Carlruhe, May 1. 1799.

VII.

IMPERIAL Aulic Decree to the German Diet, respecting the late catastrophe near Rafladt, given in on the 11th June.

His Imperial Majesty received on the 3d ult. the melancholy intelligence, in a report signed by the Margrave of Baden himself, that the French

ministers plenipotentiary, sent to the congress of peace with the empire, were stopped late in the evening of the twenty-eighth of April on their departure in the night from Rastadt, (against which they had been advised by several persons,) at a small distance from that city by a troop of people dressed in the Imperial military uniform; that the ministers Bonnier and Roberjot were murdered by many cuts of sabres; that the minister Jean Debry, who escaped from death only by an happy accident, had been much wounded; and that all of them were robbed of a great part of their effects. His Majesty is scarcely able to express by words the great shock his sentiments of justice and morality have received, and the whole force of the impression of abhorrence which has been excited in him, on the first account of this act of barbarity, committed, on the territory of the German empire, upon persons whose inviolability was under the special guarantee of the right of nations. Neither can he express the indelible impression this disastrous catastrophe has left in his mind, which always entertains the most inviolable respect for the dignity of man, for morality, and for the sacred principles of the law of nations.

It is not by illiberal suspicion and rash conjectures, not by luminous imputations and partial reports of audacious fictions, nor by the passionate sallies of a depraved heart, and the licentious fabrications of foreign and domestic editors of public

journals: it is not by inimical representations, calculated for an increase of power, exactions of money, or other secret designs, nor by furious speeches in conventions, and vindictive proclamations to the French nation and all other states; but only by a conscientious, fair, and impartial inquiry, instituted according to the prescription of the laws, and conducted with every juridical rigour, that the horrid act can be traced in all its circumstances, its authors and accomplices discovered, and the imputation of the offence properly fixed both in a subjective and objective view. For these purposes the most eligible directions and orders have accordingly been given; and his Imperial Majesty at the same time most solemnly declares before the general Diet of the empire, the whole people of Germany, and all Europe together, that nothing short of the most perfect satisfaction, regardless of all other considerations, will gratify the just feelings of the chief of the empire, respecting him whom the impartial sentence of avenging justice may pronounce guilty.

It is also the will of his Majesty the Emperor, that the manner in which this melancholy event happened,---an event which he considers in various respects as a national concern of Germany, be examined with the most conscientious impartiality, and the most perfect satisfaction given. To this he himself is most urgently induced by the domestic and foreign opinions encroaching on the legal inquiry, the decision of which is thereby prejudged.

His Majesty farther cherishes the most ardent wish, that even the possibility of a suspicion of any connivance be removed ; so that in this respect no sort of blame, owing to a want of the most deliberate attention, shall be attributed either to the chief of the empire himself, or to the empire collectively taken. In order to accomplish this design most effectually, the general Diet is hereby charged, upon mature deliberation, to appoint deputies to be present at the inquiry which has been opened. They will moreover give every advice, with a patriotic and noble frankness, as to the steps which are to be taken as soon as possible, with regard to whatever the importance of so unheard of and detestable an event may, in their wisdom and prudence, seem to require. They will thus, by giving their united advice, convince the impartial world, that the Emperor and empire are animated with the same sentiments for the execution of the most rigorous justice, and granting the most perfect satisfaction ; and that they are inspired with an equal and just abhorrence of so ruthless and infamous an act, as well as with an equal and dutiful respect for morality, and the sacred principles of the law of nations. His Roman and Imperial Majesty, therefore, expects the advice of the empire with all possible speed, and with all the fervency of his wishes as chief of the empire. His Majesty remains in other respects, &c.

FRANCIS, Emperor.

Done at Vienna, June 6th, 1799.

ON the 12th June the members of the Germanic Diet held a conference, in which the following resolutions were agreed upon, respecting the Imperial Aulic Decree :

1mo, The deliberations upon the decree of his Imperial Majesty shall commence on the 12th of July.

2do, The Imperial commissioner shall be asked, whether the decree implies a deputation of the states, or individuals of the empire.

3tio, THAT, in the latter case Ratisbon shall be proposed to the Emperor as the place of discussion ; but in the former case, a safe place, not too distant from that where the deed was perpetrated, shall be proposed to his Imperial Majesty.

4to, ONLY a deputation of four states of the empire shall be desired, which, including the Imperial cities, shall consist of two electoral and two princely deputies.

5to, THAT the French government shall afterwards be invited to delegate some person to assist in the inquiry, and to communicate the legal depositions of the injured parties.

6to, THAT the Emperor shall be intreated to give directions to the Military Commission, which is

already subsisting, to communicate all its proceedings to the Deputation, and to make the said Commission conform itself to the propositions of the latter.

7mo, The Deputation shall be provided with unlimited powers.

8vo, Both the Deputation and Military Commission shall be instructed either to agree together upon a sentence, or to send the acts of their deliberation to impartial quarters.

